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The Philippines was a former Spanish possession acquired by the United States 
(US) in the aftermath of the Spanish-American War of 1898.  Although officials 
did not originally intend to acquire the islands, unlike Cuba and Puerto Rico, the 
then President, William McKinley, ultimately decided to do so.  Throughout the 
years the US exercised sovereignty in the Philippines, it gradually introduced 
political and economic reforms normally associated with liberal democracy.  In 
comparison to other colonisers however, the US introduced such reforms relatively 
early.     
 
This thesis analyses the motives behind the introduction of selected political and 
economic reforms in the Philippine Islands from 1898 to 1916. This period was 
selected as the US had by then reached the zenith of its control over its only 
formal colony.  The thesis examines the circumstances and motivations of US 
officials and politicians involved. It analyses how prevailing interests, ideas, and 
institutions (Hall 1997), especially among Washington-based actors, such as 
Congress, the President and their key appointees involved in the Philippines (i.e. 
Secretary of War and Governor General), played a role and at times worked 
together toward the gradual political and economic liberalisation of the islands.  
Key reform initiatives examined in this thesis include the passage of the 1902 
Organic Act (also known as the first constitution of the Islands given by the US), 
certain tariff acts, inquiries on distributing religious landholdings, and the passage 
of the 1916 Philippine Bill (also known as the ‘Jones Law’).  This thesis also revisits 
and surveys some of the developments the colonial government introduced such 
as the introduction of education and early efforts at land redistribution as well as 
the motives behind such initiatives.  This thesis demonstrates how political and 
economic motivations in Washington, alongside external circumstances, shaped 
the gradual introduction of institutions otherwise associated with a liberal 
democracy.  Overall, this thesis argues that although there were benefits for the 
Filipinos, the US found the introduction of such reforms necessary given their 
broader motives. 
 
This thesis makes use of archived newspaper articles, letters shared between US 
officials, and official Congressional and colonial documents to support the 
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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION 
 
OVERVIEW 
This thesis analyses how the United States (US) was motivated to introduce liberal 
political and economic institutions in its Asian colony, the Philippines at a relatively 
early stage (1898-1916) compared to other Western colonisers.  The question that 
concerns this thesis is what the possible drivers of pertinent policies were and 
whether such drivers could act as standalone explanations that have not been 
informed by other possible explanations or dynamics.  It is an interesting study 
as this is a fairly unique phenomenon among those who colonisers.  It is also 
essential as Chapter 2 will show that most existing scholarship offers mostly 
empirical explanations for the American colonisation in the Philippines. 
 
In light of the foregoing, this introductory chapter focuses on establishing how the 
US was an unusual colonial power.  The second section briefly describes of some 
of the reforms that the subsequent chapters will discuss.  The third section will 
also identify the major features of other major colonies and how their colonisers 
treated them, and when they featured reforms to liberalise their colonies.  The 
choice of colonial relationships is based on whether the coloniser was a major 
global power at about the beginning of twentieth century (although some of these 
powers have actually begun colonising their colonies well before this point).  For 
the most part, the relationships will feature a Western coloniser and a non-
Western colony.  The exception to this will be the British-Australian colonial 
relationship.  Discussing that demonstrates how a Western coloniser's treatment 
of a non-Western colony differed from the relationship between a Western and 
non-Western colony.  Hence, it reinforces that the relationship between the 
Western US coloniser and the non-Western Philippines is unique, given how the 
former introduced colonial reforms in the latter.    As Chapter 7 discusses, 
education is one of the first reforms introduced in the Philippines.  Hence, this 
chapter will show when it was present in the other colonial relationships.  Another 
thing that will be highlighted is when the reforms that provided opportunities for 
political participation in these colonies were introduced relative to when 
colonisation began.   
 
Given what the section contains, the fourth section will discuss the thesis’ main 
focus, significance, and implications.   The final section will outline how the rest of 
the thesis will proceed and in doing so, reiterate that the at various times, the 
outcomes of introducing more liberal reforms early on were made as a result of 
the interaction of beliefs or values (ideas); norms, constraints and institutional 
set-ups (institutions); and material and electoral agendas and motivations 
(interests).  Ideas, institutions, and interests are each referred to in general as 
the Is.      
 
THE UNITED STATES: A UNIQUE COLONISER 
The Philippines was the United States’ (US) only colony in the Asia-Pacific region.  
Officials did not intend to colonise it in their initial plans during the Spanish-
American War and it was regarded largely as an afterthought.  However, 
politicians and other officials came up with several justifications to assume 
sovereignty over the Philippines from Spain.  As Chapter 5 will show, officials often 
articulated the move to acquire Philippines in terms of these officials’ interests.  
These interests would include their ability to establish a naval base in the Western 
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Pacific and a better footing to access China.  What was notable, however, is that 
US officials introduced various politically liberal reforms relatively early on in the 
colony and although Filipinos experienced the benefits of such reforms to varying 
degrees, there are indications that the reforms were not introduced to solely 
benefit the Philippines.  There were interests and other deeply rooted ideas that 
contributed to this.  At the same time, there were institutions both in the 
Philippines, US, and internationally that the US had to deal with and were 
constrained to work with.   
 
The US was nonetheless unique in among colonisers in its approach to political 
liberalisation in the Philippines in that a) the Philippines was a non-Western colony, 
and b) the US was introducing such reforms relatively early.  This was an 
unprecedented move in comparison to concurrent colonisers.  Among the key 
things the US introduced relatively early in the Philippines include a constitution 
for the colony that allowed its inhabitants a greater say over a wide range of 
affairs, a formal education system, land redistribution, and a relatively free trade 
regime.   As will be seen in the next section, one or more similar moves towards 
liberalisation came relatively late among European colonies.  
 
EUROPEAN COLONIAL EXPERIENCES: A BRIEF SUMMARY 
The European colonial experiences show here that Western colonisers introduced 
reforms associated with liberal democracies relatively late to non-‘white’ colonies.  
Moreover, in cases where the introduction of such reforms was relatively early, it 
was not as robust as what the US would introduce in the Philippines. 
 
French in Algeria (1830-1962) 
Before 1865, French settlements emerged along the coast and Muslim and Berber 
areas in the interior part of the territory were under military governance, 
especially those occupied by Algerian Muslims.  The French state seized land what 
they deemed as unused and as a consequence, indigenous algerians were pushed 
to the margins (Christelow, 2005: 52-53).  Algeria was eventually established as 
a colony to help decongest Mainland France (colonie de peuplement).   
 
Reforms intended to be liberalising were introduced only in the 1860s, though 
they only applied to the Western population living there rather than the indigenous 
Arabs.  
 
Muslims had no representation in France’s national assembly until the end of World 
War II.  Moreover, the Algerian Assembly did not exist until the 1940s.  This 
assembly was subsequently abolished in the Algerian War as it was seen to hinder 
the Lacoste administration (Lenze, 2016: 20)1.  It was replaced subsequently by 
the division of Algeria into five districts each with their own assembly.     
 
French officials had not paid much attention to education in the Algerian colony.  
However, when they did, the French colonisers hindered Algerians from building 
their own identity in this aspect.  The focus was instead on assimilating Algerians 
into French identities (Heggoy, 1973; Heggoy and Zingg, 1976).  Genuine 
 
1 In the midst of the Algerian War of Independence, the National Liberation Front had 
carried out a series of terrorist attacks and pied noir (people who were born in Algeria but 
had French or European heritage) interests.  As a consequence, French colonisers placed 
the colony under a state of emergency. 
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educational reforms came when the French strengthened their position in their 
African possessions from 1881 to 1919. However, such reforms were regarded as 
“too late” and offered “too little” and the number of schools built was insufficient 
to meet the needs of the Algerian territory (Heggoy and Zigg, 1976: 573).  As 
part of France’s educational legacy in Algeria, less than 5% of Algerian children 
attended school by 1870 and by 1954 about only 20% of Muslim boys and 6% of 
Muslim girls received formal education (Horne, 2006). 
 
French in Vietnam (1887-1954) 
The French colonisation of Vietnam was obtained as a consequence of France’s 
victory in the Sino-French War.  Among the key drivers of this were economic 
motivations, and rice and rubber were the main products.  Corvee or forced unpaid 
labour for males was also introduced in 1901 to help fill the need to construct 
essential infrastructure in the territory.   
 
Although the governor general exercised a significant amount of authority to 
interpret the colonial laws as he saw fit, political autonomy to benefit the locals 
was not considered until after the end of World War II when Ho Chi Minh attempted 
to negotiate for it only to end up in a French Indochina War until 1954. 
 
Education initiatives were seen in Vietnam relatively early and provided with the 
help of French missionaries.  French officials did not adopt a centralised colonial 
educational policy for Vietnam until 1918.  This centralisation of this educational 
policy was done because officials felt the teachers acted as troublemakers and 
rebels who sided with and can mobilise Vietnamese armed resistance against the 
French (Kelly, 1977: 96-97; Llewellyn et al., 2019).  Although the Americans 
wanted to introduce educational initiatives to Filipinos also as a way to discourage 
moves towards independence similar to the Vietnamese, a centralised education 
system was introduced much earlier in America’s colonial run.    
  
 
British Rule in India (1858-1947) 
The British ruled India in some form since the eighteenth century (as a fiefdom of 
the – privately owned - British East Indian Company) though direct rule by the 
British state (the ‘British Raj’), was formally introduced in 1858.  In addition, the 
Indian Councils Act of 1861 was theoretically intended to allow more Indians a 
greater say in local affairs than in previous iterations of such institutions.  
However, there was no room for Indians on the Council to discuss financial 
matters, and they could not take binding votes.  It was in the Government of India 
Act of 1919, which created a bicameral Indian legislature and allowed more 
participation by Indians (Kashyap, 1994).  However, at this point, only males who 
owned high-valued property were allowed to stand for representation in the said 
legislature (Ganguly, 2011).  The Indian set-up stands in contrast to the 
Philippines, which was colonised by the Americans for a fewer number of years 
before Filipino males who achieved a property or literacy requirement would be 
permitted to stand for colonial elected office2. 
 
When it came to education, primary education was provided primarily by Christian 
missionaries in the early days of direct British rule and less so by the British state 
itself.  The middle-class were responsible for financing their own education in the 
 
2 Please see Chapter 6 for a more extensive explanation. 
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1860s and the opportunities for women to educate themselves to the same degree 
as men were limited.  By 1900, less than 10 per cent of primary school-aged 
children in India attended any school (Chaudhary, 2017).  Between 1860s and 
1912, spending on education in the subcontinent was lowest among British 
colonies (Davis and Huttenback, 2009).    
 
Belgian Colonisation of Congo  
Belgian involvement in Congo took place in the late nineteenth century when 
Congo became personal property of the monarch at the time, King Leopold II, in 
an effort to enrich the monarch’s commercial interests in palm oil and rubber.  It 
was taken over by the Belgian state in 1908 and the focus was on developing the 
colony’s industrial and agricultural sector.  Forced labour became a feature of 
building the economic infrastructure.  When it came to political participation, as 
at 1951, native Congolese did not hold any positions in the central colonial 
administration apart from being consultants in consultative bodies (Wigny, 1951).  
One of the reasons for such exclusion was that the population was not educated 
to a level desired by colonial officials yet.  Education was largely the remit of 
religious organisations such as the Catholic Church.  A total of over seven percent 
of pupils had underwent formal education in Congo as at 1943 (Harris, 1946).  
 
Dutch Colonisation of Indonesia 
Although the presence of Dutch colonisers in Indonesia started in 1602 through 
the (privately owned) Dutch East India Company, direct rule by the state began 
in the 1800s.  The motivations for colonising was to extract spice and cash crops 
for profit (Booth et al., 1990).  It was initially characterised by a forced labour 
system known as the cultivation system whereby peasant farmers were required 
to hand over 20 percent of their harvest to the State.  It was abolished in the 
1870s during the start of the Liberal Period, which focused on introducing private 
capitalism into Indonesia (Vickers, 2005).  Living standards were, however, still 
undesirable at the turn of the 20th century (Indonesia-Investments, n.d.).   
 
Education, alongside irrigation and emigration was emphasised as part of The 
Ethical Policy only starting in 1901. As part of this, Dutch officials tolerated 
indigenous political movements.  However, as these movements became more 
radical, officials tightened the restrictions again on what it has seen as subversive 
acts and had led to the establishment of the Indonesian Nationalist Party 
(Indonesia-Investments, n.d.). 
 
British Colonisation of Australia – A “White” Colony 
Australia was a special case as it involved “White” subjects that the British would 
colonise.  The motivation for colonising Australia was less about extracting crops 
as it was more about managing prison populations in Britain as relatively minor 
offences (e.g. petty theft) were punishable by transportation and exile.  
Furthermore, as the US declared independence from the British empire in the 
1770s, it meant fewer options for the British Empire to send its convicts (Ballyn, 
2011).  Most of the prisoners deployed there decided not to return to Britain upon 
completion of their sentences. 
 
When it came to liberal-democratic institutions, English law (including the Magna 
Carta and the Bill of Rights) was applicable into the Australian colony.  However, 
demands for representative and democratic government increased in the middle 
of the nineteenth century.  Limited self-government was granted to New South 
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Wales, Victoria, South Australia, and Tasmania in 1855, decades after Britain 
started settling the territories (ibid).    
 
THESIS’ MAIN FOCUS, IMPLICATIONS, AND SIGNIFICANCE 
As it can be seen from the cases just reviewed, essential liberal reforms were 
introduced relatively late by different colonisers relative to the US introducing 
similar such reforms in the Philippines.  For instance, in Vietnam, centralised 
colonial education was introduced over 20 years after the French exercised 
sovereignty over it whereas in the Philippines, it was much sooner.  India 
permitted propertied males several decades after direct British rule whereas 
Filipino counterparts received this less than 10 years after Americans ruled the 
Philippines.   
 
Therefore, based on the foregoing differences, this thesis seeks to explain why the 
United States decided to introduce liberal reforms in the Philippines at a relatively 
early stage.  As such, this thesis analyses the motives and environment behind 
the introduction of selected political and economic reforms in the Philippine Islands 
from 1898 to 1916.  This period is chosen as the US had by then reached the 
zenith of its control over its only formal colony.  The thesis examines the 
circumstances and motivations of US officials and politicians involved.  This is 
especially among Washington-based actors, such as Congress, the President and 
their key appointees involved in the Philippines (i.e. Secretary of War and 
Governor-General), played a role and at times worked together toward the gradual 
political and economic liberalisation of the islands.  The thesis will look at whether 
the given reasons are enough or how other reasons or factors played into the 
saliency of the given reasons using Hall’s (1997) ideas-institutions-interests 
framework, also known as the 3Is framework. 
 
Key reform initiatives examined in this thesis include the passage of the 1902 
Organic Act (also known as the first constitution of the Islands given by the US), 
certain tariff acts, inquiries on distributing religious landholdings, and the passage 
of the 1916 Philippine Bill (also known as the “Jones Law”).  These initiatives 
highlight the gradual political liberalisation among the other things that took place 
during the said period.  This thesis also revisited and surveyed some of the 
developments the colonial government introduced such as the introduction of 
education as well as the motives behind such initiatives as well as early efforts 
towards land redistribution.  This thesis demonstrated how political and economic 
motivations in Washington, alongside external circumstances, shaped the gradual 
introduction of institutions otherwise associated with liberal democracies. 
 
Once again, the main research question that this thesis wants to answer and 
analyse is: why did the US implement liberalising reforms in the colonial 
Philippines between 1898 to 1916?  The answer lies primarily in the fact that the 
reasons were the product of an interaction of prevailing interests, institutions, and 
ideas. Hall’s (1997) 3Is framework, a tool used in public policy, shows that the US 
did not introduce measures associated with liberal democracy to the Philippines 
out of a commitment to democracy or liberal reforms per se. The thesis argues 
that there were deep-seated interests and ideas that influenced policymaking 
which could best be served in the Philippines by instituting elements of a liberal-
democratic political and economic system. Among other things, the introduction 
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of such reforms was underpinned by mostly negative perceptions of Filipinos and 
a hope that by doing so, the Filipinos would have fewer reasons to want to rebel 
against US sovereignty.  More importantly, the thesis also shows that some ideas-, 
institutions-, and interest-based reasons interacted with one of the others such 
that each of them, in and of themselves would not be sufficient explanations for 
US policy in the Philippines.       
Given that the 3Is framework is utilised in the analysis of public policy coupled 
with the unique features of American colonisation in the Philippines, the thesis 
would contribute to the existing body of literature by linking the attempts to 
reform the colony to the different ideas and interests that US-based actors 
harboured and the prevailing institutions in the US and Philippines.  This thesis, 
thus, represents a rare attempt to trace an articulation of ideas, interests, and 
institutions to account for colonial practices that involved instituting such reforms. 
 
GENERAL STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS 
The thesis consists of five main parts.   
Part I, which contains Chapters 1 (introduction), 2, and 3, focuses on establishing 
the foundations for the remainder of the thesis.  Chapter 2 will review previous 
attempts at explaining the relevant phenomena in the Philippines, what their 
strong points that may be useful for the thesis and what areas they fall short on 
to warrant the approach in this thesis.  Chapter 3 discusses the theoretical and 
methodological basis for the rest of the thesis.  It will outline Hall’s (1997) 3Is 
framework.  Specifically, the chapter explains the meaning of ideas, interest, and 
institutions, how the framework has developed, how it is used in broader public 
policy analysis, and how it is relevant for use in analysing the period this thesis 
examines.  The 3Is framework will be the primary framework that this thesis will 
use. The chapter also concludes by providing the thesis’ methodological 
underpinnings to justify the 3Is place in historical sociology. 
Part II will contain chapters 4, 5, and 6.  In particular, they consider the early 
socio-political atmosphere in the Philippines.  Chapter 4 aims to outline the key 
institutional set-up that US colonisers inherited as they entered the Philippines.  It 
shows that the institutional features they found in the Philippines were constraints 
that they needed to deal with as they would discharge their mission in the ensuing 
decades.  Chapter 5 then turns to the decision to take the Philippines.  It will 
outline the ensuing Is that interacted to help the McKinley administration and 
other officials decide what to do with the Philippines as well as on the very start 
of the administration.  Chapter 6 will then turn to the first major effort to provide 
the Philippines with a Constitution, i.e. 1902 Philippine Organic Act.  It will again 
look at the ideas-interests-institutions that played a role in helping officials make 
the critical decisions and why, for instance, the Philippines received the level of 
governance that it did.    
Part III focuses on efforts to improve material conditions in the colony.  For each 
of these sections, Chapter 7 will go into the question of education, given that other 
scholars have widely posited that it is one of the most important contributions of 
US rule.  Chapter 8 will then look at the question of initial land reform attempts 
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as some officials have tried to do this and yet, have found out that there were 
factors that limited its effectiveness.  Chapter 9 goes to the question of tariffs.  
For one, this was controlled largely by Congress.  However, this issue remained a 
source of contention between the relevant interest groups.  For these three 
chapters, the ideas-interests-institutions framework will be used to illustrate the 
dynamics and motives behind how the Philippines was given such measures.  
Likewise, the argument here was that these were not a product of giving 
Part IV, or Chapter 10 examines the dynamics behind the passing of the Jones 
Law as well as the ideas, institutions, and interests that involved in doing so.  Part 
V and Chapter 11 will act as the concluding chapter.  It will then summarise the 
key findings of the thesis and reiterate how the framework has explained certain 





CHAPTER II: LITERATURE REVIEW: SITUATING 
EXISTING STUDIES ABOUT US COLONISATION OF THE 
PHILIPPINES IN THE FRAMEWORKS 
 
INTRODUCTION 
This thesis aims to use a theoretical framework developed by Hall (1997) to 
analyse the process by which the United States government introduced political 
and economic reforms akin to liberalising its Philippine colony from 1898 until 
1916.  That framework is used widely for public policy analysis and comparative 
politics but has not yet been applied to US colonial policy.  As the US colonial era 
in the Philippines has been studied in different ways, this chapter aims to review 
selected works done on the Philippines and colonisation to highlight the strengths 
that they bring and the areas where they fall short.  Out of a critical engagement 
with this literature, the thesis creates the intellectual space for using a historical-
sociological approach to develop an original understanding of the significance and 
consequences of the US' attempts to introduce partial democratisation into its 
Filipino colony.  
 
Whereas an appropriate theoretical framework will be introduced in Chapter 3, 
this chapter focuses on interrogating literature that can be grouped into three 
categories.  The first section looks at approaches to colonial control, which in 
particular reviews Marxist approaches put forward by Filipino nationalist 
historians, Teodoro Agoncillo (1956) and Renato Constantino (1975), as well as 
progressives – a school of thought that critiques the degree to which agents have 
acted in contrast to their stated values but with less emphasis on class struggle - 
such as Frank Golay (1998).  Marxist arguments about selected land redistribution 
efforts will be revisited as well here.  Their approaches to studying history have 
been well-known and have some useful points as well as issues that need 
emphasis.  This section will also look at geographical perspectives that explain 
American rule.   
 
The second section focuses on the approaches of other 'non-western' sources 
(though ones that have strongly influenced 'western' thinking), particularly 
regarding the degree to which they offer insight into today's understandings of 
colonial actions. Edward Said's (1978) Orientalism and provides a lens for 
criticising how accounts that promote narratives of the superiority of western 
ideals and values are used and what their consequences are.  The aim here is to 
highlight how important the framing Americans had been of Filipinos was in 
making decisions.  This chapter will attempt to use their lenses as a way to 
highlight the negative portrayals of 'non-western'/’non-white' people found in key 
pieces such as Kipling's White Man's Burden, which effectively justified US 
colonialism of the Philippines.  The articulation of a 'non-western' lens will thus, 
provide a basis for a more nuanced appraisal of how pieces sympathetic of 
'western' perspectives thought of Filipinos.   
 
The final section focuses on literature related to education and the degree to which 
relevant scholars have addressed the debates on the rationale of colonial 
education.  Given that subsequent chapters, especially Chapter 7, will highlight 
the contribution of colonisers to country's education system, it is useful to flag in 
this section how previous authors have covered and accounted for the mindsets 
that came to bear on this.  Among the questions that this section hopes to seek 
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the answer to is the extent to which these works can explore factors other than 
material interests behind the provisions for colonial education.       
 
As valuable as the contributions of the works discussed in this chapter have proven 
to be, other important factors do not receive sufficient consideration, and as such 
get missed out.  As such, this chapter will conclude by reiterating some of the 
strengths of the existing literature that lend themselves to a more theoretical 
approach that articulates material motives in the context of prevailing institutional 
set-ups and values, as well as the shortcomings that such a framework hopes to 
address.  The conclusion will also emphasise that the previous works featured here 
fail to pay adequate attention to the political and economic situation in the US, as 
well as the desires of officials not just for the Philippines but for the broader 
geopolitical image of the US as an emerging power.  Thus, another aim of this 
chapter is to show a need to weave into the discussion of a theoretical framework 
more players than, initially, might have seemed appropriate. 
 
REVIEW OF APPROACHES TO COLONIAL CONTROL 
Marxist-Nationalist Approach 
The Marxist approach focuses largely on grounding the motivations of would-be 
colonisers in a desire to control the means of production, such as land, other 
natural resources and technology.  The underlying premise is that societies are 
structured on the basis of class inequalities whereby a small but powerful 
property-owning class lives off the “surplus labour” that workers produce 
(Chakrabati, 2016: 11).  Exploitation is also a key element of the Marxist 
approach, especially as Marx thought it was a system based on the “theft of 
labour” (ibid).  Marxists, thus see colonisation as a means to fulfil a dominant 
power's material interests and strengthen its position.    In here, there is a 
structural relationship whereby a system of developed (known as the core) and 
underdeveloped (known as the periphery) economies prevail.    As such, some 
Marxists such as Fanon (1961) note that violence is an essential feature of 
colonisation as the dominant power does not want to relinquish control.  An 
important theme is that the colonised subjects do not necessarily want 
decolonisation as the most privileged of them -dependent for their wealth on the 
colonisers - may lose out (Fanon, 1961).   Anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism 
movements are seen more as part of the general struggle against global 
capitalism.  Specifically, anti-colonialists see Marxism as something that could be 
studied along with other resources such as nationalism and that it has been 
Marxism's relationship to nationalism that has been essential (Young, 2016: 111-
112).  Additionally, imperialism has a connotation whereby a state uses its power 
to try to find economic monopolies for its larger firms (Wolfe, 1997: 388).  
 
One of the more prominent Marxist scholars on the Philippines is Epifanio San 
Juan.  In his book US Imperialism and Revolution in the Philippines, San Juan 
(2007) has called attention to how the Philippines has been represented in the 
official government documents and how colonial acts of violence have been 
downplayed.  San Juan is Marxist in that he emphasises motives related to capital 
accumulation among US officials and allied business interests for acquiring 
overseas territories.  He argues that a desire for capital accumulation had driven 
what he called “the messianic impulse of genocide”, which in the case of the 
Philippines, was the Filipino-American War (ibid: xv).  Moreover, he reiterates that 
violence against non-whites in the US has been a feature even before that country 
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industrialised (ibid: 27).  As such, San Juan establishes that racism towards non-
White races was part of the American psyche before the US colonised the 
Philippines.  San Juan also takes issue with a limited acknowledgement in Western 
discourse of US imperialism whereby those who would consult such would not 
think that it had existed and how such imperialism inhibited the development of 
the native culture.  A recurring argument in San Juan’s work was demonstrating 
how the portrayal of the Filipino in Western sources acted to shape the 
consciousness of US officials.  With San Juan raising these issues, he argues that 
a one-sided accounting of the US role in the Philippines has obscured the 
underlying motives US politicians and their allies had in the colony.      
 
Nationalist historians like Teodoro Agoncillo (1956; 1960; 1990)3 and Renato 
Constantino (1975) have introduced a leftist angle to their telling of the American 
story in the Philippines.  The nationalist historians have attempted to view the 
Philippine situation as a struggle and that Filipinos, especially the peasantry, are 
the ones on the struggling side.  Specifically, one of Agoncillo other books - The 
Revolt of the Masses (1956), although not dealing directly with US rule, sets up 
the ordinary Filipino as someone locked in a struggle against the US' colonial 
predecessors (the Spaniards) shortly before the US' arrival. Agoncillo's (1956) 
work offers a look into his mindset, which shows the Filipino peasant revolution 
as "unfinished", and that movements promoting independence were initiated by 
the petite bourgeoisie and the working class in cities. Agoncillo's narrative is 
shaped by what he considers the differences between what Philippine officials said 
shortly after the Philippines became independent from the US and what he 
observed (Ileto, 2011: 500).  Agoncillo's (1956) account of Andres Bonifacio's 
role4 in the Philippine revolution attempts to tap into Marx's initial thought of a 
peasantry that needed to be mobilised to pursue national liberalisation.     
 
Another one of the key tenets of their arguments are their conceptions of "mis-
education of the Filipino" by colonisers and their talk in terms of social classes with 
the Filipino masses being the oppressed and exploited party and the US officials 
siding with the oppressive capitalists (McFarlane, 2000: 302).  To them, colonial 
powers like the US introduced such measures with a hope of increasing surplus 
value and thus fulfilling the interests of their major business allies.  On the notion 
of benevolent assimilation, for instance, Agoncillo (1990: 214) argues that 
business and religious interests pressured President William McKinley5 into 
acquiring the Philippines as a base for their operations and missions, respectively.  
He documented how revolutionaries like General Antonio Luna and Emilio 
Aguinaldo rebuffed such a proclamation and did their part to reduce tensions6.  
 
3 Two books written by Teodoro Agoncillo are discussed in this section – History of the 
Filipino People (1960; 1990 is latest edition) and Revolt of the Masses (1956) which 
focuses on the Philippine Revolution of the late 1890s.   
4 Andres Bonifacio is a filipino national hero.  He was credited for being one of the leaders 
of the Philippine revolution against the Spaniards.  He was part of the Katipunan 
organisation, which advocated full Philippine independence.   
5 William McKinley was President of the United States during the time of the Spanish-
American War of 1898.  As such, his administration was tasked with deciding the fate of 
Spanish possessions.  Analysis of the process behind is provided more in Chapter 5. 
6 Emilio Aguinaldo was the first president of the Philippines, also known then as the Malolos 




Agoncillo has also presented evidence of brutality perpetrated by the Americans 
and senior Filipino officials.  (e.g. Agoncillo, 1990: 230).  
 
Agoncillo believes that in interpreting the events of the past, historians should be 
critical without dismissing evidence that may rebut their own beliefs (May, 1998: 
292).  Agoncillo (1990) wants those who interpret historical events for readers to 
challenge established accounts and to be challenged.  
 
As Agoncillo (1990) has focused on the element of struggle by casting the less 
privileged Filipino classes as the oppressed and the American elites and Filipino 
office holders as oppressive forces, he failed to account for any benefits that 
Filipinos may have derived.  For instance, when Agoncillo illustrated McKinley's 
Benevolent Assimilation, he has not acknowledged whether any good intentions 
among colonial officials existed, even derivative ones.  Even if self-interested 
motives prevailed, it does not have to exclude questions of whether genuine 
desires to improve the Filipino way of living, no matter how misinformed, existed.  
In this matter, the narrative that Agoncillo sends to audiences is that self-
interested motives were the sole driver of policy and action.  Based on examining 
Agoncillo's work, one thing that was lacking was a vigorous attempt to 
acknowledge that any action by officials that originated in economic or power 
interests yielded desirable results for Filipinos.   
 
In relation to the previous paragraph, Agoncillo's approach, as written in the 
relevant sections of his 1990 book, also focuses more on the Filipino perspective.  
Even though there were some references to American intentions, they were not 
discussed in the same detail to help account for their mindset as completely as 
other approaches.  Thus, the process and factors towards the key decisions made 
by relevant officials become obscured. Agoncillo's works have discussed the 
decisions but less so of how and why they arrived at such decisions.  Discussing 
them would enrich Agoncillo's - and Constantino's - work as it could show how US 
officials thought about their decision and role in the struggles that such scholars 
wish to portray (i.e. between Filipinos and the colonisers). Granted that at the 
heart of nationalist history is an attempt to build an analytic narrative of struggle 
among non-elite Filipinos against other powerholders, it presumes that the officials 
on the US side were well-informed about how they considered what they wanted 
to do in the Philippines and why at greater length.  That is, it would assume that 
officials there would have to think hard about creating social classes, but evidence 
presented by such historians has remained relatively limited.  The letters invoked 
by US sources document what happened.  However, an interpretation of the 
reasons for such remains limited on the part of these historians.   
 
However, one of Agoncillo and Constantino's notable strengths is that they did not 
treat the Filipinos monolithically.  For instance, they have shown how wealthy 
Filipinos have collaborated with the colonial administrators, a phenomenon called 
comprador bourgeoisie. It is valuable in that it illustrates, albeit implicitly, the 
presence of institutional set-ups that administrators had to deal with and the 
institutions that as the succeeding chapters will allude to, have shaped the 
execution of their policies.  Their approach is similar to Fanon's (1961) 
characterisation of local elites' role in facilitating the spread of colonialism.  That 
said, it is also important to note that Agoncillo and Constantino have emphasised 
that this is a struggle not just between Filipinos and foreign occupiers but a class 
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struggle.  Agoncillo and Constantino can thus be considered both Marxist and 
nationalist.    
 
In trying to frame US activities involving the Philippines as a struggle between the 
elite class (US and Filipino officials on one side and less wealthy Filipinos on the 
other), another significant and related issue is that Agoncillo and Constantino 
assume that colonisers think in terms of a zero-sum game where one party gains 
and another one has to lose as a result.  That may be true with respect to how 
the Americans saw themselves vis-à-vis other colonial powers.  The Spanish-
American War was one such event.  There was also a clear desire for the US to 
exercise its power under the Monroe doctrine and drive European colonisers like 
Spain away from the Western Hemisphere.  However, Agoncillo and Constantino's 
works seem to imply that such a condition was present between coloniser and 
colony.  The fact remains that for all the possible motives the US had in the 
Philippines, it does not mean that the Filipinos would not benefit from it.  If the 
US pursued a zero-sum expedition against its colony, one would need to pose 
some questions regarding its reforms.  They would need to be asked to the effect 
of whether they would be introduced in the first place, albeit slowly.  Under a zero-
sum game scenario, the Philippine Islands may not be receiving any of the reforms 
even if such reforms had the sole intention to satisfy the administrators in the 
islands.   
 
Marxist authors are also useful in trying to ascertain the effectiveness of land 
redistribution efforts.7  As will be explained further in Chapter 8, land redistribution 
is a way to achieve economic progress, something which officials in the US hoped 
to elicit out of the Philippines but were hindered from doing so.  Among the authors 
who are relevant in this include Saturnino Borras.  Borras does not specialise on 
the causes of US colonisation or their motivations per se, but he, together with 
Jennifer Franco, point out that most of the peasant uprisings that occurred during 
the Spanish and American eras focused on issues of land, which was something 
that Agoncillo (1956) and Ileto (2011) concur with.  As such, they go on to argue 
that dealing with land ownership is crucial to solving the plight of the rural poor.  
Their framework highlighted a sense of struggle between the powerful (colonisers 
and landed owners) and the peasant classes.  Colonial officials in both Spain and 
the US reacted with repression (Franco and Borras, 2007: 68).  Franco and Borras 
acknowledge the presence of the contentious issue of the Friar Lands and the US' 
attempts to resolve it.  Furthermore, they suggest that resistance and 
insurrections were not against colonisation itself but rather the inability to address 
issues of property rights effectively.  That is considering that the Philippines, as 
will be highlighted in subsequent chapters, especially Chapter 8, had not had a 
robust institution of property rights that would include those who were most 
vulnerable to losing the lands they occupied.   
 
Although connecting land redistribution to insurrections was that one of the 
significant takeaways of Franco and Borras' (2007) work, their framing of struggle 
does not account directly for subsequent events such as the distribution of political 
power towards Filipinos.    Moreover, as Chapter 7 alludes to, education would be 
used as a tool to pacify the insurrections by endearing the hearts and minds of 
the Filipinos to what life under US influence had to offer.  As plausible as Franco 
 
7 US colonial efforts to address such issues of land redistribution will be discussed more 
in Chapter 8.   
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and Borras' arguments are in explaining the shortcomings of officials on land 
redistribution, their argument of it leading to insurrection and the increased 
nationalist sentiment is undermined by the fact that officials attempted to address 
the underlying issues, albeit by introducing weaker legislation.  Furthermore, 
those officials possessed other means to quell the ensuing insurrections.   
 
 
Figure 2 - Philippine Islands Map as of 1898;  
source: Shepherd (1911: 199) 
 
Filomeno Aguilar (1998) discusses how the US intervened to prop up the sugar 
industry in Negros (refer to Figure 1 for its location relative to the rest of the 
Philippines). He suggests that the US was desperate to pacify insurrections 
happening around the islands by enlisting the assistance of native elites.  Aguilar 
points out that administrators wanted to incentivise these elites to cooperate in 
their efforts to quell rebellions by providing them opportunities to participate in 
governance.  Moreover, he compared Filipino elites to their Malayan and Javanese 
counterparts by saying that that former was integrated into the system more as 
politicians and less as civil servants, which was the norm in the latter two settings.  
Aguilar also discusses that the colonial state found it challenging to solve issues 
brought about by rinderpest and locust plagues and the unprofitable environment 
plaguing the agriculture especially in Negros where colonial officials discovered 




Aguilar manages to point out that native elites were responsive to colonial 
incentives.  In doing so, they cited the context of pacifying the Philippines, and 
they allowed local elites, some of which hailed from the line of sugar capitalist 
class from Negros, to participate in affairs as politicians fairly early (ibid: 189).  
That is a narrative that most other scholars have accepted.  Given that there was 
a problem with quelling insurrections or preventing more of the sort from 
happening, officials had to play a gambit even if some of them were hesitant.  
Aguilar also points out how much power was bestowed to native elites, especially 
in (trying to stop) gambling, which was something stifled during the Spanish era 
but re-emerged under the Americans.  All of these accounts are valuable in that 
they imply how institutionalised various practices (e.g. gambling) were.  His work 
points out that if there are interests the colonial administrators wanted to fulfil, 
they needed to work within the norms the native elites were used to (ones 
presumably developed under the Spaniards). 
 
Aguilar pays limited attention to considering how local elites thought that such 
was their motives, as his work has spent more of the time looking at fulfilling 
economic interests of elites and administrators and to some extent considering 
the institutional set-up of the islands in accounting for the outcome of introducing 
policies and incentives.  Aguilar also places relatively limited emphasis on how 
colonial elites conceived how establishing such power structures would serve their 
material motives.  For instance, what would inform the motives of suppressing 
rebellions?  Would that be a key reason? Although accounting for material motives 
may constitute a compelling narrative, it is not clear how local elites conceived of 
such as their interests.  Such conceptions are pronounced to a relatively limited 
degree when it came to citing Philippine Commission chair Jacob Schurman's8 
hope for increased governance for the Filipino people.  The conceptions for 
material motives, however, has not been given further elaboration and are merely 
implied.  Also, given that officials based in the mainland had domestic sugar 
interests to worry about as Aguilar himself has inferred, if material interests alone 
are considered, it would be reasonable to imply that these officials may not extend 
assistance to the Negros sugar industry to the degree that it did so.9  
 
A strength of the Marxist-based frameworks is that they show that the reasons 
behind US rule were economic and geo-political rather than largely altruistic.  They 
have reiterated that the US did not hesitate to engage in acts of violence in the 
Philippines, as was the case during the Philippine-American War.  This is especially 
given that scholars like San Juan (2007) have reiterated that violence has been a 
tool to subjugate non-white peoples throughout US history.   
 
San Juan, effectively claims that Western scholars have downplayed US 
transgressions and cast local elites in a more antagonistic light than warranted in 
explaining perceived backwardness, especially when interrogating notions of hiya 
 
8 Jacob Schurman was chairman of the Philippine Commission set up by William McKinley 
in 1899 to investigate the conditions in the Philippines and provide recommendations on 
what appropriate structures are to be implemented. 
9 Although Aguilar (1998) focused especially on the power dynamics of propping up the 
sugar industry in Negros, this work nonetheless tried to examine it in the context of 
existing class structures in the Philippines, which he argues were propped up and that a 




(shame), utang-na-loob (internal debt), etc.  San Juan has also illuminated how 
the US officials portrayed Filipinos as pre-modern, less “civilised” than Americans.  
This thesis does not dispute that Americans used such characterisations of 
Filipinos and in later chapters, it will consider such characterisations as a key factor 
in analysing the decisions US officials took.  Irrespective of how flawed these 
recurring characterisations of Filipinos were, the fact was that they influenced 
some of the policy decisions this thesis will analyse. 
      
In relation to dispelling the notion of altruism among Americans who wanted to 
do business in the Philippines, the Marxist approaches have highlighted the role 
of business interests in shaping US policy.  Furthermore, these authors uncover 
that such interests emerge in framing US colonialization of the Philippines as a 
class struggle.  In this, they emphasise what they consider is the exploitative 
nature of colonisation.  For instance, San Juan (2007) has called out what 
Chomsky terms “politics and ideology” constrained by the “consensus of the 
business community”, which promote ideas related to a so-called “free market”. 
But such accounts, San Juan shows, at times obscure violent action and downplay 
exploitation.  As succeeding chapters document, some officials and politicians 
wanted to satisfy their business allies.    Similarly for Marxists such as Agoncillo, 
class struggle becomes a basis for introducing other elements associated with it 
such as regional inequalities  and collaboration between Filipino elites and US 
officials.  Agoncillo has, for instance, continued to frame the Americans and Filipino 
elites as advancing US business interests.  For Marxists like himself, such 
collaboration happens to the detriment of the vast majority of Filipinos who do not 
own the means of production.  
 
As valuable as those points are in elaborating the extent to which opportunities to 
exacerbate class struggle and the power imbalances between the US and the 
Philippines are, the Marxist approach has its limitations.  One such limitation is 
that the assumption that the state, which in this case is the US government (both 
in Washington and through their representatives in the colony), is always 
preconfigured to assist a capitalist-owning class when it has other functions or 
groups that it needs to work with.  In other words, that an agent’s actions are 
predetermined by their position in the power dynamic.  Although the likes of San 
Juan, Agoncillo, and Aguilar have pointed out that the state wanted to promote 
US business interests, there is evidence that that is only one of a number of 
interests the US pursued.  For instance, the state facilitated the fostering of 
religious interests (Domhoff, 2005).  As Chapter 5 argues, the state helped 
Christian missionaries. Additionally, although one could conceivably connect the 
threat of warfare against rival powers to opportunities for economic exploitation, 
given the economic reasons for rivalry between sovereign states, the Marxist 
scholars have generally been unable to account directly for how rivalries between 
sovereign states could explain reasons to acquire a colony and/or grant it a certain 
status. 
 
Moreover, although the Marxist literature introduces the economic interests of 
agents, other dimensions need to be considered and mobilised to be able to 
formulate a more adequate explanation for the course of US colonialism in the 
Philippines: institutions and ideas.  This thesis does not intend to contradict 
Marxist-based accounts but instead, complement them by providing more context 
to such accounts and examining the process of policy-making.  The Marxist focus 
on class interests needs to be understood alongside other factors.  The 3Is 
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framework, which the next chapter will explain in more detail, is a widely-used 
framework to analyse public policy but has not yet been deployed to understand 
US colonial policy.  It is able to examine a variety of factors and their impact on 
the decision-making process involved in colonial policy.  Specifically, the 3Is 
framework incorporates how the ideas, interests, and institutions work together 
to explain such a phenomena.  Thus, the framework provides a more holistic 
perspective on such processes. 
 
In light of the foregoing, this thesis utilises the 3Is framework to analyse US 
colonialism in the Philippines and its consequences between 1898 and 1916.  As 
a result, it provides an original explanation for the origins of what would later 
become Asia’s first democratic state. 
  
Progressive Approach 
The progressive approach to historical analysis is a school of thought that portrays 
the dominant powerholders as a hypocritical force.  That is, scholars in the 
approach criticise those who held positions of power for failing to act in according 
to the values those actors wanted to profess.  Scholars in this field tend to express 
reservations about the actors' motives.  Although this may be a characteristic 
shared with Marxism, the progressive approach places less emphasis on the 
concept of class struggle.  A progressive approach does not have to reject the 
principles behind what agents claim to profess per se but questions whether the 
agents' motives are consistent with such.    
 
Among the progressive voices in accounting for colonial decisions is Frank Golay 
(1998).  In his work Face of Empire, Golay has approached it based on looking at 
the legislative history of decisions related to developing the US' only colony in 
Asia.   
 
Golay is particularly useful for his empirical detail.  He has also extensively 
discussed the role of US politicians.  For instance, Golay (1998: 34) evaluates the 
worries of the McKinley administration during the legislative/Congressional 
process about colonisation and the concerns they had about opposition to their 
proposals. Golay portrays McKinley as someone concerned with maintaining 
standing within his party.  This detail provides clues to the role of partisan politics 
in the colonisation decision. He also examines US perceptions of a potential Japan 
threat to the US and whether keeping The Philippines would help or hurt America's 
ability to defend itself against possible Japanese aggression.   
 
Golay's focus, however – like those of Agoncillo and Constantino – mainly centres 
around how US power players stood to gain materially and electorally from in The 
Philippines, with limited attention to how ideas-based considerations might have 
determined the policy outcomes.  For instance, in the decision to acquire the 
Philippines, most of the references Golay made had to do with the "commercial 
advantage" as well as President William McKinley's desire to expand the number 
of his Congressional allies10.  (cf. Golay, 1998: 33-4).   Although it is clear that 
 
10 Golay (1998) argues that this “commercial advantage” was touted by Navy Admiral 
George Dewey, who was well known for his victory in the Spanish-American War under 
President William McKinley’s administration.  This “commercial advantage” implies that 
Dewey and by extension McKinley thought that the Philippines had economic benefits for 
the US.  Also in consideration is that 1898 was a midterm election year and McKinley 
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commercial interests were an important consideration, the issue that warrants 
consideration is whether these interests alone played a decisive role in driving 
decision-making.   
 
Larkin (1999: 926) also criticises Golay's approach as it has a limited view of how 
colonisation was viewed from an indigenous perspective as there were issues 
related to the Philippines that may have been accounted for.  Larkin, however, 
has applauded Golay for his argument that colonisation of the Philippines should 
be seen in the broader context of empire building, the roots of which date as far 
back as the Mexican War.  Also evident in this work is that Golay shows how 
concerns over these related issues resonated with each politician's constituencies.   
   
The closest allusion to less material-based approaches would be Golay's invocation 
of Kipling's White Man's Burden.  Although Kipling's poem will be discussed later, 
it is sufficing to say at this point that there were implied ideas about what a "White 
Man" was.  Nonetheless, given what other accounts say about how effective 
Filipinos are, the central role of ideas was not as explicitly pronounced in Golay as 
elsewhere.       
 
Approaches Highlighting Socio-political and geographical considerations 
As the Philippines is an archipelago that consists of seven thousand islands, the 
logistical difficulties US administrators would face in managing the territory it 
acquired from Spain would inevitably become an issue.  Previous colonisers had 
experienced challenges integrating the southern parts of the archipelago, the 
Muslim regions of Mindanao (cf. Abreu, 2008) (Figure 1 presented earlier shows 
the position of Mindanao relative to the rest of the Philippines and Figure 2 shows 
the Philippines relative to the rest of the Western Pacific region with Mindanao in 
the southernmost island group).    According to Abreu (2008), Spain for instance, 
had at most exercised "nominal" control over the said region as Spanish 
administrators remained mostly confined to their fortifications, and they had to 
flee north during the outbreak of the Philippine revolution.  It was hence another 
manifestation where the Spaniards struggled to exercise their will. 
 
 
needed to increase his majority in Congress, especially considering that some members 




Figure 2 - The Western Pacific region in 1898.  Source: Omniatlas (2017) 
 
Abreu (2008) documents that US administrators attempted to subjugate the 
southern part of the country.  Such attempts met local resistance, and although 
the sultans had to compromise from time to time, they regarded attempts to 
introduce US-style practices, especially on education and community tax 
certificates as an affront to the way of life.  Moreover, the Peace Treaty that 
heralded the end of the military rule across most of the colony did not extend to 
the Muslim South and as such, hostilities continued between 1901 and 1913 in 
what became known as the Moro Rebellion (Theodore Roosevelt Center, n.d.).  
Abreu also points out that communal property rights were widespread in the 
southern Philippines, given that this region was not touched by Spanish rule as 
much as northern parts of the colony.  Such a practice caused friction as colonial 
administrators engaged in land grabs, and the parcels of lands involved were 
transferred to private enterprises.   
 
Based on the foregoing, Abreu (2008) provides an account where early on, the 
Moro areas of the Philippines warranted a different treatment from the rest of the 
colony.  That was the case when the Moro areas were not included in the peace 
treaty ending the anti-colonial struggle of 1899 and hostilities continued until the 
1910s.  From here, one would otherwise infer that resources used to suppress 
insurrections were diverted from the north.  Given that attempts for insurrections 
were prevalent in the north, one may also guess that the different treatment might 
imply that the Americans had a different mindset for Moros or that the Moros were 
more hostile towards anything that they considered to undermine their way of life.  
That was especially the case when southern locals did not appreciate the efforts 
to be educated in the American way of life.  However, Abreu is unable to account 
for the connection between efforts to liberalise the more northern parts and pacify 
the southern region.  Given the different colonial experiences each region had 
undergone as well as the differences in their receptivity to the American measures, 
Abreu suggests that the varying institutional configurations in the Philippines were 
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considered by the US when promulgating the next steps the colonial 
administration wanted for the colony. According to Abreu, the US' approach was 
not a 'one-size fits all' approach to solving the issue of internal rebellions. 
 
Notwithstanding the differences in treatments, the fact is Spain ceded the entire 
archipelago to the US, and the Moro region was eventually given independence at 
the same time as the rest of the colony (in 1946).  In retrospect, there was no 
intention to grant various regions outright independence at different times, even 
as officials approached each region differently.  Furthermore, in the early 1900s, 
President Roosevelt regarded the Philippine colony as a whole, and not just one 
or a few regions, as an entity whose locals cannot govern on their own.  The 
inference from this is that officials wanted to achieve the same objectives of 
security both regions but that the unique circumstances prompted administrators 
to treat the Moro region differently until the concerns they rectified the concerns 
there.  
 
The extent of articulating which material motives were relevant to the US-Moro 
situation was, at best, implicit. Certain sets of beliefs may have been significant 
to the extent that earlier Moro leaders were assessing how much of a threat 
Western culture, including education, was to their way of life.  Likewise, accounts 
by Abreu (2008), by invoking that early Moro leaders felt threatened by Western 
culture, implies a strength of Muslim institutions in the South that may have made 
it difficult for Western occupiers to make inroads there in the first place.  Almost 
no attention is paid to the institutional issues involved (such as the possible 
significance of the mosques in helping to mobilise popular opposition to the US 
colonisers). 
 
Finally, although looking at the differences in how the Moro regions were treated 
adds perspective and evokes questions on strategies to manage resources, Abreu 
would be well-served to identify the views from Washington more extensively, 
especially since the decision to effect long-lasting changes would come from 
politicians and how they see their prospects, as well as those of the US.   
 
Foreign Policy-Related Approaches 
The Contested State by Amy Blitz (2000) provides an overview of the early colonial 
era from 1899 to 1916.  Unlike most other approaches discussed so far, Blitz 
discusses the Philippines more in terms of domestic politics.  She manages to 
identify the partisan dynamics with most of the president's party supporters in 
congress favouring acquisition and Democrats mostly in opposition to it. Blitz's 
approach points out the foreign policy and economic interests that the US officials 
and politicians possessed such as Taft's stake in trade agreements and his battle 
with other industry interests.  She highlights the importance of transnational 
relations between politicians in the US and the Philippines, such as when there 
were moves to devolve even more powers to Filipinos during the Wilson 
administration and when governors-general like Francis Harrison worked together 
with Filipino representatives such as Manuel Quezon to promote steps towards 
independence.  These common goals stemmed from various interests from each 
party (51).         
 
Although it is a compelling account and is useful for this thesis in the sense that 
alliances between individual politicians on both sides were formed, Blitz's work 
could have made more explicit reference to how material motives of officials 
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related to the US's acquisition of the Philippines could have been interpreted and 
the institutional contexts it operated under.  Although there were occasional 
allusions to America's mission to shape its image with the Philippines and 
references to form an "appropriate form of government for the islands", (37), this 
piece of literature would need to make clear references to what administrators 
and politicians have thought of the Philippines as it was an important discursive 
tool to convince colleagues about what the intentions were.  Furthermore, 
regarding the motivations to provide the Filipinos with a say, Blitz has not 
discussed the factors driving both proponents and opponents to it.  The exception 
is when he mentions the development of "goodwill" between the two races (37).  
It begs the question again of why it was such.  Blitz does account for Taft's desire 
to isolate opposition from Emilio Aguinaldo's insurrection-prone forces and Taft's 
“policy of attraction”, though.  Nonetheless, the references to what her work says 
about ideas towards Filipinos needs more elaboration. There were more allusions 
to this when saying Wilson did not want Filipinos to prove themselves "worthy of 
self-government" (48), which meant there was a clear implication that an idea 
about Filipinos not being able to govern themselves or that Filipinos were by 
nature like this or that was a prevailing thought.     
 
In accounting for the passage of the legislation that would bring the Philippines 
one step closer to independence, Blitz makes almost no substantial reference to 
other geopolitical events such as the dynamics in the Western Pacific11.  Other 
scholars would consider this.  Given that a rising empire like the US had finite 
resources, one would want to consider how strong its defences were against rival 
forces in the Pacific arena.     
 
Even as Blitz has made occasional references to the long-standing norms such as 
the strength of the farmers' unions in the US, she does not explain in detail how 
they have consolidated.  Even when it comes to the discussion of material 
considerations alone, references to the historical glut thesis and previous desires 
to access the Chinese market were12.  As Chapter 5 points out, these items are 
important when analysing relevant factors (whether they have actually followed 
up on this motivation once they were the colonisers is a different story).  Blitz also 
pays limited attention to institutions such as property rights.  
 
Victor Bulmer-Thomas (2018) looks at the Philippines in relation to America's 
broader rise and fall as an empire.  A direct discussion on relevant parts of the 
Philippines came in a chapter related to American pursuits in the Orient.  As 
Chapter 5 discusses in more detail, most scholars have traced the acquisition of 
the Philippines to America's desire to expand trade with China.  Bulmer-Thomas 
adds that the US was fascinated by Spain's trading arrangements with China.  
Moreover, the genesis of trading with the region had its roots in the late 1810s.  
The work points out the lack of appetite for statehood to be granted to territories 
 
11 One such geopolitical incident that officials invoked was the threat of an emerging 
Japanese power.  There was a fear that if the Japan were to attack the Philippines, it would 
undermine US military power.  This will be discussed more in Chapter 10. 
12 The Glut thesis is a concept which promotes the notion that seeking markets overseas 
was a solution to domestic production surplus.  This was a popular concept scholars used 
to characterise the economic developments of the late nineteenth century in the US.  
Among the promoted moves associated with such is increased access to the Chinese 
market.  This will be explored more in Chapter 5. 
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outside the mainland and it highlights that the Supreme Court declared the 
Philippines as an unincorporated territory which meant it does not have "civil" and 
"procedural" rights, just "fundamental" ones under US law (ibid: 97).  Bulmer-
Thomas had also illustrated the economic challenges of introducing trade for local 
US industries as well as the immigration issues that Filipinos may be entitled to, 
which some politicians back in the mainland believed would be detrimental to the 
labour sector in the US.  
 
Bulmer-Thomas’ work is valuable in terms of its accounts of the broader 
geopolitical context that the US faced not only in the Western Pacific but also the 
rest of the world.  Moreover, as the Philippines was just a subsection of Victor 
Thomas's (2018) book, this goes to show there was a macro focus on the project 
of imperial rule.   It has also highlighted the domestic economic and political 
interests at play that wanted to build America's image and ideals as an empire.  
The section also makes a brief mention to Filipinos "taking advantage" of their so-
called "fundamental" rights with the introduction of liberalised trade laws (97).  It 
is in these respects that the thesis could use the chapters in this account. 
 
Given that the title of Bulmer-Thomas' (2018) book is entitled Empire in Retreat: 
The Past, Present, and Future of the United States, it is notable that the chapter 
does not pay sufficient attention to the steps and processes concerned with 
devolving power away from the US colonial administrators to Filipinos.  Given that 
between 1902 and 1916, a significant number of powers were devolved to native 
politicians and bureaucrats, one would have expected a discussion on the motives 
for such from works trying to make sense of an empire trying to step back from 
its colonial obligations.13  As Chapter 10 of this thesis will explain and analyse, 
these events should be mentioned given that there were external forces that could 
make American power vulnerable (e.g. Japan) and that officials considered these 
even years before they started implementing moves to offer the colony more 
devolved powers.       
 
CHALLENGES AND QUESTIONS POSED BY 'NON-WESTERN' LITERATURES 
Some scholars have criticised approaches that disregard the importance of 
stereotypes of colonised people.  Orientalism by Said (1977) focuses on the 
perceptions of colonisers towards the colonised subjects and more importantly, 
how these perceptions affect the colonised themselves.  Among Said's main 
arguments is that orientalism is used by the West (or Occident) as a way to 
characterise what he calls the Orient.  Moreover, the Orient was used by Western 
scholars and power holders in a manner that allowed them to justify their 
perception of themselves as superior to their colonial subjects.   
 
Said regards the Orient as a projection onto the colonised 'other' of anything the 
West saw undesirable in itself.  It means that for any undesirable trait the Western 
powers possessed themselves, they would articulate to make it seem that the 
Orient possessed such a characteristic.  Moreover, under the concept of 
orientalism, anything conceptualised about the Orient was intended for the 
consumption of powerholders in the West.  That was propagated in the 19th and 
20th centuries when western countries apprehended in their colonies what they 
considered to be a pure form of human existence – a sort of 'innocence' - 
 
13 Please see chapters 5 and 10 for a more detailed analysis of the motives and 
circumstances behind the devolved powers. 
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compared to their self-characterisation of their own societies as highly 
sophisticated, technologically advanced, and complex.  Said suggests that as far 
the West is concerned, given the supposed 'innocence' of their colonial subjects, 
the 'protection' (and thus the control) by the colonisers was justified.  
 
In the context of US colonisation of the Philippines, one could say that the US took 
the role of the West, whereas the Philippines was an embodiment of the Orient.  
As will be mentioned in subsequent chapters, one of the underlying ideas that 
would be influential in decisions by officials was the ability of Filipinos to govern 
themselves.  In there, several authors would argue that officials thought Filipinos 
did not possess such abilities yet and needed education.  San Juan (2002: 15) 
emphasises the presence of Orientalist stereotypes in the case of how officials saw 
Filipinos who fought for self-determination: "wily, devious, incapable of 
domestication".  San Juan argues further that state apparatuses that the US 
colonisers introduced (e.g. legal system, census, surveillance) replaced 
anthropological knowledge (ibid).  Under Said's characterisation, this implied that 
the US, by imposing education and other institutions to the degree that it did, was 
also trying to assert the dominance of Western ideas about the Philippines.  On 
the other hand, US officials had to rely on native officials who were holdovers from 
the Spanish government to help carry out the former's directives.  Nonetheless, 
and as will be seen in subsequent chapters, Governors-General like William Taft 
did not prefer such a tactic.   
 
Applying this to Kipling’s (1899) White Man's Burden, which is about moves to 
colonise the Philippines, it is noteworthy that he uses the phrase "White Man" at 
the start of every stanza.  Although other pieces of works tend to portray the 
"White Man" as someone who was benevolent and cavalier, Kipling made it clear 
in the first stanza how the other party to this was portrayed: "your new-caught 
sullen peoples, Half-devil and half-child".  The use of the words "new-caught", 
"devil", and "child" to refer to the other connotes Western superiority and 
inferiority for the Orient, which in this case is the subjects that would be caught.  
The West (based on Said's characterisation) characterised the Orient as "half-
devil" and "half-child" to justify the tasks.  Moreover, his explicit reference to the 
phrase "White Man" was a way to remind readers what he thought about; what 
that character possessed in relation to those who were not.  In this case, it was 
the ability to impose what it thought of as moral on the subjects it would put under 
its jurisdiction.  Kipling also goes on to use phrases like "Fill full the mouth of 
famine and bid the sickness cease;".  The inclusion of such words is a 
characterisation that the Orient, to the West, was a place stricken with economic 
backwardness.  The Orient is, according to Kipling, also a state of material poverty 
that the West thinks it needed to eradicate.           
 
To further highlight the features of Kipling's (1899) poem, Roxanne Doty (1996) 
illustrates the US colonisation of the Philippines.  In the study, Doty presumes that 
identities of "Western people" and "inferior races" did not exist until discursive 
practices surrounding certain points were brought to the fore (331).    Doty argues 
that colonial relationships follow what she calls a "distinctly social logic by which 
actors construct themselves and others and the 'reality' that makes…colonialism 
possible" (333).  She focuses on the language used in texts and pays attention to 
the terms used.  She analyses Kipling (1899) and emphasises both the word 
"white" and "man" in separate sections.  Doty invokes how Kipling characterised 
colonisation as an exercise in manhood and that a failure to colonise would 
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undermine the emerging power's image. Despite such a desire, Doty argues that 
the US' acquisition of the Philippines is, unlike Spain’s, borne not out of "fear" but 
"love and sympathy".  Doty also characterised how manhood was seen in the other 
way by opponents; that being a colonial power would undermine the sense of 
manhood.  Nonetheless, Doty also emphasised the word "White" in the title to 
suggest that being a white man was a mechanism to exercise power over those 
who were not "White" (336).  When decisions to grant Filipinos rights and 
privileges closer to what "white" Americans enjoyed were considered, Doty argues 
that Americans found this unthinkable because Filipinos were regarded as 
"unthinkable".   
 
In addition, Figure 3 shows examples of how the media had portrayed Filipinos 
during the earlier parts of the colonial era.  One of those cartoons also portrayed 
the US as saviours from oppression (McCutcheon, 1914).  The other has 
highlighted notion that American education would “superstition, ignorance,…etc” 
and “bring civilisation” (Hamilton, 1899).       
 
Those pieces of literature the emphasise the positioning of the West as superior 
and the Orient as requiring supervision become useful in the subsequent chapters.  
As mentioned previously, they would form the basis for the frame scholars would 
use interpret the belief system they thought the West (i.e. US officials) would 
subscribe to.  Their beliefs had to have originated from somewhere.  Said and 
Doty were framing the West (US officials) as wanting to exercise their superiority.  
As the subsequent chapters will show, there is some credence to this as politicians 
and officials were in the process of trying to prove themselves.  Elements of these 
would be manifested in McKinley's Benevolent Assimilation and instructions to the 
Philippine Commission, even though he was reluctant at first.  Officials would be 
explicit in their intentions.  This notion would also bring the question up of why 
officials would contemplate the decisions they made in the first place – as 
empirical chapters would argue, is this was their chance to address what they saw 
as deficiencies in the colony.  That was manifested in the introduction of 
educational programmes – to address the notion that they thought Filipinos could 
not be left to govern themselves.  That was the colonial administration’s way to 
exert their power – by introducing reforms and hope that Filipinos (the Orient) 
would not want to let go of their ties to the US, something that pro-colonial actors 
like William Taft would hope to achieve.   
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Figure 3 - Some Portrayals of Filipinos and Americans in the US Press, 
McCutcheon (1914), Hamilton (1899) 
 
One attempt to integrate orientalism to the study of the Philippines was conducted 
by Reynaldo Ileto (2001), who reviews Karnow's (1989) In Our Image14.  
Consistent with orientalism's principle of drawing attention to instances of 
literature that promotes Western superiority by projecting anything undesirable 
about itself onto the Other, i.e. Orient, Ileto criticises Karnow for casting Filipinos 
in an adversarial light.  Specifically, Ileto says that in Karnow's text, Filipinos were 
"doomed" all along due to their long-standing practices related to kinship and 
reciprocity (Ileto, 2001: 5).  Furthermore, as a result, Ileto thinks that this Karnow 
uses these traits he observed as a basis to construct a binary characterisation of 
Filipinos vs Westerners with the latter portrayed as the more superior party. 
 
Ileto (2001: 6) reviews Compadre Colonialism: Philippine-American Relations: 
1898-194615.    Although Ileto lauds what he believes is a "faithful" representation 
of such thoughts by the book’s various authors, he raises the concern that such 
perceptions are prone to being relied upon, and reproduced by officials.  This flaw 
that Ileto uncovers in Steinberg's has later framed and informed Karnow's (1989) 
work.  In other words, Steinberg believes that Karnow's perceptions of Filipinos 
are tainted, given by the fact that Karnow believes Filipinos are an inferior race.    
 
 
14 In Karnow’s (1989) book In Our Image, he offers a journalistic account on the events 
of the Philippine-American War and the focus here was on the successes, failures, and 
difficulties of the US trying to transmit its ideals into its sole Asian colony both during its 
colonial era and afterwards.   
15 Compadre Colonialism, edited by Owen and Cullilane (1971) highlights the thoughts of 
colonial officials on Filipinos during the colonial era.  Steinberg argues here that officials 
had at some points needed to de-prioritise the inculcation of US values in favour of 




Ileto's work concludes with an inference that the way America has seen itself is 
coloured by the way it has seen other races, including Filipino colonial subjects.  
It is significant in highlighting the depiction of the Filipino as the Other.       
 
Another attempt made at critiquing studies of Philippine colonial experiences in 
terms of orientalism is provided by Azurin (2002), who expressed criticism of 
Karnow.  Azurin has questioned not only Karnow's perspective but also the lack of 
academic rigour as he compares the quality of Karnow's work to Corpuz (2005) 
and Bresnahan (1981).  Azurin has characterised Karnow's work as "no more than 
a babe in the woods, whimpering about the lack of will among the stubborn natives 
to imbibe American democratic ideals" and a "waste of time reading it" and 
something that merely reflects his perspectives on what he observed (143-144, 
149).  By extension, he criticised Ileto for even using it as a benchmark for an 
Orientalist perspective.  Notwithstanding the flaws in Karnow's work, Azurin has 
pointed out a distinguishing characteristic of researchers based outside the 
Philippines.  That is, compared to their Filipino counterparts, foreign-based 
researchers are likelier to subscribe to a school of thought and a theoretical 
framework for whose elements they must account for in their chosen research 
site.  Azurin suggests this is because the researchers' mentors have encouraged 
or trained them to seek out, the failure to do so successfully would have 
repercussions for their careers moving forward.  Azurin has also pointed out 
practical constraints (e.g. funding) for why there was a need to assign and map 
relevant elements in the empirical findings.   
 
Despite Azurin's criticisms and concerns about Orientalist literature, he is mindful 
about Said's limitations.  For instance, he mentioned that when a Western 
researcher would focus on warlords and warlordism, it was not necessarily in and 
of itself Orientalist.  It may be true that one may come to a research site with a 
framework.  However, the absence of a framework does not erase the reality that 
something that others may consider a warlord existed.  In this manner, it is 
something that cannot be reconciled by merely invoking an Orientalist 
perspective.  Based on Azurin's assertions, he does not necessarily see Orientalist 
and native literature as contradicting.  Notwithstanding Karnow's contribution and 
Ileto's use of it, Azurin believes that both perspectives can complement each other 
in the understanding of the research subject.  Such perspectives, according to 
Azurin, also encourage Philippine-based researchers to "compete" and improve 
their work (150).  
 
Based on the foregoing, orientalism offers a lens by which scholars attempt to 
make initial sense of how they thought perceptions about the Other, which in this 
case is the Filipino, were formed.  Orientalism is thus, a manifestation of how 
influential and powerful perceptions could be.  Orientalism is, however, not the 
only way in which perceptions are manifested and that the thesis will consider a 
range of other similar tools.  The concept of this will be discussed more in Chapter 
3. 
 
EDUCATION AND COLONIALISM 
FREIRE'S PEDAGOGY OF THE OPPRESSED 
While Chapter 7 will discuss educational issues in greater detail, commentary on 
the relevant literature is warranted here as they provide clues as to how US 




When it comes to the role of education, one theoretical framework that comes into 
mind is Paul Freire's (1968) Pedagogy of the Oppressed.  One of his work's central 
tenets is that the "central" problem of humanity is how its members affirm their 
human identities and that such quests get disrupted when oppressors try to 
exercise their power over oppressed people.  In addition, he argues that education 
is useful for oppressed people to find their humanity and become liberated, but 
only if someone from their ranks leads them.  In this case, the oppressors find 
themselves in a position to consider freedom as "threatening" but that despite 
this, the oppressed people would find themselves isolated from each other and 
regard the oppressor as "good" forces.   
 
Freire does not address the Philippine situation directly.  He may have a compelling 
account on what to do to avoid the pitfalls the oppressors used.  However, this 
thesis is not too focused on the outcome of educational initiatives.  This thesis is 
not so concerned as well with the effect that colonisation and the educational 
policies had on self-esteem.   
 
Freire's work may, nonetheless, exhibit some form of resonance to the Philippine 
situation.  As Freire argues that they see the concept of liberation as something 
threatening, its resonating point in the Philippine situation is that administrators 
discussed and put forward the programme they did.  As Chapter 7 would show 
more extensively, there was hesitation by administrators to make academic-based 
education more widespread for fear that it could spark more insurrections, 
something that colonial educational initiatives wanted to suppress in the first 
place.  Hence, oppressors, which in this case are the colonial administrators, could 
be motivated to design programmes that help ensure that the oppressed subjects, 
in this case, the colonised, stay in line and be discouraged from rebelling against 
the order.   
 
Freire also refers to his theory of "cultural action" consisting of two kinds: 
"dialogical" and "anti-dialogical" action.  The latter of which involves divide-and-
conquer tactics, invasion, and other methods used to reinforce the oppressor's 
power over the oppressed.  On some level in, there were signs of these tactics by 
administrators, especially in the early colonial era, albeit subtly.  Although it was 
not stated explicitly, Freire's "anti-dialogical" approach may have some resonance 
in the fact that some educational institutions catered to some prospective future 
Filipino leaders.  Nonetheless, if this framework were to be applied to the 
Philippines, one would imply that there would be a gulf between the poor Filipinos 
and affluent ones.  Moreover, given the political situation that Filipinos have 
experience over decades, it could also be tempting to think that Freire's advice to 
increase the chances of a successful liberation was disregarded and to adverse 
consequences.   
 
Therefore, Freire's work, if applied to account for the educational policies in the 
Philippines, can serve as a reminder for one of the commonly cited reasons why 
administrators wanted to apply the educational policies they did in the first place 
– to discourage rebellions16.  
 
Although Freire does not address the Philippines directly, his work provides a 
reminder that colonial administrators would find it in their material interests or 
 
16 This is discussed more in Chapter 7. 
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stand to gain from Filipinos becoming less encouraged to cause rebellions.  With 
Freire's framework in the background, it would imply that by preventing Filipinos 
from recognising what Freire calls their "humanity" and "critical consciousness", 
colonial administrators are shoring up the security of the colony, and would thus 
stand to gain from that.  However, this would then imply that administrators have 
a mindset that Filipinos are by nature, a security risk.  At the same time, there 
needed to be an institutionalised set-up that should have facilitated such 
perceptions.  These could be coming from the coloniser's side or from the colony's 
(e.g. the norms that colonisers found upon their arrival).  Nonetheless, these 
articulated together would mean that administrators would have a basis to claim 
security considerations and thus, whilst trying to educate Filipinos, do so in a way 
that would not encourage Filipino pupils to destabilise what administrators 
consider as security interests, thus, preventing pupils from experiencing what 
Freire calls "humanity" and "critical consciousness".   
 
 
ROLE OF THE THOMASITES  
The Thomasites were a group of several hundred educators who sailed on the US 
Army transport vessel Thomas (hence the term Thomasites) from San Francisco 
to Manila to support the colonial administration's mission of educating Filipinos.  
They took over from the US military who provided initial education to Filipinos 
(Anderson, 2018: 47).  Given their influence and role as some of the first civilian 
educators in the colony, attempting to review works centred on them will allow 
this thesis opportunities to include educational initiatives in an analytical 
framework.  
 
One such scholar to write about the Thomasites is Steinbock-Pratt (2012).  
Through Steinbock-Pratt’s review of the Thomasites, she tries to fill a gap in the 
historiography of gender in the Progressive Era17 as a result of women in the era 
being portrayed more as being associated with staying at home when in fact 
women have been involved in gainful employment experiences outdoors.  In the 
process, Steinbock-Pratt acknowledges that women looked forward to the 
prospect of the establishment of institutions in a setting (i.e. the Philippines) 
where few Americans occupied at the start.  She argues that their arrival in the 
Philippines marked a transition from a war setting to "suasion".  But what is even 
more notable is an acknowledgement that the teachers presented themselves 
differently from what administrators intended for in the territory (178). 
 
Given the nature of the approach and gap Steinbock-Pratt wanted to address in 
her field, it is understandable that the narrative put forward focuses on the 
experiences of the Thomasites.  In trying to situate Steinbock-Pratt's work when 
it comes to the motivations of colonial officials, Steinbock-Pratt's assertions are a 
reminder of how such officials wanted to use their soft power. Steinbock-Pratt's 
assertion that this is a transition from military to civilian power would seem 
consistent with what officials had in mind.  Furthermore, given the motivations of 
these women, one would infer that they would be a suitable foil for administrators 
to be able to make ordinary natives less suspicious about their moves since these 
 
17 The progressive era is an era where views and ideas that promote more rights and 
privileges towards other demographics who were previously deprived of them.  One such 
example is women’s rights to vote and rights in the workplace. 
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teachers are regarded as the middle person between the administrators and the 
natives.   
 
Although not related to the Thomasites' professional careers directly, Steinbock-
Pratt has documented the incidents in these teachers' private homes and their 
free time.  Whilst at home, the Thomasites had shown their disdain for what they 
considered as minor native transgressions.  During free time, these Thomasites 
have been portrayed to show a fascination for Filipino bodies, particularly men.  
The point here is that Steinbock-Pratt portrayed the Thomasites, as humans, had 
notions and ideas about ordinary native Filipinos that were not different from how 
other Americans saw Filipinos in the colony.  That is especially evident in their 
treatment of native servants or household helpers, who committed minor 
mistakes.  In some ways, one could argue that these Thomasites would embody 
how Americans in general saw Filipinos.   
 
Ultimately, Steinbeck-Pratt sought to portray women who felt otherwise 
constrained by their traditional roles back home, as empowered with authority 
given that they had to deal with Native Filipinos.   
 
That said, one way where Steinbock-Pratt's work becomes extraneous, vis-à-vis 
this thesis is when it highlights debates and policies over whether men should 
have preference over women in upcoming recruitment cycles.  Despite their 
depiction as the middle person to help ease what Filipinos intend to do, there was 
also rather limited explicit or direct engagement with the question of what role 
the Thomasites' public demeanour played in the motivations of administrators.  
Nonetheless, if one considers the role of the beliefs/perceptions, institutional set-
ups, and material motivations in the promulgation of educational policies, this puts 
into doubt the notion that officials wanted to primarily provide independent women 
with opportunities especially since it was policy for a time to have men as a 
preference.  Though the empowerment of women was a derivative benefit, doing 
so for its own sake was not a priority of the colonial administration.  Therefore, 
this account helps rule out some of the possible primary motivations for 
educational initiatives.  Nonetheless, these shortcomings in the literature do not 
take away from the fact that there were other motivations that administrators saw 
as essential in this process.    
    
CONCLUSION: SITUATIING THE CONTRIBUTION OF THE THESIS 
The thesis' contribution to existing Philippine historical literature lies in connecting 
the emergence of key aspects of liberal reforms to the material and non-material 
motivations for the US to do so more systematically.  Although the works that this 
chapter discusses have identified different explanations for why the US would 
pursue such motivations, they also provide an opportunity to identify how the links 
between each of them interact.    
 
When it comes to where these may come in, the orientalist mindset's significance 
becomes useful when the thesis considers the prevailing ideas in the process of 
American decision-making.  Given that ideas are described as beliefs about 
subjects, the orientalist mindset is one manner by which this concept is 
manifested.  However, the thesis aims partly to find out whether this alone can 




The review of the Marxist/Nationalist historians emphasises the material 
considerations people who hold authority and their allies.  Just as with the 
orientalist views on the US administration of the Philippines, there is value in 
highlighting the US’ material stake there.  Given that resources are finite, it 
necessitated a need to consider where to best use them and where the gains could 
be maximised.  Nonetheless, such approaches as presented suffer from their zero-
sum approach to explaining the US' mission in the Philippines and the former's 
attempt to introduce liberal reforms when there were clearly some material 
improvements, even residual, that the Filipinos experienced and benefitted from, 
compared to when the Spaniards were present.  Therefore, focusing on the US' 
mission in terms of their desires for material exploitation and class struggles 
obscures other considerations.  Even though it was conceivable that the 
government wanted to possess in the Philippines to get something out for people 
in the mainland and more particularly for business interests, most accounts would 
suggest that Filipinos experienced a material improvement.  Moreover, despite the 
finite resources, there were other reasons officials and politicians thought of to 
pursue the acquisition of the Philippines.   
 
Another one of the opportunities for this thesis to come in is that the works 
reviewed here have not emphasised directly how the politicians back in the 
mainland viewed the Philippines and Filipinos, as well as their own broader mission 
in the Far East.  The perspectives and approaches reviewed here add some value 
in their own right but given the Orientalist perspective prevailing about Filipinos 
among officials in the mainland, it provides an opportunity to witness such 
mindsets in action.  It also accounts for them when identifying the motivations to 
delay or introduce measures to liberalise the Philippines.  Moreover, as Azurin 
(2002) argues, these approaches should not be seen as competing but 
complementing one another.   
 
Given that some of the existing scholarship has discussed what colonial 
administrators and local elites have discovered, the reality was that most of the 
officials were partly dependent on the cues from Washington.  Decisions about 
where the Philippines featured in the US agenda, whether materially or in terms 
of America's image, had to clear the political process and system.  As the coming 
chapters would point out, colonial administrators, as well as the executive branch, 
depended on their political prospects and the desire of their colleagues to bolster 
the image of the US abroad.  They were also dependent on the perceptions of 
various politicians and administrators on what the Philippines is.  Based on those, 
such considerations are also why the thesis focuses on the policy processes.   
 
In other words, given that existing scholarship suggests a role for each idea, 
interest, and institution, and the opportunity such scholarship has provided by not 
discussing the domestic political situation in the US directly, this thesis’ 
contribution is using a more analytical framework to analyse the political and 
strategic decisions made to colonise the Philippines.  The contribution also includes 
using that framework to analyse why the US decided to gradually introduce 
selected political and economic reforms between 1898 and 1916.  That period was 
when the US exercised maximum power over the Philippines.  Emphasis will be on 
the policy-making process, which includes analysing the origins of reasons 
associated with such decisions.  Analysing the origins of such reasons also means 
considering the connections and articulations between the kinds of factors that 
have been ascribed to the phenomena in the Philippines.  This thesis wishes to 
 
 39 
suggest and emphasise that through the 3Is framework discussed in the next 
chapter, many of the factors behind the US’ actions on the Philippines have not 
developed in isolation from one another.  Thus, 3Is framework introduces an 
original explanation for the origins of what would later become Asia’s first 
democratic state.  It is through this that the other perspectives these scholars 
have championed are enriched and complemented.   
 
The next chapter will explain the underpinnings of the theoretical model that 
brings together material motivations, institutional constraints, and perceptions 






CHAPTER III: INTERESTS, INSTITUTIONS, AND IDEAS:  
THEORETICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL REFLECTIONS 
 
INTRODUCTION 
As discussed in Chapter 1, the main focus of this thesis is to map out how and 
why the United States, as a colonial power, began to introduce liberal political and 
economic reforms in the Philippines at a relatively early stage compared to other 
Western colonisers.  Given that dynamic, there is a question on what the possible 
drivers of the pertinent policies were and whether they could act as explanations 
that have not been informed by other possible explanations or dynamics.   
This chapter introduces a framework for analysing such questions and explores its 
application and significance.  The works surveyed about the Philippines in Chapter 
2 suggest an opportunity for a less interest-only-based explanation to provide new 
insights into the Philippine situation in the early twentieth century in a more 
nuanced way.  
Hall's (1997) 3Is framework is a widely used model in analysing how public policy 
works and variants have emerged to appropriate the 3Is framework to different 
kinds of policies.  This chapter's second section outlines what ideas, institutions, 
and interests are.  It will also explain each of them, discuss their importance and 
salience in accounting for phenomena and outcomes.  It will, however, explain 
why considering them alone is not always sufficient.  The next section will also 
reiterate some of the authors who have privileged and criticised using just ideas, 
interests, and institutions as a sole explanation to reinforce the points given in the 
previous sentence.    
Based on what the second section has uncovered about the Is, the third main 
section will also illustrate how the ideas, interests, and institutions interact 
together to shape policy.  Specifically, examples will be illustrated to demonstrate 
how scholars have used the 3Is framework to analyse the process and the ensuing 
outcomes.  The chapter will show the framework's relevance to explaining US 
colonial policies in the Philippines by identifying the different ideas, institutions, 
and interests and previewing how they potentially interact.  From here, there 
would be a justification for how the 3Is fits within the tradition of historical 
sociology.  In particular, that as historical sociology encourages the creation of a 
theoretical lens to help make sense of previous phenomena, the 3Is framework 
can provide an interpretative lens for analysing the key factors involved in the 
process of decision-making.  
INTERESTS, INSTITUTIONS, AND IDEAS: USEFUL BUT INSUFFICIENT IN 
THEMSELVES 
Bashir and Ungar (2015) describe interests broadly to refer to the agenda that the 
actors have, institutions as existing structures and policies, and ideas as the 
knowledge and values that policymakers have toward an issue.  The coming 
subsections will discuss the different Is and how each of them is valuable but also 




Hall (1997: 176) defines interests simply as the "material" agenda of the actors 
involved in policy-making.  The mention of material interests implies that they can 
refer to anything that would deliver financial gains, access to resources, electoral 
victories, among others.  Similarly, Pomey et al. (2010: 709) defines interests as 
the "agendas of societal groups, elected officials, researchers, and policy 
entrepreneurs".  Such actors can come in the form of groups or individuals.  For 
Hwang (2006), interests can be thought of as the material benefits an actor 
believes he or she stands to gain or lose from pursuing a particular decision.  
Furthermore, interests are thus often associated with principles of rational choice 
(Blyth, 2003), which assume that an agent will act based on what he thinks will 
provide him with more material benefits.  These can take the form of group 
interests, class interests, or agents acting on behalf of groups. 
Interests may refer to an agent's electoral prospects and the degree of support 
an agent hopes to obtain by deciding to take a particular action.  Interests also 
refer to the other things that someone may stand to gain or preserve as a result 
of taking certain actions.  
This thesis adopts a position interests refer to a political or economic agenda an 
actor hopes to gain, defend, or satisfy as a result of making a certain decision.  
The fact is agents act and decide on what they believe they stand to gain or lose 
politically and economically/materially.  Perceiving something as an interest to be 
a basis for making a decision does not necessarily mean the agent would 
ultimately protect it successfully; the agent may be wrong and still lose out.  
However, it still does not preclude that agent from acting based on it.   
There are a few limitations of using material-based or interest-based approaches.  
One of Blyth's (2002; 2003) key assertions is that interests are social 
constructions and that agents' decisions do not reflect their interests per se but 
how they perceive or think their interests are.  Blyth also highlighted a flaw of 
rational choice-based accounts by suggesting that they rested on "statics" more 
than "dynamics", which means that they did not adequately consider the role of 
change.     
A critical consideration of using material-based approaches is whether an observer 
could assess if the action an agent takes is actually in that agent's best interest.  
It implies one must consider the values system involved as well as the information 
made available to these agents.  Blyth (2002; 2003) questions the explanatory 
value of interests in and of itself.  Rational choice approaches provide the basis 
for interest-based explanations.    He has acknowledged that the salience of 
rational choice theory in political science lied in helping the discipline think about 
how the achievement of stability was a problem.  However, one of rational choice's 
assumptions that he found faulty was that it was a given that agents knew what 
their interests were.  Under such a premise, there was almost no question about 
how they thought about what their interests were.  Another problem with 
highlighting interests lies in the circular logic that may arise implicitly.  For 
instance, if an agent decides to do A over B, there is a tendency to conclude or 
assume that choosing A was a "rational" choice and that it was considered 
"reasonable" to the said agent.  However, by making such assertions, one could 
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merely equate an agent's interest to what is observable. Second, that what an 
agent does is due solely by what the agent believes is his or her interest.  Thereby, 
a pitfall of relying solely on interest-based explanations is that observers may tend 
to reduce the analysis to something akin to a "because they wanted to do it, they 
did it, and because we know they did it…, this shows they wanted to do it"-type 
of circular reasoning where the underlying reasons for doing something may 
remain undiscovered (Blyth, 2002: 27-9).    
Schonhardt-Bailey (2006) attempts to analyse the repeal of the corn laws in 1846.  
She looked in particular at why Conservative Prime Minister Robert Peel pushed 
to repeal corn laws when members of parliament (MPs) from his own party had a 
financial stake in retaining such corn laws.  The author identifies the so-called 
supply- and demand-side pressures to analyse the decision.  Schonhardt-Bailey 
analysed MPs' speeches for keywords. Such keywords contained the basis for what 
MPs prioritised.  The strength of Schonhardt-Bailey's work is that it impresses that 
interests alone were not sufficient in accounting for such decisions.  If that were 
the case, then the MPs would vote in favour of retaining and against repealing the 
Corn Laws.  Peel himself would not have pushed for it, given that he would face 
backlash from his party-mates.   
Additionally, Schonhardt-Bailey's account suggests that interests are not static 
over time.  That is, there should have been other forces in play to make agents 
think differently about their interests.  In the case of the passage of the corn laws, 
as Britain's economy's structure evolved, it prompted key MPs hesitant of free 
trade to warm up to it, and their electoral coalition influenced them to embrace it.  
The bottom line here is that interests and how to satisfy them are subject to 
change.  Given the non-static nature of interests, it will mean that external 
conditions influence them.  It will also mean agents will think differently about it 
as a result of interactions and changes in circumstances.      
INSTITUTIONS  
North (1995) defines institutions as the "rules of the game".  More specifically, 
these are "formal and informal rules, norms, precedents, and organisational 
factors that structure political behaviour", or government structures and policy 
legacies among others (Hall and Taylor, 1996; Hall, 1997; Pomey et al., 2010).  
That goes beyond a traditional definition whereby John (2012: 56) argues that an 
advantage of introducing institutions is that it acknowledges the unique nature of 
each polity's rules and emphasises the values that shape state traditions.  It 
implies that in addition to formal structures in place such as the bureaucracy, 
institutions are also informal traditions that agents need to obey.  Examples of 
such would also include notions of reciprocity, the machinery of key groups.   
For Hall, theoretical approaches that emphasise the importance of institutions 
ascribe factors behind economic policy or performance to the organisational 
structures of the political economy.  It primarily ascribes the nation-state as the 
main unit of analysis.   In turn, the actors in the analysis include organisations in 
the economy, such as trade unions or firms.  This approach also pays attention to 
institutional differences among nations.  In turn, scholars in the discipline argue 




Using institutions alone to explain how policies are adopted contains limitations.  
Decision-makers do not necessarily internalise the norms associated with such 
institutions.  An institution-only-based approach does not adequately consider the 
political and social context that would affect how such institutions would work in 
the society they are located in (John, 2012: 55).  It implies that John further 
argued that using a standalone institution-based approach is most appropriate for 
making a comparison between two countries (ibid, 56).     
Furthermore, Hwang (2006) criticises the limits of institutional explanations, 
especially when accounting for how key welfare policies in South Korea have 
evolved.  For instance, he questioned the notion that such policies were products 
of urbanisation and industrialisation.  Hwang points out that such programmes 
existed before wide-scale industrialisation efforts.  Hwang argues that by adopting 
an institution(-only) approach, such approaches do not address the availability of 
policy choices within which the pertinent political opportunities arise.  Existing 
institutional approaches do not necessarily indicate what actors consider as 
important.  Although institutions provide the constraints and platform for which 
agents would have to act, Hwang argues that institutions do not inherently tell the 
actors involved what their feasible options and desires are.  Those would have to 
be something that actors would need to make sense of within these institutional 
constraints.  Institutions are also not inherent or self-commanding. 
When trying to explain change, Hwang argues that institutions per se do not 
necessarily explain policy change since they tend to promote what is called "policy 
inertia" (2006: 18).  That reinforces the notion that institutions are the 
constraining power that provides agents with a reality check on how far their ideas 
can be realised.  Beland (2009) argues similarly that institutions and historical 
institutionalism identifies what the actor's goals are or what is important, but more 
importantly, that there are constraints that surround them.  Although they are 
useful in explaining the failure of policies or options to advance to the next stages, 
institutions themselves are unable to explain how the policies were even options 
in the first place. 
Although Hall is usually known for emphasising the use of ideas in some of his 
work, there are occasions in which he flags up the usefulness of institutions.  For 
instance, Hall (1993) provides an application of how institutional analysis is 
conducted and uses institutions to explain how policies change.  He was interested 
in how the UK government shifted from a Keynesian- to a consumption- and 
monetary-based economic orientation.   
The previous account implies that with too many institutions, it may be difficult to 
ascertain the importance of each.  Furthermore, with the identification of too many 
institutions, one may devalue the importance of potential institutions.  As a result, 
a broad definition of institutions could erode how well such can explain the 
decision-making process (John, 2012: 56).   
Steinmo (1989) also attempted to use institutions to discuss how the US, UK, and 
Sweden have diverse tax policies.  He argued that political structures (e.g. 
fragmented institutional structure in the US, centralised state structure in Sweden, 
first-past-the-post electoral system in the UK) played a major role in how tax 
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policies differed not just between the three cases but within some of the cases.  
However, studying institutions alone had its limits, such as its inability to explain 
the relatively high corporate tax rate in the US as at the time of the studies.  
Amidst Sweden's institutionalised state-interest group relationships, the 
intermediation of group remained dependent on the country's social structure and 
that the electoral system would only cause stability if voting patterns have 
remained consistent.  In this case, interests have played a key explanatory role 
to distinguish how Sweden and the UK have been apart in tax regimes (in John, 
1998: 50-51).   
Based on the foregoing, this thesis adopts the position that institutions are 
structures and constraints that agents have to work with or consider if they are to 
make certain decisions and carry out what they want to do.  Although identifying 
institutions is not always sufficient in justifying why agents decided in a particular 
manner, they are nonetheless useful as they provide what North describes as the 
norms in which decision-makers should consider and operate under.  Furthermore, 
amidst the differences mentioned in this section about how institutions are 
understood, this thesis plans to adopt the North's (1995) characterisation of an 
institution as the established norms and practices agents encounter, or the "rules 
of the game".  Agents may have an interest in something, their ability to fulfil it 
may be limited or constrained by the presence of the institutions or norms in the 
areas they plan to operate.  On the other hand, as Hwang suggests, scholars need 
to make sense of institutions to identify and appreciate the options available to 
agents that had to make decisions.   
IDEAS 
Ideas are socially constructed beliefs that individuals hold (Goldstein and 
Keohane, 1993: 3).  More specifically, Pomey et al. (2010: 709) describes them 
as "knowledge or beliefs about what is", or "views about what ought to be (e.g. 
values)", or a combination of both.  Based on these, ideas influence not only an 
agents' definition (in Gauvin, 2014: 3) but also these agents' perceptions of what 
is acceptable.  Ideas are also associated with the meaning that actors place when 
deciding certain courses of action.   
Among the key questions that analysts consider when analysing ideas is whether 
a policy option is consistent with prevailing societal values, style of government, 
and/or values of the most influential professional groups (Gauvin, 2014: 3).  Ideas 
may take the form of political, social, and economic beliefs and this thesis plans 
to examine both.   
Cairney (2012: 242) argues that the concept of an idea may refer to a broad range 
of concepts and social practices. Cairney's aim with ideas is that one has to identify 
common themes such as the degree to how such ideas explain political power.  
That includes one's world views and shared beliefs.  It may also comprise 
traditions passed down through socialisation and understandings of the world that 
one can use to articulate interests.  Hall (1997) argues as well that ideas may also 
refer to ideologies.  Beland (2016: 736) also defines ideas as "changing and 
historically-constructed 'causal beliefs' that agents harbour".  Beland further 
argues that these would incorporate the values and perceptions that actors 
possess.    Campbell writes that ideas are supposed to be treated as an aspect of 
 
 45 
reality that can mould human behaviour and policy decisions directly.  Ideas can 
powerfully affect the policy-making process given that they affect preferences 
about what goals are deemed desirable and they also give so-called "cognitive 
maps" for assessing how to reach such goals (Feldmann, 2013: 355). 
Hall (1997) argues that compared to the first two approaches discussed, the idea-
centric school is relatively underdeveloped but still important to understand the 
outcomes.  Ideas-centric approaches include the significance of culture to 
economic policies.  Furthermore, other scholars (e.g. Hall, 1989; Hirschmann, 
1981; Walsh, 2000; Weir and Skocpol, 1985) contend that ideas are important in 
that they define what policy options are feasible.  Some scholars (e.g. Appel, 
2000; Goldstein, 1993; Haas, 1992; Sabatier, 1988; Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 
1993; Dolowitz and Marsh, 2000) also go further to argue that ideas themselves 
are the main causal factors in why agents would decide in favour of a certain 
action (in Poteete, 2003: 527). 
Some scholars ascribe their preference for interest-based approaches before 
institutional-based approaches.  According to Goldstein and Keohane (1993: 6-7), 
ideas should only be incorporated into analysis after one deems that interest-
based approaches do not sufficiently account for the outcome.  On the other hand, 
scholars such as Sikkink (1991) and Haas (1992) prioritise ideas more.  Policies 
would be influenced by ideas that have received consensus among the relevant 
profession.  Hall also argues that allocating causal forces to ideas is done as they 
provide an opportunity to create newer types of possible social or political groups.  
A third group posits that ideas which have had broader definitions should have 
causal primacy as they constitute the most basic meaning systems that make 
possible individual or collective action (Johnson, 1994).  Based on the foregoing, 
it also tries to imply that interests and institutional factors are not predefined or 
uninformed.  Thus, ideas shape interests and institutions.  
For Hall, ideas-based approaches can account for aspects of human interaction 
that cannot be emphasised in other approaches.  Challenges remain, however, as 
there is difficulty to separate ideas from other approaches.  On the other hand, 
although incorporating ideas enhance analysis, Hall posits that those who 
emphasise too much of ideas at the expense of material interests are in danger of 
missing out on other factors that are important to the functioning of the political 
economy.  Thus, Hall analyses the interactions between ideas, interests, and 
institutions.   
Therefore, Hall has put forward some guidelines for those who want to work with 
ideas.  They include a need to put forward sophisticated theories on how ideas 
could be persuasive in their own right, irrespective of what propels their salience.  
It necessitates an improved definition of how new ideas interact with existing 
ones.  Hall also argues that ideas are influential if they are part and parcel of social 
contexts in which they operate.  It would then be useful to identify and discuss 
how such ideas become institutionalised in their society.         
Beland (2016: 736) argues that one should rigorously assess how ideas matter.   
In an earlier piece of scholarship, Beland (2009) also extends Blyth's approach to 
ideas and argues along a similar line.  In particular, Beland argues that ideas help 
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actors make sense of their interests.  Among his primary arguments about what 
ideas do is that they shape assumptions that affect what is in the proposals that 
agents put forward.  Second, they play a useful role in constructing issues that 
make their way onto the agenda.   Finally, given the assumptions that agents 
work under as well as the problems and issues that were constructed, ideas act 
as discursive weapons used in the construction of reform measures.  Beland 
concedes however that if ideas are to be the fundamental causal factor, certain 
institutional and political conditions need to be present.  It is through the 
interaction of ideas with institutions and political actors that institutions become 
politically influential.  Furthermore, for Beland, institutional factors, thus limit the 
effectivity of ideas.  Similarly, cultural factors impact what Beland calls the 
"framing process".  Under the "framing process", if values that movements seek 
to defend score low in a society's belief system, the task becomes more 
challenging.  However, if the value under discussion runs high in that hierarchy, 
the framing process becomes more effective.    
Hwang (2006) also adds that given that agents have multiple preferences, how 
issues are defined affect their decision.  Finally, ideas can be used as discursive 
tools.  Furthermore, Beland makes room for discussing the impact of institutions 
on the politics and underlying ideas.  That was something that Schonhardt-Bailey 
has argued in accounting for how some members of Peel's party supported his call 
to repeal certain the Corn Laws.    
For John (1998: 123), the issue is whether ideas have an independent influence 
on policy formulation and implementation.  It means that he focuses on whether 
the existence of ideas per se can cause actors to decide in a particular manner or 
aim for a certain outcome.    
Based on these accounts, the two common themes that emerge are that of ideas 
as values or shared beliefs.  In other words, ideas try to answer the question of 
what is it that the agents who are making the decisions and trying to put forward 
a series of policies believe in and basing their actions on such beliefs.  Although it 
may be useful to think of ideas as knowledge, the problem with this notion is that 
knowledge may not be absolute or sincerely applied.  As such, this thesis adopts 
ideas as something that refers to an agent's beliefs or values, especially those 
that were historically-constructed (e.g. Beland, 2016).  Ideas help the agent make 
sense of the options he or she has for decision-making and can also provide him 
or her room to manoeuvre his or her interests.  Further and in relation to that, the 
agent's priorities and world views provide a way for agents to shape how they 
understand their interests. 
 
INTERACTION AMONG THE IDEAS, INTERESTS, AND INSTITUTIONS 
The 3Is framework is widely considered by scholars to be the foundations for 
politics (Bashir and Ungar, 2015).  As a starting point, Heclo (1994) broadly posits 
the relationship of ideas, interests, and institutions: a) "interests tell institutions 
what to do"; b) "institutions tell ideas how to survive"; c) "ideas tell interests what 
to mean".  These are positions that were briefly posited by some of the scholars 
discussed earlier in the chapter.  They imply several things: interests are not self-
explanatory; they need to be rooted in contexts about beliefs and values systems.  
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Given how widely used the 3Is framework is in public policy, it can act as a tool 
to help account for how various factors could lead to the outcomes that had 
transpired when the US colonised the Philippines.   
To further illustrating how these Is potentially work together, it may be worth 
revisiting their strengths and weaknesses briefly in explaining a certain 
phenomenon.  Hwang characterises how interest-, ideas-, and institution-based 
scholars consider the role of changing target institutions.  For those primarily 
concerned with interests, change happens if the structure of preference 
experiences changes.  Preference experiences, in this case, would then refer to 
what an agent's options are, based on what that agent values.  The question then 
becomes how to account for such changes.  The answer lies in bringing ideas into 
the discussion.  In this light, ideas, which refers to the values that an agent 
subscribes to, helps to shape the way he or she changes thinking about interests.  
Schonhardt-Bailey (2006) shares a similar notion of ideas by arguing that 
reinterpreting the meaning of conservatism within the 1840s British Conservative 
Party to match the need to repeal the corn laws was a way to persuade wavering 
MPs from Peel's own party. 
 
Furthermore, consistent with Heclo's (1994: 383) characterisation that "ideas tell 
interests what to mean", ideas also act as rhetorical devices that could convince 
agents with decision-making powers that thinking about their interests in a certain 
way could serve what they think of as their interests.  For those primarily 
concerned with ideas, on the other hand, institutional change how which actors 
define and articulate their policy positions. 
 
Moreover, for institutional-based theorists, change is perceived as the 
consequences of strategic action in an institutional context that lends itself better 
to some alternatives over others.  Hwang argues that each of these ideas, 
institutions, and interests considered on their own are particularly problematic in 
their inabilities to explain policy changes and the form such changes manifest 
themselves in (Hwang, 2006: 10-11).  For one, this strengthens the notion that 
one of the ideas, interests, and institutions have to be situated in a particular time 
or contexts and that the timing of when certain events happened may be 
important.      
Ideas telling interests what to mean is something that Blyth (2002) has already 
raised.  As established previously, interests per se do not have any inherent 
meaning and are subject to social construction.  More specifically, ideas affect 
preference and as mentioned earlier, provide a "cognitive map" for how to 
consider and attain such preferences (Feldmann, 2013: 355).  In other words, 
ideas provide a guide for agents for achieving their interests.  In relation to such, 
Blyth (2003: 702) has argued that ideas can be used along with interest- or 
rational choice-based explanations as – but not limited to - "power resources".   
Ultimately, his point here is that one has to make room for how or why agents 
behave the way that they do; in other words, why agents consider this or that as 
interests to begin with.  For him, "ideas constitute our interests" (ibid).  It means 
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that interests of being satisfied by opening new trading routes or winning re-
election should have originated from somewhere.  They imply that these should 
have been reached partly as a result of what one values.   
Based on Beland's (2009) arguments, the relationship between institutions and 
ideas can be one where institutions limit ideas from or encourage actors to realise 
their full potential.  Given Beland's concern that institutions per se do not indicate 
how options were conceived, it suggests that ideas come in that they would stand 
for the assumptions that agents have to inform their creation of options.  As 
institutions also refer to social arrangements (e.g. what local officials can do), 
their presence implies that collaboration has to take place between local 
(representing the institutional) and transnational actors to ensure ideas are 
implemented as effectively as possible.  It was also previously mentioned that 
ideas are powerful precisely because of how they interact with institutions and 
political agents (i.e. and their interests).  Therefore, Beland suggests that given 
the important role of ideas, the study of institutional forces, agents and their 
interests is warranted.  Finally, he argues that as ideas help shape interests, any 
ideas about how interests are seen may impact the ability to mobilise for support 
of such assertions.   
Similarly, Beland also suggests that although ideas help agents make sense of 
their interests, agents also decide to promote the ideas that become part of the 
agenda.  Beland argues specifically that certain ideas, to become influential, need 
to have powerful agents promoting them. 
As Heclo (1994) posits that "interests tell institutions what to do", he is suggesting 
that interests and institutions act together such that the resulting institutions are 
a reflection of the interests that agents have had in mind.  The resulting 
institutions are there to help agents realise what they think their interests are and 
that they are not established necessarily for their sake.     
Poteete (2003: 531) provided a lens for considering the relationship between ideas 
and institutions.  Ideas, according to her, feed into one's expectations about causal 
relationships.  Furthermore, institutions come in between ideas and interests by 
deciding who may choose and implement policies.  It would make sense given that 
institutions act as a constraining factor that helps agents make sense of how far 
an agent's ideas can be taken.  Institutions help influence the attentiveness of 
actors to ideas when it's time for them to make decisions.  Institutions also 
influence the degree of attention-specific sets that policymakers give to ideas from 
particular sources, and the former determines the degree of influence any given 
set of ideas need to achieve to effect policy changes.  As for the relationship 
between institutions and interests, the former structures the latter (Poteete, 2003: 
528, 531).  Furthermore, as a result of the constraining nature of institutions, they 
will help agents rethink of what their interests are, which in turn will translate to 
what decisions are made.   
The constraining power of institutions on ideas can also be manifested in works 
such as Lieberman (2002). Lieberman (2002) attempts to account for changes in 
US policy during the civil rights era.  Affirmative action was borne out of conflicts 
between institutions and ideas.  Civil rights were discussed in terms of promoting 
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the idea of racial equality.  Those in authority had to implement relevant legislation 
within existing institutions.  The institutional set-up of the US, such as the power 
that states had and members of Congress from southern states have forced 
proponents of civil rights to lower their expectations.  The implication is that 
institutions have constrained the idea of racial equality from reaching its full 
potential.  As a consequence, there was a series of political problems that 
occurred, which in turn triggered stronger and less incremental civic action.  
Policymakers came up with better policies whose outcomes exceeded the 
intentions of the original laws (in John, 1998: 141). 
Based on the foregoing, ideas can help agents make sense of what their interests 
are.  It provides them with a set of values for which to decide what interests to 
keep in mind as they pursue decisions.  On the other hand, ideas are also going 
to reflect the interests that are dominant in society.  Institutions limit the 
effectivity of the ideas that come into mind. At the same time, ideas also help 
agents make sense of the institutions around them in a similar way that they make 
sense of interests.  Institutions make agents' aware of the interests that agents 
may pursue, given its constraining power.  Likewise, institutions also reflect the 
interests of the agents that have gone before them.    
However, this thesis does not intend to argue that interests, ideas, or institutions, 
each in and of themselves, will always be the most important determinant in policy 
outcomes.  The thesis would instead focus on their interactions.  Ideas, interests, 
and institutions, when used, would always operate in combination with each other.  
The extent to which one or two of them will be privileged over the rest is 
contingent on the phenomenon under examination.   
Figure 4 - SIMPLIFIED DIAGRAM OF HOW Is POTENTIALLY INTERACT 





INSTITUTIONS    INTERESTS    
 
 
POTENTIAL APPLICATION TO PHILIPPINE CASE 
The given framework helps identify and analyse the ideas, interests, and 
institutions that could have been influential in how the US decided to (a) take the 
Philippines, (b) grant the Philippines a constitution that contained more civil 
liberties from within the colony in 1916, and (c) introduce the institutions 
associated with such liberties between 1898 and 1916.  Works by Blyth's (2002), 
Poteete (2003), Hwang (2006), Beland (2009) and Humpage (2010) help 
Ideas help agents make 
sense of interests. 
 
Ideas reflect the agents’ 
interests 
Institutions constrain and/or facilitate the saliency of interests. 
Institutions result from the construction of the agents’ interests.   
Institutions constrain 
and/or facilitate the 
saliency of ideas. 
Ideas help agents make 
sense of institutions. 
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characterise the nature of the interactions of the ideas, interests, and institutions 
in the Philippine setting.  
Institution-related factors 
Based on various accounts on why the US took the Philippines and introduced 
pertinent reforms when it had control, several common institutional factors were 
present to the extent that they influenced the nature of the reforms.  First of them 
was the commitment of the US to honour existing directives, laws and treaties.  
Senior officials believed there would be in trouble if, for instance, they violated 
the principle of neutrality.  Such a line of thinking was also extended to the notion 
of property rights, which also served to constrain decisions to introduce key 
reforms.  It was related to another institution involved - the Catholic Church.  One 
of the chapters discussing land redistribution shows (Chapter 8), the governors-
general had to tread lightly so as not to go anger this group.  Furthermore, their 
influence has limited what governors-general could do to give Filipino a piece of 
the land.  As will be argued, this institution was a limiting factor in how much the 
executive branch could grant Filipinos ownership of land, given how valuable the 
Friar Lands were.  The influence of the Catholic Church then relates to the electoral 
interest politics that US officials had to work with.     
Another institution is the relationship between the executive and legislative 
branches.  Back then, there was a separation of powers between each branch of 
Congress that politicians and bureaucrats observed.  The Presidents and the 
administrations they led could, hence, not get all of their agenda passed even if 
their party dominated Congress.  The President and the Governor-General failed 
to get an outright abolition of tariffs as members of Congress have expressed 
opposition and reasserted the authority of the legislative branch.     
As will be seen in the coming chapters, particularly in Chapter 4, a third institution 
the US government and its representatives had to deal with was the 
local/provincial elites in the Philippines to be able to achieve their stated political 
and economic pursuits in the colony.  These were mostly holdovers from the 
Spanish government.  
Based on the institutional perspective, a hypothesis emerges.  US officials, with 
their attempts to introduce liberal reforms, had to work with pre-existing 
institutions.  These institutions, in turn, had the potential to limit the effectivity of 
certain outcomes.  These institutions would have actors who have their interests 
in perpetuating social relations.  These had, at times, frustrated efforts to 
introduce liberal reforms.  These institutions in the Philippines and the US had at 
times frustrated the hopes of officials to introduce progressive reforms.   
Interest-related factors 
As mentioned in the previous sections, interests refer to the agendas that agents 
have when pursuing a course of action.  Some of the main interests involved in 
US actions over the Philippines include improving the US' image as an emerging 
power, securing the Philippines from rebellions, better prospects for the domestic 
US economy, satisfying key domestic interests groups.  
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Interests may encompass economic and strategic/geopolitical interests.   Dr 
James Kurth defines geopolitics as the "study of the 'realities and mentalities of 
the localities'" (Granieri, 2015: 492).  The localities in that instance refer to paying 
attention to the local contexts and cultures of the parties involved in the policy in 
question.  Granieri further argues that geopolitics looks at the "longer-term forces" 
that shape the actions agents decide.  More particularly, geopolitics is about 
looking at the historical and geographical factors that shape policy-making.  The 
geopolitical sphere provides opportunities to identify interests, including economic 
and political ones.  It should have connections to the economic factors that drive 
the actors involved.  In this case, the actor is the US as a state and the key officials 
acting on its behalf.  One could hypothesise that under the geopolitical level of 
analysis, the US government had a strategic use for the Philippines in the Asia-
Pacific region.  Another related interest stemming from geopolitics is the after-
effects of economic downturns in the US.  The relevant questions that stem from 
this include a) What else did the US want from the Asia-Pacific region?  b) 
Furthermore, where else in the world could the answers to how strategic retaining 
the Philippines was lie in? c) Given that the US had other possessions and its 
adversaries, did such circumstances undermine what would become its 
commitment to the Philippines?    
On the interest level of analysis, a hypothesis that comes into mind is that the 
Asia-Pacific provided opportunities for the US to explore other places to exert their 
influence and expand their territories.  That is analysed in conjunction with 
economic or interest-based explanations as well as ideas-based explanations (e.g. 
glut or overproduction thesis).   
Inspired by Hall's interest-based approach, the upcoming chapters would attempt 
to look at interests that were present in the US and the Philippines that would limit 
the desired outcomes, their effectiveness as well as encourage certain pieces 
legislation.  Chapter 8, for instance, draws from various sources to see how US 
government officials and Congressional leaders responded to reactions from key 
constituents.  These responses would then try to account for whether these 
officials wanted to do something but were unable to do so.  Congressional 
legislation meant to target the Philippines and assist it economically, and more 
importantly, any hindrance to what could have been a quicker passage is covered 
by this.  In this perspective, a question of land reform would be covered especially 
on the foundations that the US found themselves grappling.  Therefore, this thesis 
would also hypothesise that interests connected to certain US industries delayed 
the passage of bills that would have provided the colony with economic assistance 
sooner.   
As mentioned several times, Hall has hinted out that the interests approach, 
emphasises decisions made from the perspective of gains or loss.  In this light, 
how much were electoral politics a factor in the decisions made to develop the 
colony?  The interests approach makes some mention of the economic and political 
benefits of holding or liberalising the Philippines at some point or letting it free 
altogether.  In other words, it refers to what actors or agents thought they could 
stand to gain for operating in the islands.  This rational-based approach considers 
the presence of constituencies or lobbies that delivered key votes and would 
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otherwise benefit from the Philippines remaining a US territory or not.  The 
rational-based approaches examine the constituencies who would withhold votes 
if the US government or its representatives in the Philippines were to liberalise 
certain policies in the colony.  In any case, one hypothesis under the interest-
based approach is that electoral politics was an important consideration for 
politicians.   
Furthermore, in some cases, there would be a change in management, i.e. 
including their political affiliation.  Additionally, politicians want to get re-elected.  
Given the difference in political affiliation, there would be a different set of policies 
and circumstances that they intend to address.  The key, however, is that they 
campaigned to address such circumstances, and they need to be seen as keeping 
their campaign promises in front of voters.  Hence, one of the hypotheses that 
would be explored, especially in Chapters 8, 9, and 10 is that electoral politics was 
one of those things that helped ushered in changes in policy.   
The other possible interest-based reasons officials acquired the Philippines that 
they needed a base for the US for its naval activities and easy access to the 
Chinese market.  The Philippines would then serve that interest.  Similar reasons 
would apply for issues of instituting trade policy and education.  Thus, this thesis 
analyses the role of developing the colonial economy as a primary consideration 
for the establishment of institutions of education and the trading regime.   
Ideas 
Given that ideas refer to shared beliefs and emerge from values, if one was looking 
at interests and institutions in isolation, then one might say that liberal reforms in 
the Philippines were introduced to merely improve Filipinos' lives.  The same is 
true for desires to grow the colonial economy. However, given that such initiatives 
take effort and entail material costs, one would want to reflect on what they are 
doing this for.  Hence, ideas enter the picture, and the link may be deep or indirect.  
The ideas and discourses involved had to do with those of the "white man's 
burden", "civilising mission", and the notion that US officials felt Filipinos were not 
ready to govern themselves.   In this light, such measures and reforms are 
introduced to address ideas US officials harboured about the Philippines.   
Analysing US actions using the ideas approach involves looking at the ideas that 
the US put forward to Filipinos such as "liberty" and "civilising".  Moreover, it also 
considers other ideas that politicians have been floating around, such as the so-
called "white man's burden" as a purported justification to take the Philippines 
under US possession.  The "white man's burden" implying that the officials 
believed those belonging to the "white" race are in the best position to introduce 
reforms.  Another way to see this level of analysis manifested this is to look at the 
educational programmes the US instituted in the islands.  Scholars have posited 
that one of the obvious contributions to the Philippines was the public education 
system whereby certain ideals and values the US wanted Filipinos to inculcate 
were transmitted.  Without overstating the ideas approach, by considering ideas 
and cultural items that were floated by US officials, one could plot out other issues 
in which the otherwise strictly economic or institutional levels of analysis alone 
are unable to touch on.  From here, one can hypothesise that the US supported 
 
 53 
the establishment of formal institutions associated with itself to make its values 
known even if there are questions as to whether the US actually stood for what it 
claimed to stand for.  Therefore, the ensuing institutions reflect the ideas that 
officials had about the Philippines.              
Some potential interactions between Interests, Institutions, and Ideas 
Although each chapter tries considering as many ideas, institutions, and interests 
as possible, some of them are linked intrinsically to each other.  Also, in identifying 
the ideas, institutions, and interests, the thesis will show that some interests are 
linked to each other.  This is also the case for some ideas and, to some degree, 
institutions.  For instance, one of the points this thesis will highlight is economic 
and geopolitical levels of analysis cannot be easily separated when accounting for 
the motivations of US officials to stir the Philippines in a certain direction.   
One potential hypothesis stemming from the interactions between ideas and 
interests is the glut thesis was powerful enough, as evidenced by the fact that key 
officials wanted to find new markets for US goods.  It made officials make sense 
of their desire to seek ways of becoming profitable, hence their desire to look for 
new markets.  The glut thesis, coupled with the ensuing economic depression in 
the US, provided a discursive opportunity to frame the ensuing acquisition of the 
Philippines in such economic terms. 
Likewise, just as much as there were ideas that encouraged interests related to 
free-market capitalism to emerge, the same was true for more protectionist-based 
economic approaches.  The idea of protectionism helped politicians conceive that 
they could take care of industries that supported them politically by ensuring these 
industries (especially those dealing in sugar) do not face intense competition from 
their counterparts in the Philippines.        
The ideas surrounding the US' "civilising mission" influenced the interests of 
officials to want to secure the Philippines from insurrections.  One such 
manifestation which will be discussed continuously in subsequent chapters is a 
"policy of attraction" put forward by Governor-General William Howard Taft. The 
key interaction between ideas and interests here is that attracting Filipinos to the 
incentives that Americans offered them reflected the desire for US officials to 
secure the colony from rebellions and insurrections in an innovative way.     
As institutions have a constraining power over interests, colonial officials felt 
compelled to work with the institutional set-up in the Philippines.  Therefore, 
amidst the former's desire to pursue its interests, the latter had constrained the 
possibilities made available to the former.  That was especially the case when 
attempting to rectify issues surrounding land redistribution.  The power of the 
Philippine institutional set-up is manifested by the fact that governors-general 
such as Taft conceded they had to work with them to put forward their own policies 
even though their preference was to work with a different kind of group.   
The interaction between ideas and institutions is highlighted again when it comes 
to discussing efforts surrounding land redistribution.  The Catholic Church was an 
institution that US officials and politicians showed deference to.  The fact that 
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politicians worried about the Catholic vote implies that the institutionalised 
Catholic Church wielded considerable influence.  
As a consequence of the institutional set-up, it became more challenging for US 
officials to introduce ideas of further democratic and autonomous reforms and 
instead, gave credence to the idea that Filipinos were unable to manage their 
affairs, and thus unworthy of full autonomy and democracy just yet.    
Finally, given that this thesis hypothesises that institutions as consequences of 
ideas and interests, talking about the resulting institutions is integral to how 
authors like Heclo (1994) characterise their interactions, i.e. interests telling 
institutions what to do.  In the case of the Philippines, and as will be illustrated 
more in subsequent chapters, the interests would interact with institutions in a 
way that suggests these institutions were established as a way to minimise 
security risks as well as serve other interests.      
Table 1 shows a further list of ideas, interests, and interactions that the 
subsequent chapters will discuss in more detail. 
 
Table 1: TABLE OF POSSIBLE INSTITUTIONS, INTERESTS, AND IDEAS THAT 
AFFECTED US DECISION-MAKING PROCESS ON THE FUTURE OF THE 
PHILIPPINES 
Institutions Interests Ideas 
Property Rights 
 
Existing Elites and Social 




International laws and 
conventions (e.g. 





Political system and set-
up in the US 
 
 
Security from Filipino 
rebels 
 
Commercial and military 
considerations (e.g. 
Philippines as an access 
point to China and naval 
base).   
 
Defeating Spain in the 
Spanish-American War 
and preventing European 




Developing the colonial 
economy 
 
Interest groups (e.g. 
industry lobbies, 
business groups, Catholic 
voters) 
 
The “policy of attraction” 
to incentivise Filipinos to 
want to remain with the 
US as a result of the 




Filipinos as uncivilised 
 
Notions of readiness of 












Keeping Threats in the 
Pacific under control 
(e.g. Japan) 
 
Improving the US’ image 
as an emerging power 
 
Managing economic risks 







METHODOLOGY AND RATIONALE 
BASIS IN HISTORICAL SOCIOLOGY 
In a broad sense, this thesis utilises a historical-sociological approach to the 
research field: the development of political institutions in The Philippines during 
the American era. 
As the thesis aims to find out where the elements of Hall (1997)’s and similar 
scholars’ framework mapped in what is known about the Philippines, this thesis 
had taken an interpretative approach to previous events.  Furthermore, the 
elements of the Philippine case were unique enough to add valuable insights to 
the theory. 
This thesis is grounded in comparative historical analysis.  Comparative historical 
analysis is an approach to performing historical sociology, which “ask[s] questions 
about social structures to be concretely situated in time and space”.  They look at 
how meaningful actions and structural contexts interact with each other to 
generate the outcomes scene and highlight specific features within social 
structures.  Thus, groups had chosen or encountered “varying paths in the past” 
and as a consequence would limit or introduce newer alternatives in the path 
forward (Skocpol, 1984: 1-2).     
More specifically, causal analysis looks at possible outcomes of interest and the 
plausible causes to be analysed and chosen specifically.  It also does not treat the 
big questions and certain outcomes as static over time as it has to accounts for 
appropriate changes in circumstances.  These mean not ruling cited possibly 
causes out but at the same time not taking such as the determinative 
explanations.  Another important aspect is to treat the final outcome as a product 
of a process over time.  This includes considering the timing of relevant events.  
Finally, as comparative historical analysis is about attempting to account for 
significant historical outcomes that consider key historical contexts, the number 
of cases is limited, and the approach allows scholars to easily move between 
theory and history as novel explanations become discoverable (Mahoney and 
Rueschemeyer, 2003: 10-13).   
Skocpol also posits various approaches that unify history and sociology: applying 
a general model to explain historical instances, using concepts to develop a 
meaningful historical interpretation, and analysing causal regularities in history.  
This thesis’ work lies between the former two.  Such strategies are useful for 
explaining and demonstrating how the otherwise abstract theory can work in a 
concrete case (Skocpol, 1984: 365).  This is useful when, for instance, attempting 
to account for and demonstrate what the relevant phenomena are.  In line with 
this approach, Mahoney (2003) offers a more specific strategy in which to manifest 
these principles.  In comparative historical analysis, there is what is called a 
“within-case strategy” whereby the focus is on examining and comparing 
processes within particular cases and looks at what Mahoney calls a 
“disaggregated” case (ibid: 360).  In the context of the 3Is framework, a 
“disaggregated” case involves breaking the process down into the outcome and 
the possible explanations and aspects and other important parts of the context 
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surrounding the related decision-making processes.  A specific technique in 
analysing causal relationships is process tracing.  Process tracing is an effort to 
identify causal relationships by looking or identifying possible intervening variables 
through which the explanatory variable can be used to create a causal effect on 
the outcome variable (ibid: 363).  The possible explanatory variables here will be 
the different ideas, interests, and institutions that were currently involved.  
Process tracing is applied by identifying the roots of the possible causal 
explanations for an outcome and where appropriate, showing how they may not 
have possibly acted on their own but through their interaction with one or a few 
other ideas, interests, and institutions.  As comparative historical analysis is 
concerned with causal explanations, one way to achieve this is to show the extent 
to which ideas, interests, or institutions needed one or the other to be a viable 
cause.     
In view of the foregoing, this thesis’ contribution when it comes to accounting for 
the drivers of policymaking is to explain how or why such possible explanations 
are insufficient reasons in and of themselves.  It is in this way that the thesis could 
establish the foundations for a more robust causal analysis.   
The comparison within the case that is called the Philippines manifested in several 
ways.  One way is manifested by looking at the different processes, the more 
commonly invoked ideas, interests, or institutions will be analysed to see the 
extent to which they have informed the phenomena feasibly.  A second way is to 
see whether there were any changes within the reasons invoked within the 
process.  This could be especially useful when trying to account for reasons to 
acquire the Philippines in the first place and reasons to further grant it 
liberalisation (as well as oppose it along the way). 
Blyth (2002) argues ideas shed light on what interests mean.  Based on the 
meaning of ideas and interests established early on, this gives the thesis room to 
assign which are ideas, institutions, and interests, and explain such interactions 
between them.  This also gives rise to the fact that this thesis will borrow some 
elements from the second approach identified by Skocpol: that of providing a 
meaningful historical interpretation.  For this to work, one has to consider carefully 
what the “culturally-embedded intentions of individual or group actors” in such 
settings are.  The aim is trying to identify contrasts and not generalisability 
(Skocpol, 1984: 368).  The interpretative approach also suggests that it is just 
one lens to consider when looking at the circumstances that led to the decisions 
made by US officials.  
The 3Is framework also provides a theoretical lens that does not merely rely on 
narrative history.  As Šubrt (2017) has discussed, part of that involves enquiring 
about the social structures that were prevailing.  Based on the explanations given, 
this involves identifying the institutional settings.  Furthermore, there is room for 
the 3Is in historical-sociological analysis in that actions and contexts’ interactions 
with each other are examined.  It means looking at previously published historical 
works and archives, and identifying the broader geopolitical context that they’re 
operating with.  It is through here where one gets a sense of the prevailing ideas 
that agents were putting forward and were attached to.  These materials will also 
provide a clue or even an explicit mention of what the agents’ interests are.  
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Hwang (2006) has also suggested that those who put ideas forward to explain 
certain phenomenon are also considering such with a sociological perspective.  
Thus, it facilitates causal analysis by looking at the possible causes and asking 
questions such as whether such a possible idea, interest, or institution on its own 
was the reason and how else it could inform or be informed by another one.  
Moreover, given that comparative historical analysis emphasises that processes 
develop over time, there will be explanations that attempt to trace the roots of 
the possible causal variables (i.e. ideas, interests, and institutions) for the 
resulting outcome.  This would also be an opportunity to identify the context in 
which they operated and the degree to which they were dependent on other 
possible explanations.   
  
EMPIRICAL RESEARCH STRATEGY 
For Skocpol, historical sociologists may consult archives using methods that 
historians do, or use such works to act as evidence, and such may be combined 
with other ways of analysing evidence about phenomena (Skocpol, 1984:360).   
Using what Mahoney (2003) calls a “within case” strategy and in particular process 
tracing has clear implications for what to look for.  Given that this is a test of 
possible causalities, the thesis will involve a gathering and listing of the commonly 
stated reasons as well as the contexts therein.  Therefore, to identify the possible 
causes, this thesis has used a wide range of sources such as archives of American 
newspapers, Philippine Commission Reports, selected letters between officials 
(especially those who served under Presidents McKinley, Taft and Wilson), and 
legislative transcripts (especially from the US Congress) were among the main 
primary materials18.  Some of the reports were available online such as 
Hathitrust.org, Theodore Roosevelt Center, and the University of Michigan’s the 
United States and its Territories website.  Some presidential letters were made 
available in volume by EE Morrison (ed) for Theodore Roosevelt (1951-1954) and 
AS Link (ed) for Woodrow Wilson (1978-1980).  These archives provide direct and 
first-hand information that will help reconstruct the policymaking process and thus 
provide an empirical basis for the assertions made in the upcoming chapters.  This 
thesis consulted archives from November 2016 to April 2018.19  In addition, the 
works of Constantino (1975), a Filipino historian whose works highlight the 
dynamics and contradictions of development during the colonial era, is a case in 
point, as is that of Karnow (1989).     
Chapter 4 focuses on the institutions that colonial officials needed to work with as 
they would deal with the Philippines.  The other empirical chapters (Chapters 5 to 
10) focuses on analysing a set of possible explanatory variables (i.e. ideas, 
institutions, and interests) associated with the ensuing outcomes.  A key part of 
explanations will be showing what other one variable could not be a sole 
explanation for the ensuing outcome.  
 
18 These materials are publicly available in the British Library in London and Library of 
Congress in Washington DC. 
19 A full listing of the archives used and their location is found in Appendix B. 
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The thesis focused on gathering and interpreting data about institutional 
developments at the colonial and federal levels.  As such, relevant were pieces of 
legislation passed by Congress, transcripts, and journals of Congressional and 
Philippine Commission.  These archives contain clues on what the relevant US 
officials had in mind when promulgating certain policies.  It was in here whether 
one could identify any interests, ideas concerning Filipinos being invoked.  These 
were analysed along with the institutional constraints the agents operated under.  
These were identified with a view that the granting of such measures of 
liberalisation was not due to a single reason, and that the reasons were related to 












 CHAPTER IV: PRE-AMERICAN INSTITUTIONS IN THE 
PHILIPPINES: A FOUNDATION FOR OTHER INTERESTS, 
IDEAS, AND INSTITUTIONS 
 
INTRODUCTION 
As will be seen throughout this thesis, one of the most recurring reasons for the 
decisions of US officials and politicians toward the Philippines was the idea that 
Filipinos was incapable of governing themselves and are uncivilised.     
 
Given that the US was the victorious party in the Spanish-American War, one 
would think that it would want to shape the former Spanish colony in its own 
image by introducing its own institutions.  Whether they would have altruistic 
intentions is something else Chapters 5, 6, 7, and 8 would address.  However, if 
the US were to have an altruistic plan to reform the Philippines, what constraints 
would they inherit?  That is the question that this chapter will explore. 
 
Such constraints would not be unique to colonies as the US faced its constraints 
when trying to expand the reach of its institutions in its territory.  But institutional 
practices in the colony they would inherit have existed for centuries, some of which 
have foundations even before the previous coloniser colonised the territory.      
   
The US was not the Philippines’ first coloniser.  It acquired the Philippines from 
Spain as part of the Treaty of Paris for $20 million (about $605 million at 2018 
values).  William McKinley, however, admitted limited knowledge about the 
territory his country would be acquiring.  McKinley thus commissioned a study to 
better understand the environment in which they would be operating in (cf. 
Morrison, 2009).  As mentioned in the previous chapter, the US had ultimately 
experienced mixed results when it introduced its institutions on the Philippines.  
Economically, the US also had trouble instituting land reform and opening up other 
industries.   
 
The main issue that this chapter will be to identify what the institutions are that 
would await the US as it took over sovereignty over the Philippines.  As 
characterised in the previous chapter, institutions are formal or informal norms 
usually developed over time, as well as the organisational structures that 
reproduce those norms.  Given the subsequent idea where US officials have of 
Filipinos as culturally immature and thus “unready” for self-government, this 
chapter explores the basis for that understanding. That basis partly lies in the 
underlying institutions that were prevalent before US occupation of the territory.  
Previous authors would characterise institutions as formal or informal structures 
that would constrain the decisions and outcomes that arose.  Colonial officials 
would cite such structures in future reports.   
 
The system that the Spaniards established in the Philippines fostered class 
divisions and government mismanagement, as well as to spread the influence of 
the Catholic Church far away from Spain.  Attempts to develop the local economy 
were limited.  Furthermore, attempts to introduce more modern liberal institutions 
were an afterthought (Wolff, 1961: 17).  Throughout the sixteenth to most of the 
eighteenth century, representatives of the Catholic Church took charge of internal 




Also, regarding the Catholic Church trying to make inroads in the East, amidst the 
abuses the Spanish committed in the Philippines, there was a markedly different 
idea of racial inferiority between Spanish colonisers and American colonisers.  For 
one Spanish and Portuguese colonies primarily permitted slaves and subordinate 
colonised peoples to listen to the Christian doctrine.  That was something that was 
lacking legally among Anglo-American areas, especially in the 18th and 19th 
centuries, especially as slaves in the British West Indies did not get most privileges 
associated with Christianity and plantation owners were not allowed to 
evangelising to their slaves in the hopes of keeping their slaves in line and 
discouraging open rebellion (Tannenbaum, 2001: 82).  In other words, the 
Spanish colonisers made it a point that Catholic doctrines permeated every aspect 
of life. 
 
Before proceeding further, it is necessary to emphasise that this serves as a 
background chapter.  To establish connections to the broader question of how 
subsequent decision-making of US officials was informed, there will be brief 
references to future actions.  Those future actions will be discussed in more detail 
in the coming chapters.  Nonetheless, it is sufficient to say is that as this chapter 
would show, institutions were deeply rooted in something and that ideas 
Americans would have about inhabitants of their new colony were not completely 
unfounded.  Furthermore, given the ideas and the practices prevalent during 
Spanish colonialism that this chapter plans to outline, it also aims to provide points 
of contrast to future ideas US officials would later espouse.   
 
Before the concluding section, this chapter will reflect on how the institutions are 
relevant to the framework introduced in Chapter 3.  It is in here where the chapter 
will preview how the institutions could interact with a few other important interests 
and ideas, thus providing a basis for officials’ future actions.         
 
PRE-HISPANIC INSTITUTIONS 
Important among the pre-existing social arrangements and institutions prior to 
Spanish colonisation were practices of reciprocity. These relationships involved 
notions of indebtedness where those with more material resources provided for 
those who did not have them in exchange for services and indebtedness.  Arguably 
such a sense of indebtedness has characterised, for instance, election campaigns 
through to the present day.     
 
Regarding indebtedness, the class of people would also be dictated by how much 
one owes the other.  Social mobility between a free man and someone indebted 
was still possible compared to during the Spanish era.  The lowest class, the peons, 
would have to render services until their debts have been cleared.  If they die, 
their offspring would be responsible for the remainder of the unpaid debt.    
However, they can, in turn, also have peons who are indebted towards them if the 
latter has some form of indebtedness towards the former (Constantino, 1975).   
 
POTENTIAL FOR ABUSE 
Scholars have characterised pre-colonial institutions that appeared to resemble 
dependency as mild.  Moreover, they have found that abuse of the system was 
less common.  Nonetheless, there were aspects of such institutions that lent 




Riedinger (1995: 18) was among those who thought that the institution of one’s 
relationship with a pre-colonial datu or chieftain was characterised with 
reciprocity.  In addition, the villages in the Philippines were regarded as 
“clientelist” and less formal (Neher, 1985: 1).  Under such a relationship, creditors 
may request debtors for further favours even after the latter’s debt or obligation 
has been settled because the creditor considers the offer of credit as a form of 
personal accommodation to the debtor which the debtor must reciprocate at some 
point (Hollnsteiner, 1964: 40).     
 
As reciprocity and indebtedness prevailed, there were risks for those who were 
dependent on others.  Given the informal nature of this, there were no formal 
institutions that could regulate or settle disputes.  As a result, the effectiveness of 
these reciprocal institutions depended heavily on the character of the parties 
involved.  Most pieces of literature have not commented on whether the value of 
services rendered by the debtor was commensurate to what was actually owed to 
the creditor.  Nonetheless, such issues needed to be taken into account to assess 
the degree to which institutionalised relationships were vulnerable to abuse or the 
degree to which such abuses could be preventable.    
 
Given that scholars (e.g. John, 2012) have argued that institutions are by their 
nature also informal, safeguards to minimise abuse become even more imperative 
if the system is to be trusted.  The fact that the network of dependents on a single 
leader ran deep already raises questions.  For one, given the leader’s stature, he 
can tell everyone in his network to do whatever he commands to their detriment.  
This meant that with an institutionalised deep network of dependents, the leader 
would think that his power base would be less vulnerable to being undermined. 
Given the informal nature of the network, it was theoretically possible that the 
leader could use his leverage to persuade those followers in his network of 
dependency to disregard long-standing institutions if he wanted to.  With this 
informal nature, there is no guarantee that the leader of the dependent networks 
would want to follow whatever norms he would place.  On this count, there was a 
potential to end existing institutions that leaders wanted.           
 
EARLY SPANISH INFLUENCES ON SOCIAL SETTINGS 
Just like the Americans who conquered the Philippines, the Spaniards initially 
conquered the Philippines to open a trade route between Mexico and China, 
although their motives also involved helping the Catholic Church gain a footprint 
in the Far East.   
 
The Spanish Crown was also in alliance with the Catholic Church as the latter saw 
the former as an important agent for its missionary activities.  There was 
practically no separation between the Church and the Crown.  In light of this 
partnership, the Spanish King was regarded to be a “patron of God”.  The King 
was thus also regarded being indebted to a certain divine power and that to satisfy 
this debt, the King needed to attend to the needs of the lands he was entrusted 
with ruling (Rafael, 1988: 147).  This meant that the King had to provide the 
necessary financial and military support to such territories.  Roscher and Bourne 
(1944: 4) also added that if it was necessary to perform exploitation on such 
colonies, it should be done in a way that considers the well-being of those in such 




As will be seen in this chapter, the desire to acquire land was a key driver of how 
enterprising political and Church officials dispensed with their duties.  Roth (1977: 
39) argued that colonisers worked based on the principle that land ownership was 
“the noblest condition for a gentleman and the highest form of status.”  For such 
officials, acquiring land was about increasing their prestige.  Although one may 
argue that this may be connected to exercising stewardship and care, it was a 
principle that was ripe for abuse.  This was given that most natives neither had 
free status nor possessed sufficient resources to participate in the colony’s political 
life. 
 
Although the Spaniards, led by Portuguese explorer Magellan, initially stepped foot 
in the Philippines in 1521, they formally assumed sovereignty over the islands in 
1565.  The Philippines was originally designated as a province of the Viceroy of 
Mexico from 1565 until 1821 when it was subject to direct Spanish rule.   
 
The existing social structure was crucial to Spanish officials hoping to exercise 
their rule over society.  Although there was a central colonial governance 
structure, day-to-day governance was in practice left to existing leadership that 
Spanish officials found prior to colonisation (Roth, 1977:30; Simbulan, 2005: 18).  
In the process, friars and local officials became more influential and used the 
situation to amass wealth.   
 
Spanish officials made the datus or local village chieftains into the cabeza de 
barangay or cabeza (Simbulan, 2005: 18).  They were the go-between central 
Spanish government (Borromeo-Buehler, 1985: 72). They were primarily 
responsible for tax collection in their jurisdiction (Phelan, 1959: 122).  
Furthermore, under this system, the cabeza’s firstborn male child automatically 
inherited such a position from his father (ibid: 122, 126).   
 
The cabeza became part of the upper class or the principalia.  As such, the 
principalia class enjoyed certain privileges, some of which depended on the 
province the cabeza belonged to.  Phelan (1959) for instance, cited the situation 
in Pampanga, where the cabeza was given a title to reiterate to the local 
population the status of the cabeza.  To incentivise loyalty to the higher 
authorities, members of the principals were also not included in the draft for join 
forced corvee labour (or the polos y servicios).  They had also gotten exemptions 
from paying tribute (Simbulan, 2005: 18).  According to Nadeau (2002: 80), one 
consequence was a division formed between natives who paid tribute and those 
who did not.  The latter also merely collected tribute on behalf of the colonial 
administration.  These privileges depended on the provinces in which the cabezas 
served. 
 
Amidst all the laws that the Crown had promulgated on the Philippines, the central 
government had given leeway to its local officials to interpret the laws as they see 
appropriate.  This meant some of them using the law to maximise their political 
advantage and placing burdens on their subjects.  In other words, that directive 
opened the possibilities for corruption to become widespread in the colony.  It also 
limited the possibilities for social mobility for most native Filipinos, especially those 
outside the principales class.      
 
On the other hand, not all officials received exemptions or relief from Spanish 
officials for agreeing to be part of the Spanish operation.  Even as other provinces 
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have permitted exemptions for local native officials to render forced corvee labour, 
this was not the case in the likes of Cavite, where the leaders faced the risk of 
imprisonment if they failed to do such (Borromeo-Buehler, 1985: 73).  In some 
cases, they were paid salaries that were low (ibid, 74).  Officials based in different 
provinces were hence not given equal treatment.     
 
According to Phelan (1959: 122) and Aguilar (1998: 58), existing members of the 
local elite enjoyed greater degrees of social mobility, especially if a local friar wrote 
a reference letter for them.  In the process, such local politicians witnessed first-
hand how political machinery beyond the local levels of governance worked.  
These included family succession and rotating family members among the 
different positions available (Phelan, 1959: 126-127).  However, only members of 
the local elite with adequate resources were able to avail and that the 
requirements to avail of these privileges were prohibitive.   
 
Encomienda, Encomendero System and Methods of Servitude 
Spanish officials dealt with issues surrounding land ownership when they were in 
the Philippines.  Cushner and Larkin (1978: 103) pointed to commanders of armies 
who conquered the Philippines and believed that their superiors assured them of 
land. As a consequence of such, the encomienda system was born. This was 
primarily instituted to reward Spanish officials for the services they rendered to 
the Crown and as a way to secure such lands that were acquired (Vargas, 2003: 
4; Simbulan, 2005: 17).  Under this system, a Spanish official (the encomendero) 
was in theory responsible for providing care for the natives.  In exchange, the 
natives were required to render forced corvee labour and pay tributes to the 
encomendero (Constantino, 1975; Vargas, 2003: 4).  The encomienda system 
was supposed to be discharged with the view of supporting the colonies and the 
mission of the Spaniards (Roscher and Bourne, 1944: 4; Constantino, 1975: 44; 
McLennan, 1973a: 19).   
 
However, such an institution also faced abuse.  Some encomenderos were greedy 
and possessed what was called a “capitalist impulse” at the expense of the 
peasantry (Constantino, 1975: 42, 44).  Friars referred incidents of abuse to more 
senior officials, and such instances of abuse commonly involved the value of 
agricultural goods produced (Abinales and Amoroso, 2005: 55).  Furthermore, 
natives did not possess sufficient cash and were forced to barter some goods to 
satisfy their obligations.  As a consequence of such abuses, it also took a long time 
for less wealthy members of the encomienda to pay off their tributes.   
 
Moreover, Roth (1977) also indicated that such a system yielded too much power 
such that clergymen who acted as landowners had to face onerous bureaucratic 
conditions to even apply for exemptions for their labourers.   
   
These abuses demonstrated a relaxed implementation of The Laws of the Indies 
– the law upon which the encomienda was based upon.  Such a law in practice 
favoured the encomenderos at the expense of the native population.  Those who 
promulgated a flexible interpretation did not take into account the propensity to 
abuse such a law.  Those entrusted to the care of the unscrupulous encomendero 
was deprived of the care they were due.  
 
The theory and the practice of the encomienda system was a testament to the 
fact that although institutions were important, the people behind them also played 
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a key role.  Given that senior Spanish officials had given leeway to colonial and 
local officials to interpret the laws as they see fit, some enterprising encomenderos 
treated their encomiendas in that manner.     
 
In a letter, Henry Kerr, an aid of President William Taft’s family, wrote that in 
practice, the Spanish instituted a system akin to “practical peonage” where 
common folk were kept indebted by appealing to the latter’s weak spots.  In this 
peonage system, the common folk or “tao” as was called, were to render labour 
until that person’s debt has been settled (Henry Kerr, 21/01/1906: 3).  This bore 
some resemblance to the pre-Hispanic system of peonage, but as Kerr pointed 
out, the officials deliberately exploited the locals’ weak spots in order to increase 
the chances of successfully getting them to render servitude.  Kerr concluded that 
this method was successful.     
 
Introduction of Property Rights 
Riedinger (1995) argues that one major institution that Spanish introduced to the 
Philippines was that of property rights.  Before the arrival of the Spaniards, the 
lands that chieftains used were for “communal use” but that eventually, they 
became the private property of someone (Krinks, 2002: 25).  Moreover, Abinales 
and Amoroso (2005: 60) said when the Philippines was at the early stages of being 
colonised by Spain, the real estate that the Crown-owned were no longer 
communally-owned.  The consequence of this was that children no longer enjoyed 
an automatic right to work in such lands once their parents passed away (ibid).  
If they wanted to continue doing so, they needed to pay fees the Crown for a 
relevant title.  However, in practice, this meant that less wealthy families were 
displaced and the wealthier local elites benefitted more of the time (McLennan, 
1973a: 19).     
 
Based on this, the institution of property rights did not automatically come with 
improvements in living conditions, particularly for those who were less wealthy.  
Borromeo-Buehler (1985: 73) further argues that even institutions associated 
with pre-colonial Filipino leadership, especially the ones that featured patron-client 
relationships, were further reinforced by the colonial government.  As mentioned 
previously, a key difference in that iteration was that greed became more of a 
central feature than in the pre-Hispanic iteration.      
 
Cabazas found ways of retaining parts of the tribute they collected even if they 
were legally not permitted to do so.  For instance, they collected more tribute than 
was necessary (Abinales and Amoroso, 2005: 57).  
 
The issue of property rights also brought up issues on concerning sharecropping.  
In theory, this system was supposed to simultaneously mitigate risks and manage 
the incentives (Stiglitz, 2003: 21).  According to the accounts given, however, the 
key problem was that the risk the tenant could bear did not have a maximum.  As 
the risk that the tenant would bear was based partly on the value of the produce, 
it was not up to the tenant to say what this value meant.  As a consequence, such 
tenants had to depend more on their landlords had to say. 
 
Based on all of these, the Spanish regime has heralded a merger of two 
institutions: pre-hispanic notions of indebtedness and tribute on the one hand, 




When institutions are not established to promote the welfare of actors it touches, 
there is a risk that “opportunism” could emerge (Toye, 1995).  Such was the case 
when members of the local principalia class acquired designated as private 
property.  In this light, the cabezas took advantage of this and saw this as a route 
to wield greater power than they previously had.  
 
Although O'Driscoll and Hoskins (2003: 2) argued that having secure property 
rights were a necessary part of societal development in the sense that it settled 
the question of who legally owned certain properties, the reality was more 
complicated than that.  The institution of property rights allowed more members 
of the principalia class than less wealthy individuals to assume control of the land.  
Moreover, there was a logistical issue in that the Spanish officials tasked with 
overseeing the implementation of such institutions were unable to do so, partly 
because of the geographic conditions (e.g. weather/climate) in the communities.  
As such, there continued to be abuses and manipulations.   
 
Membership in the local elites was a consequence of whether someone took on a 
leadership role in his local community (Rafael, 1988).  There were semblances of 
this in the Spanish colonial era, such as the differences among social classes being 
a consequence of a leader’s ability to assert control over labour services, which 
Cushner and Larkin (1978: 109) attributed partly to one’s ability in combat.  
Cushner and Larkin further add, however, that institutions that facilitated greater 
wealth did not completely consider the credentials of the officials in question.      
 
Although Spanish colonial officials attempted to introduce reforms to the 
Philippines early on, the abuses that previously characterised the institutionalised 
behaviour persisted (Phelan, 1959).  
 
  
THE ROLE OF THE CHURCH 
During the early colonial period, the Church, in particular, the friars, played a 
significant role in how the colony’s political and economic landscape was like.  
(Roth, 1977: 37).  For instance, clergymen sat on the board that was responsible 
for deciding how to divide lands that the Spanish Crown had legal possession of.  
Given their ability to possess the land they thought that they owned, and they 
owned a sufficient amount of land to participate in the colony’s political and 
economic affairs, the friar assigned to each subdivision played a critical role 
(Constantino, 1975: 74).              
 
For more than half of Spain’s time in the Philippines, the Philippine territory 
remained closed to outside trade and representatives of the Church continued to 
wield more influence over day-to-day matters.   
 
EDUCATION AND CONNECTION TO ECONOMIC GROWTH 
Discussing education provides one with clues as to how officials valued 
investments in human resources of the future.  Kerr (21/01/1906: 4) wrote in his 
letter that such education consisted of just small bits of teaching pupils the 
Spanish language and heavier bits of Catechism.  Kerr mentioned that the 
authorities did not permit attempts at improving education levels as they were a 




On some level, such trouble for the Spaniards would eventually be realised.  The 
illustrados, or enlightened affluent Filipinos that were educated in Europe, formed 
movements that Spanish officials found subversive.  Such would imply that 
Spaniards feared that by extending higher forms of education to the wider 
population, such troubles could be replicated across more corners of the colony.           
 
As for the implications for the kind of human capital in the colony, the lack of 
educated Filipinos was manifested in how closed-off the colony’s economy was.  
Kerr (1906) stated that the colonial economy was set up in such a way that did 
not incentivise capital accumulation of more than what was necessary to survive.   
 
EARLY CONCLUSIONS FROM THE PRE-EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 
On the one hand, Spaniards came to Christianise the Philippines.  On the other 
hand, acquiring large parcels of land accompanied the Spaniards. As a 
consequence, the agents involved were given avenues to act abusively.  
 
The earlier part of the Spanish colonial era had three key economic legacies.  The 
first of them was the introduction of the notion of private property.  The second 
was the high amount of tribute collected from locals.  The final legacy was the 
institution of forced labour (Sobritchea, 1981: 19-20).  Given the wider 
opportunities for upward social mobility during the pre-hispanic era, the economic 
institutions introduced by Spanish officials made such prospects more challenging.  
This should not be surprising given that the nature of institutions and incentives 
within them had been too attractive for local elites to pass out.     
 
The institutions that the early colonial era introduced largely had the effect of 
consolidating existing pre-hispanic institutions.  Furthermore, the practices 
stemming from the encomienda deviated from the legal rationale for its 
establishment.   
 
The encomienda system in the Philippines made opportunism possible.  The failure 
of formal institutions made such manifestations glaring.  Another cause of such 
failures was vagueness or imperfect information.  Local elites used the situation 
to enrich themselves as a consequence.  Peasants and commoners faced the risk 
of being disenfranchised when institutions of property rights were introduced.      
 
EIGHTEENTH- AND NINETEENTH-CENTURY SPANISH COLONY 
When Spain started to lose most of its territory in the Western Hemisphere, the 
government in Madrid would assume direct jurisdiction over the Philippines.  It 
was in this latter period where measures to liberalise the economy were 
introduced.          
 
Spain realised that it could not continue the economic practices that had 
characterised its rule over most of the first half of its rule.  One of the realities 
was that Spain had lost much of its influence vis-à-vis other colonising European 
powers, given that it lost a lot of its colonies in the Americas (Chu, 2010: 78).  A 
brief British invasion of Manila prompted Spain to open up the Philippines 
economically.  Spain’s loss to Britain also forced it to politically reconsider its 
position (Constantino, 1975: 114).  One such example was that the Galleon trade 
where the Philippines played a role as a transhipment port between Spain’s Latin 
American colonies and China became more financially difficult to sustain and 
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justify continuing.  With this in mind, the Spanish crown felt that to help keep the 
Philippines more competitive, it had to look for new global markets for raw 
materials.  As a consequence, the land would be central to increasing demand 
(Abinales and Amoroso, 2005).   
 
As Spain executed its new plans for the Philippines, the colony would experience 
adverse social issues.  One such manifestation was share-cropping.  It mutated 
into a much level that widened the gap between owners and tenants.   
 
The Friars were among one of the largest landowners in the colony (Roth, 1977).  
Governor-General Jose Basco y Vargas designated friar lands for commercial use 
(Putzel, 1992: 46).  Given that the colony was undergoing economic and other 
social changes, friars agreed to lease some parcels of their land under the 
inquilinato system for a fixed annual cost. (McLennan, 1973a).  When the 
inquilinato (lessees) became prosperous enough, they acquired lands and used 
them as a platform to manage their export-based firms  (Putzel, 1992: 47).      
 
In the aftermath of the Anglo-Spanish war of the 1760s, where native Chinese 
lent support to the British, the Spanish colonisers expelled the native Chinese from 
the Philippines (Putzel, 1992: 46). The Spanish, however, decided to allow them 
to re-enter the Philippines and perform a variety of activities there.  In fact, 
Spanish ships were deployed to Canton to acquire more Chinese goods in addition 
to the supplies the Spaniards previously acquired (Constantino, 1975: 115).   
 
EVOLUTION  AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE CHINESE MESTIZO 
The mestizo - a descendant of mixed racial heritage in Spanish colonies - has been 
around in the Philippines prior to the Spanish promoting policies to liberalise it 
economically (Constantino, 1975; Simbulan, 2005).  The mestizo was rooted in 
the principales of the previous centuries as these principales members married 
Chinese or Spaniards.  There were, however, more Chinese mestizos and this 
group had become more influential (Simbulan, 2005: 22).  For most of this 
chapter, it will be the Chinese mestizo who married into Filipinas that will be 
discussed in this context.  At some point, some members of the mestizo class 
overtook the principales and became the dominant group among the elite 
(Constantino, 1975: 121).  During their early years, mestizos made a name for 
themselves in the field of merchandising (ibid, 121).   
 
When Spain decided to open up the Philippines in the nineteenth century to trade 
from other countries, the Chinese mestizo played a more prominent role in 
economic affairs (Tan, 1986: 141) and became more economically powerful in this 
era (Anderson, 1988: 4).  The mestizo’s prominence was credited to the dilemma 
Spanish officials faced when they decided to expel pure Chinese businessmen from 
the Philippines during the eighteenth century as a consequence of the Anglo-
Spanish War, in particular, whether Chinese people contributed to or damaged the 
colonial economy (Roth, 1977: 117; Tan, 1986: 143; Chu, 2010: 56).  Ultimately, 
officials decided to convert Chinese people into Catholics and introduce them to 
Spanish culture (Wickberg, 1964: 68).   
 
To express what officials thought of as the value of Chinese mestizos were to the 
economy, they were entitled to pay a tribute of only ₱3.00, which was at the time 




As Kerr (1906: 9) pointed out in his letter, the Mestizos have a “singleness of 
purpose for personal gain rising almost to the height of virtue”.  This means that 
any prospects of Mestizos acting for a national interest were too optimistic.  Kerr 
also adds that these Mestizos know that they would eventually become the “real 
rulers”.  This would imply that they needed to be moved towards supporting 
causes that involve more than their interests.      
 
Chinese mestizos also became infamous for their landholdings.  Initially, they 
leased land owned by friars (Simbulan, 2005: 25).  Although Chinese mestizos 
also engaged in the arenas of wholesale and merchandising, competition from 
pure Chinese in such endeavours made them consider landholdings to be a more 
profitable endeavour, thus engaging in the latter (Constantino, 1975: 123).   
 
Putzel (1992: 48) describes that Chinese mestizos also became known for their 
business activities in sugar haciendas or plantations, found primarily in Panay and 
Negros.  Lands that the Chinese mestizos legally owned were utilised primarily to 
facilitate the export market, and thus, sharecroppers were left with a more limited 
supply of produce for themselves (Constantino, 1975: 119).   
 
ISSUES WITH SHARECROPPERS 
In the latter parts of the Spanish era, the sharecropping system was the main 
source for generating an agricultural surplus.  The farmers provided the labour, 
whereas landlords provided the capital and other resources (Aguilar, 1994; Roth, 
1977: 119). 
 
David Barrows, one of the first US officials to be based in the Philippines, was 
among those who reported that peasants did not enjoy the gains that stemmed 
from export growth.  Instead, it was members of the landholding elite that kept 
the largest part of the gains (Simbulan, 2005: 27).   
 
Although the Philippines was a net loss for Spain fiscally during the earlier part, 
plantation-based agriculture helped revive the colony’s economic viability.  As a 
consequence, the practices associated with the plantation culture were 
consolidated (Anderson, 1988: 5).  Given the characteristics of the earlier part of 
the Spanish era, landowners did not have as much of an appetite to exploit 
agricultural labourers (ibid).  However, with the opening up of the colony and the 
rise of plantation-based agriculture, the appetite for exploitation only increased. 
 
The institution of pacto-de-retroventa became front and centre of the 
sharecropping class’ struggles.  The difficult financial conditions of low-income 
people necessitated such a practice.  It also became pronounced when the colony 
faced problems as it modernised.  Peasants saw the pacto-de-retroventa as a 
mean to relieve themselves of financial burdens when they were not doing well 
economically (Simbulan, 2005: 26).  Under this scheme, peasants may borrow 
money from someone else, which was often a Chinese mestizo.  The interest rate 
charge, however, was excessive and that the creditor had the right to acquire a 
peasant’s land if that peasant defaulted on his payment (Putzel, 1992: 47).  
Constantino, (1975: 122-123) and Simbulan (2005) posits this scheme as a way 
for Chinese mestizos to consolidate their landholdings.  Given the usurious interest 
rates involved, this institution worked more to favour the creditor, who could seize 
the land, and at the expense of the debtor-peasant.  In the end, peasants and 
 
 71 
other low-income people found themselves deeper in debt than they could afford 
to pay back.   
 
For McLennan (1973b: 20), the said scheme as a “legal fiction” especially given 
that the land in question and what was produced from it were not appraised 
appropriately.  In other words, such lands received a low appraisal value.  Under 
such a scheme, the creditor was aware of these pitfalls and operated under the 
premise that the chances of a debtor repaying his debt were not promising (ibid).  
The defaulting debtor, who just lost ownership of the property, was usually 
allowed to stay in the house as a sharecropper (ibid; Abinales and Amoroso: 
2005).  However, he was vulnerable to being evicted and to minimise the chances 
at meeting such a fate, the debtor-turned-sharecropper needed to surrender parts 
of his produce to the new landowners to cover part of the rent. 
 
There were other similar schemes whereby sharecroppers had to surrender parts 
of what they produced to their mestizo landlord, often at an undervalued price.  
This mestizo would, in turn, lease the land but gain a profit from it (McLennan, 
1973b; Roth, 1977: 120; Simbulan, 2005: 25-26).  Based on these accounts, the 
peasants who lived in lands they owned initially but lost to mestizos faced 
significant degrees of uncertainties, given the former’s financial position.   
 
Although Spanish officials expressed some concern (Simbulan, 2005: 26), some 
of them also took advantage of the weaknesses of the peasantry.  Although the 
Spaniards saw the Chinese as a threat, yet the Spaniards decided to integrate 
them using mixed marriages.  To begin with, these mestizos initially won the 
favour of the Spanish government for their loyalty to the latter (ibid, 28).  
Furthermore, given the dysfunctionality of the state, it was not surprising that the 
Spaniards were ineffective.  Based on this, one can guess that the Spaniards had 
a limited understanding of how different Chinese mestizos were from the pure 
Chinese they sought to expel, or the Spaniards had no intent in protecting the 
Filipinos.   
 
More consequentially for political fortunes, a status of sharecropper limited one’s 
ability to avail oneself of political privileges.  As alluded to by Borromeo-Bueler 
(1985: 95), for one to be eligible to stand as an elected official, the amount of 
land one could legally possess was important.  Based on that, participation was 
limited as not many people even had parcels of land of sufficient value, to begin 
with.  Consequently, their concerns were not heard properly.  Furthermore, as 
private property rights was a relatively recent institution introduced by Spaniards 
to local officials, others considered such property to be too valuable to be 
relinquished, especially as it was through property holdings that one could assert 
one’s political influence (Cushner, 1973: 39; Borromeo-Buehler, 1985).      
 
For Libecap (1986), property rights did not always guarantee equity.  That was 
the case seen with the pacto-de-retroventa system whereby the mestizos found a 
way to gradually, eventually, and systematically remove legal possession of lands 
from the debtors-later turned-sharecroppers given that these mestizos were 
aware that the latter did not always possess a high ability to settle their 
outstanding debts.  Thus, the sharecroppers were once again at a disadvantage 
since enterprising creditors who had an idea of sharecroppers’ financial capabilities 




Once again, sharecroppers were the losers in this endeavour.  Enterprising parties 
such as the mestizo exploited the situation and made gains often at the former’s 
expense.  It had some consequences for the exercise of political power moving 
forward as some of them felt that their legal ownership of property was the key 
to exercising such.   
 
OTHER SOURCES OF PROBLEMS IN THE COLONY 
The latter part of the Spanish era continued to be characterised by problems 
associated with institutions introduced during the earlier part.  The problem of 
corruption was particularly acute in the collection of tribute and forced labour 
(Abinales and Amoroso, 2005: 89).  
 
The tribute lists were a problem in their own right.  Scholars characterise them to 
not be accurate enough to account for everyone who was required to pay tribute 
and also may have missed out on those who had an exemption from it.  There 
were issues as well of lower amounts of tribute collected from the population 
(ibid).  Robles (1969) also suggests that the lower amounts of tribute were 
compounded by the fact that the central colonial government in Manila did not 
offer adequate financial assistance to the local levels. 
 
Friars continued to wield influence even as the amount of land they held was 
reduced.  Their power was seen for instance in when it came to keeping tribute 
lists up to date, which they were against since an updated list meant fewer people 
on it, which translated to lower expected revenues (Abinales and Amoroso, 2005: 
91).  
 
Given the Friars’ stake and power when it came to the tribute lists, it meant that 
in practice, residents who moved to a new community that was outside a particular 
Friar’s jurisdiction was still subject to the tribute requirements of what would be 
their former jurisdiction.  Additionally, if someone passes away, his or her 
surviving relatives or family members would be tasked with paying the tribute due 
to him or her.  As a consequence, as more money would continue to flow to the 
coffers translated to less for the people who left the community or the 
families/relatives of the deceased. 
 
Overall, the situation in the colony mirrored the political turmoil that Spain faced 
domestically in the nineteenth century.  This volatile situation was manifested in 
the appointment of up to twenty-four governors-general, most of whom differed 
in terms of ideological leaning.  Such ideological differences had the consequence 
of instituting policy changes that did not account for the political context in which 
the policies these changes would supersede operated in (ibid: 85-86). 
 
Given that constant changing of policies and the unstable political atmosphere 
back in the mainland that Spanish officials carried over to the Philippines, the 
colonial government lacked credibility.  With Spanish officials’ credibility impaired, 
they were unable to govern effectively in the eyes of the colony.  With this, there 
was an implication that the government could not be trusted to secure property 
rights, settle disputes, or control the level of corruption of institutions internally 





As the sharecroppers lacked security of tenure, they suffered political 
consequences.  A person’s electoral fortunes depended on whether one was able 
to own land or other forms of property (Constantino, 1975; Putzel, 1992).  As 
such, they had no real property under their name to qualify them to participate in 
the colony’s political exercises in a manner that affects significant changes they 
wanted.  
 
INSURGENCIES AND REVOLUTION 
Such abuses by Spanish officials eventually resulted in uprisings which only hit 
their climax in the closing years of Spanish rule.  Even if Spanish officials 
suppressed insurgencies throughout their exercise of authority over the islands, 
their power had weakened over time.   
 
Two kinds of resistance to Spanish rule have emerged in the second half of the 
nineteenth century.  One of them has been by the ilustrados – a class of European-
educated Filipinos who came back and merely clamoured for reforms to the way 
in which Spain would exercise its rule.  In terms of background, they are as close 
to Moore (1967) and Rueschemeyer et al. (1992) characterisation of the middle-
class.  They were more prolific in their writings and did not call for violent 
resistance.  Despite not advocating for outright violent rebellion, illustrados, most 
notably the Philippines’ national hero, Jose Rizal, were ultimately sentenced to 
death.  
 
Revolutionaries such as Andres Bonifacio and Emilio Aguinaldo also proliferated.  
They wanted to take up arms to end Spanish rule altogether.  Later, some of them 
would collaborate the Americans during the Spanish-American War only to be 
arrested when the Americans would take over.   
 
Such a lack of highly-educated Filipinos would also concern Americans who were 
in the territory when it was acquired from Spain.  Officials would peg their 
concerns about rebellions in part due to low educational attainment.  Such a 
perceived low level of educational attainment would cause American businesses 
to worry about leaving the operation of government in the hands of Filipinos, and 
it implies why they would prioritise enhancing law-and-order.    
 
PRE-AMERICAN INSTITUTIONS AND POTENTIAL CONNECTION WITH 
OTHER IDEAS AND INTERESTS: A REVIEW 
Indebtedness, class relations, and landholding systems were all considered 
institutions in the sense that they governed the relationships among agencies 
during the period in which they prevailed.  They became among the constraints 
which officials have tried to break through and/or deal with as they made 
decisions.  However, they bear important connections with the other ideas and 
interests that Hall has been putting forward.   
 
Furthermore, whilst they are a major part of the decision-making process in the 
sense that they provide a backdrop and context for subsequent decisions, looking 
at pre-American institutions alone may not suffice to account for decision-making.  
These institutions would be enriched in light of other ideas and interests around 




The notion of indebtedness highlighted the personal relationships that were 
present.  In practice, this institution meant that over centuries, people dependent 
on someone with more resources would experience difficulty and shame going 
against that particular someone.  They would therefore not be in a position to 
have political and economic freedom apart from their benefactors – something 
integral to the idea of democracy Americans wanted to implant on Filipinos.  
Americans would gradually introduce democratic institutions, and to the extent 
that enfranchisement was prevalent, the drive to use electoral politics to repay 
favours and retain power structures was highlighted.  However, as this practice 
has existed for centuries, it would have proven tricky to officials who wanted to 
introduce genuine reforms in the system.  However, as will be highlighted in 
subsequent chapters, if an institution-only analysis would be utilised, then one 
can argue that the US would not even introduce democratic institutions knowing 
that the institutional make-up of the colony they inherited had some hostilities to 
democratic practices they have claimed to preach.  It would also imply that there 
was more in play rather than these institutions but interests as well, although the 
latter would not be necessarily related to democratisation itself but to interests in 
maintaining peace and order during a time when rebellions were a worry.   
 
Moreover, such an institution of indebtedness also formed part of the ideas 
Americans would have of Filipinos of being a backward kind of race.  As far as 
Americans are concerned, they believed that Filipinos were not in the position of 
being entrusted to manage national affairs, given that indebtedness and kinship 
ties were a priority among most political entities in the colony.   
 
In connection with the framework set out in Chapter 3, institutions constrain or 
facilitate the effectivity of ideas.  The pre-American institutions found in the 
Philippines provided credence to the ensuing ideas.  Specifically, given the 
situation that the Kerr and his colleagues witnessed, it became apparent to 
American officials that the Filipinos could not be trusted to govern themselves and 
rectify the atrocities the Spaniards did to them with without any assistance.  That 
idea had been built up steadily.  It was also apparent that officials who wanted to 
rule the Philippines had a stronger case to do so and portray the Filipino subjects 
lacking the abilities to operate a government.  Based on these, Kerr (21/01/1906: 
13) thought that introducing reforms associated with liberal democracies to 
Filipinos more gradually was something more feasible and that full autonomy for 
Filipinos would take a long time.     
 
The framework also suggests that institutions would constrain or make salient the 
kinds of interests that agents would want to pursue.  The fact that friars were one 
of the largest parcels of land in the country highlights a major institutional 
constraint that future Governors-General had to deal with – the influence of the 
Catholic Church.  The institutional barriers toward land reform illustrated in this 
chapter will once again be highlighted in succeeding chapters when Americans 
attempt to engage in some form of land reform, especially in lands formerly owned 
by Friars.  Filipino elites who were financially capable of owning huge tracts of land 
would be the ones most able to participate in the purchase lands to be auctioned 
off.  Some of these elites would keep the lands they would acquire as 
unproductive.  However, merely characterising the friars as institutionalised in the 
colony is a sufficient ground for inaction.  Although it was true that the influence 
of the Church in the US would prove to be a constraining factor, one needs to ask 
themselves what the consequences are of breaching such an institution.  It implies 
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acknowledging the connection and role of interests.  US politicians which these 
Governors-General served would acknowledge this and become weary of their 
political interests that would be undermined if they were to breach the said 
institution.  As such, future attempts would necessitate substantial negotiations.  
In other words, the institution of the friars was deeply rooted and would have the 
necessary connections to the interests that US politicians needed to satisfy.  
Additionally, there was also the idea of whether the US government would be 
reliable enough to keep its word; that itself formed another idea.   
 
Furthermore, the institutionalised state of the Philippines at the point of acquisition 
and a few years afterwards would alert officials to security concerns.  It would also 
make salient the fact that Filipinos are prone to committing insurrections and 
hence make them aware that the territory needs to be secured.  
 
Based on the statement mentioned above, there is a connection between ideas, 
interests, and institutions.  The prevalence of the pre-American institutions, for 
instance, illustrates such.   
 
CONCLUSION, REFLECTIONS, AND FURTHER CONNECTIONS  
Once again, this chapter has highlighted the role of the entrenched elite, the 
prevailing social relationships, economic set-up, the role of the Church, and 
problems related to land redistribution.  
 
The main thing that this chapter demonstrates is that the Philippine institutions 
that the US had to work were constraints as it tried to introduce the reforms in 
the colony.  On some level, it was difficult to reconcile the compatibility of 
institutions found in the former Spanish colony with the reforms the US hoped to 
establish.  The Spaniards had left the US officials with a colony that was politically 
and economically backwards.  For instance, debt peonage and sharecropping 
continued to proliferate.  If it was ever in the US’ plan to establish more liberal 
and democratic norms and develop its economy in a span of only a few decades, 
it would need to undo more than three centuries of pre-Hispanic and Spanish 
colonial influence.  The fact that these arcane practices and institutions were 
pervasive for a long time was itself challenging for Americans to work with.  As 
American officials had pointed out, they did not know what to do with the 
Philippines during the Spanish-American War.  One may also argue that it would 
justify why liberal institutions could not be introduced all in one go.  As already 
mentioned, laws would be constructed in such a way to limit democratic 
participation.  But there are questions on whether these would alleviate the 
problems they hoped to sort out; there would also be questions on whether these 
laws would further strengthen the hand of those who became part of the problem 
in the first place.  The voting franchise was not open to most Filipinos until 1916.  
Until then, only existing Filipino men who effectively benefitted from Spanish rule 
could vote and stand for office. 
  
Furthermore, the prospects of the Philippines being a valuable contributor itself to 
the American long century was not apparent given the problems the US had 
inherited.  US businessmen would have immense difficulties doing commerce 
under such conditions.  However, in the early years, a lot of them begged 
administrations not to let the Philippines govern itself.  It would also imply the 




In consideration of this, the coming chapters will show that colonial officials would 
be resigned to working with local elites that benefitted from Spanish institutions 
even though most of their compatriots were left behind by the same.  These would 
be manifested when the likes of Governor-General William Howard Taft would 
have to choose Filipinos who previously worked for the Spanish colonial 
government for the day-to-day running of the colony’s affairs.  Burns (2010) 
reveals that those kinds of officials were not Taft’s first choice of point people to 
deal with.   
 
Land redistribution issues that this chapter discussed are also evident when 
officials tried to rectify it.  Chapter 8 will discuss more of such efforts.  
 
The presence of agitators or rebels that originated from the Spanish era and 
campaigned for Philippine Independence (cf. Kerr) was also a major concern.  
According to Kerr, it also justified the calls to educate the population for concern 
that rebellions would break out too intensely.  Officials conceded that that would 
take some time.      
 
When it comes to the larger question of what the Philippines could do for American 
interests such as setting up a Naval base and being a station to facilitate trade 
with China, it is clear that the colonial master would need to do a lot of work to 
make the colony a manifestation of its hegemonic power.  It was also no surprise 
why some officials did not think of the Philippines as itself a valuable commercial 
station.  The situation reaffirmed the need to introduce more advanced 
educational institutions and more advanced industries.  In this way, it would create 
more opportunity for revenues for the American state.  However, one interesting 
thing that writers like Putzel (1992) found lacking is a lack of more serious 
attempts at land reform in the American Era.  This chapter demonstrated the same 
during the preceding Spanish era.  It would also evoke a question of why this was 
even left out if the US was supposedly keen at imprinting its image on the 
Philippines.  More of this will be discussed in the coming chapters, but it is sufficing 
to say that the issue of land reform was something the US could have sorted given 
the problems that persisted before it entered the Philippines.  With the failure of 
land reform, one of the key power centres of the local elite remained intact.  
 
Given the institutional set-up that was outlined in this chapter, one of the things 
the next chapter does is reiterate how officials had expressed a commitment to 
modernising the Philippines based on the problems they encountered.  Such an 
idea of modernisation was based on institutions the Philippines had experienced 









As this thesis aims to use the 3Is to shed light on why the US liberal reforms for 
the Philippines relatively early on, it will involve trying to shed light on why the 
US decided to take the Philippines as a colony, to begin with.  The purpose of 
introducing this chapter is thus to analyse the role of interests, institutions, and 
ideas in the decision of US President William McKinley to acquire the Philippines 
from Spain, retain possession of it after the Spanish-American War, as well as 
those involved in the advice by other high-ranking US officials and political allies 
of McKinley.  In here, the domestic (US), as well as broader geopolitical factors, 
provide an important backdrop to the opinions and decision-makers regarding 
whether to acquire the Philippines.  By doing this, the thesis sets up some 
reference points for the subsequent chapters that examine the Is involved in 
further liberal reforms.   
 
In the process, one of the main points that this chapter demonstrates that 
strategic security considerations around the Spanish-American War, ideas about 
Filipino capabilities and what US officials thought the US’ role was, as well as 
perceived economic considerations on access to China were among the key drivers 
of the decisions to take the Philippines and retain it.  Furthermore, the chapter 
also shows that even as there was no firm plan to take on the Philippines until the 
last minute, there was a hope that doing so would fulfil some of the motives (e.g. 
interests and some ideas) that had their roots in the dynamics of previous 
decades, and that one cannot pin the acquisition of the Philippines down to one 
single cause.  However, in introducing ideas, interests and institutions, this 
chapter will pose questions about whether particular ideas, interests, and 




Before proceeding with outlining the ideas, institutions, and interests in detail, the 
next section will briefly argue that the Philippines started as an afterthought in the 
US’ plans.  It shows that at the beginning, the federal government had no plans 
to acquire the Philippines and that it would be a last-minute decision.  It is this 
backdrop for the ideas, institutions, and interests that are subsequently discussed.  
Given that officials decided to acquire the Philippines at the last minute, officials 
rationalised acquiring the Philippines in terms of other existing objectives. 
 
The backdrop from the second section introduces the third section, which is the 
ideas, institutions, and interests involved in the Spanish-American War.  Here, 
security and strategic interests (i.e. developing America’s reputation as a global 
power, need for bases in the Far East, keeping Spain at arm’s length) were at 
stake.  It was also here that the idea of Filipinos not being reliable enough to 
manage their affairs emerged as well as the related idea that officials thought the 
US needed to exercise its power to “civilise” others.  This chapter establishes how 
some of these ideas, institutions, and interests worked interdependently to have 




The fourth section then focuses on the broader economic-related factors in 
acquiring the Philippines.  These especially included the interests in the China 
trade (i.e. facilitating the China trade, keeping European powers at arm's length), 
something that was deeply rooted.  This section does not argue whether the 
Philippines was a helpful force for the China trade but that officials believed it was.  
In relation, this chapter also discusses the idea of the glut thesis (the concept 
where seeking markets overseas was a solution to domestic production surplus) 
and its possible manifestation in economic interests of key US officials.   
 
The fifth section will then enumerate other factors under consideration as the US 
was in the process of acquiring the Philippines.  These included religious interests 
and the institution of property rights.      
 
THE PHILIPPINES: AN INITIAL AFTERTHOUGHT 
William McKinley was the US President at the time of the Spanish-American War.  
Amidst the war, the US government was initially preoccupied with the matter of 
liberating Cuba and Puerto Rico from Spanish colonial rule. To McKinley’s 
administration, dealing with these two entities, which already became known in 
the mainland, was a larger priority than the Philippines.   At that point, any 
motivation related to the said matter was less about acquiring the Philippines per 
se as it was an issue of neutralising Spanish forces and keeping the Asia-Pacific 
within American reach and protecting cities on the west coast of the US from 
Spanish incursions (Olcott, 1916).  Moreover, there was also an existing US policy 
to not intervene in troubles in Spanish territories unless such troubles would 
undermine US interests. As such, such troubles were not given notice by officials 
to warrant action (Olcott, 1916: 141).  Furthermore, McKinley thought that 
acquiring the Philippines would be tantamount to “criminal aggression”.    
 
In an interview with General James Ruisling (1903) five years after the acquisition 
of the Philippines, McKinley revealed he was originally not in favour of acquiring 
it.  He further argued that he did not even know what to do with them once he 
found out the islands were involved in the Spanish-American War.  McKinley 
struggled with what to do with the Islands.  He had several options: a) return the 
islands to Spain; b) let another colonial power take over; c) grant outright 
independence to the islands; d) make the islands a protectorate of the US, and; 
e) acquire the entire territory (ibid). 
 
On balance, information such as those revealed in the Greene papers has further 
given credence to the image that other scholars had about McKinley being a 
“reluctant expansionist” (Smith, 1993: 237).  Once again, this means that any 
semblance of expansionism into the Philippines was something brought about by 
circumstances that the administration faced.    
 
Is STEMMING FROM THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR     
Scholars have considered the Spanish-American War to be the highlight of 
McKinley’s presidency. The events associated with the war here also consolidated 
the US’ footprint in the world as an empire and rising colonial power (Calabresi 
and Yoo, 2008: 236).  In the process, opportunities to develop America’s 
reputation in the world arose.  It was in consideration of these interests that the 




INTEREST in Developing America’s Global Reputation and Restraining European 
Powers  
As the US was a young rising power, the major European powers were still looking 
to further expand their territories, especially in Africa and Asia.  On top of that, 
US officials unsure of how to assert the US’ authority in the world (Zelikow, 2017: 
45-46).  Zelikow further goes on to say that as it is a rising power, it also had the 
fortune of a growing economy at the turn of the century.  Some officers and 
politicians were keen on improving the US’ standing overseas to take advantage 
of these trends.  In the minds of these actors, it was thus imperative for the US 
to improve its reputation. 
 
Having said that, there was also an appetite to slow further European conquest 
among officials.  Some of it was manifested in one of the options later considered 
for what would happen if Spain were to be defeated.  This option was to turn over 
the islands to a third power like Japan or Germany.   Germany was assessed as 
best in position to take over the reins in the Philippines, given that it was 
establishing naval ports of its own in Asia (Zelikow, 2017).  Given that the US was 
trying to build up its reputation on the world stage, brigadier general Francis 
Vinton Greene, someone enlisted by McKinley to help draft recommendations for 
the Philippines, spoke out against such a prospect.  Greene indicated that turning 
the Philippines over to Japan, Germany or another power, it would be “an act of 
cowardice of which we are incapable” (in ibid: 57).  Furthermore, McKinley himself 
thought doing so would provide an advantage to what he called were the rivals of 
the US and that such would constitute “bad business” and was something 
“discreditable”.  That was a similar line used to rule out a return of the Philippines 
to Spain (Ruisling, 1903: 17).  In other words, when officials had the option to 
turn the Philippines over to European powers (e.g. Germany), it was rejected with 
a view that doing so would reignite European dominance, something that they 
tried to avoid.      
 
A question that stems from these interests, however, is whether they could be in 
and of themselves sufficient reasons, or one needs to understand them vis-a-vis 
the prevailing ideas and institutions at the time.   Officials would have needed to 
think about the values associated with such interests.  These would include 
thoughts about what promoting America’s image and reputation entailed.  
Furthermore, the fact that officials were keen to advance the US’ reputation 
implied that, (a) they had thoughts about how to do it, and (b) there were 
institutionalised practices that may have encouraged such thoughts to proliferate 
among decision-makers.     
 
INTEREST - Need for Naval and Commercial Bases in the Far East 
As alluded to previously, McKinley was not keenly interested in the Philippines per 
se early on during the Spanish-American war.  However, the considerations 
involving the Philippines during the early stages of that war were partly rooted in 
the need to manage resources of the Asia-Pacific Squadron and make the latter’s 
missions in the region more efficient.  The Asia-Pacific Squadron was a fleet of US 
naval vessels that aimed to protect US merchants doing business in the Far East 
from succumbing to pirates.  It usually used ports in China, Japan, and Korea to 
dock its ships when it went ashore.  As part of its the initial plans for the said 
squadron, the US Navy wanted it to go after Spanish ships in Manila Bay.  Given 
the war, the Spanish ships assigned there were considered a threat by the US.  
Furthermore, given the capacity of ships and the practicality of carrying the coal 
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that would power such vessels, officers felt the need for new bases to be built 
(Zelikow, 2017: 42-43).   
 
However, the British and Japanese hosts were concerned about the use of their 
bases to launch wars, especially against Spain.  On top of this, the manner of 
transporting coal did not lend itself well to existing plans of the US (ibid, 43).   
 
Though McKinley was reluctant to conquer the Philippines at first, he was 
nonetheless in favour of building US naval bases overseas.  McKinley also had a 
record on annexation as his administration oversaw the annexation of Hawaii 
(Gould, 1980).  As such, this implies that McKinley’s ultimate stance to annexe 
the Philippines was not completely surprising as far as the desire to build bases 
was concerned.    
 
Additionally, some government and military officials under McKinley had plans of 
their own.  Imperialists such as William Taft and Theodore Roosevelt found 
commercial value in acquiring and governing the Philippines.  They felt that the 
Philippines would ultimately serve their broader trading needs.  Officials did not 
necessarily value the Philippines per se as a final destination for trade.  However, 
the Philippines, together with Hawaii, Wake, and Guam, would comprise a network 
of naval and coal stations that would form a trade route for the US to China (e.g. 
McCormick, 1963; Beveridge, 1900; Gould, 1980) and access to Korea, French 
Indochina, and the Malay Peninsula (Vanderbilt in US Congress, Senate, 1899: 
561).  Since the beginning of the Spanish-American War, senior officials of the 
McKinley administration (though not necessarily McKinley himself) wanted to 
make the Philippines the “American Hong Kong” both commercially and militarily.  
Hong Kong served these purposes for its British colonial masters: an entrepot and 
a military base from which to transport goods through (McCormick, 1963).  In 
other words, part of the appeal of the Philippines for colonialists was some major 
business figures saw it as a base to reach half the world’s population easily 
(Soberano, 1974: 42).     
 
As for possible interactions, the fact that new bases were needed implies two 
things.  First, officials were almost certainly aware that the new bases were 
essential to the US’s expression of power across the North-Western Pacific. More 
importantly, there is a question of what the ideational basis was to go to the North-
Western Pacific to pursue these interests.  For instance, given that the Philippines 
was seen as the “American Hong Kong” in a commercial sense, it is highly likely 
that their interests were associated with ideas about free trade and economic 
competition.  US officials needed a free port from which to transport goods to and 
from.  
 
INTEREST OF Keeping Spain From Advancing 
Related to the interest of keeping European powers from gaining an advantage in 
the Pacific, as US officials found that the Philippines was under Spanish 
jurisdiction, they were considering the prospect of it using what the consequences 
of letting it advance were.  McKinley was fearful that if the American side lost in 
its war against Spain, there would be no place for them to “refit” in the Orient.  
Furthermore, McKinley implied that a victory for the Spaniards would also mean 
that the latter would become unconstrained in attempting to seize parts of the 
western United States (Rusling, 1903).   Given that officials at the turn of the 
century were wary of further European expansion, it made sense to the US to 
 
 81 
contain Spain, the other main party in the Spanish-American War, and prevent it 
from resurging as a colonial power.   
 
However, this interest to contain Spanish power could not have existed in a 
vacuum.  As ideas help make sense of agents’ interests, this would mean that 
officials must have developed the idea that Spain undermined American prospects 
as the latter tried to expand its footprint.  On the other hand, as ideas reflect 
agents’ interests, the account above portraying Spain as a threat suggests that 
officials in the US had other interests that it had to protect, such as the tracts of 
land that it had in the western part of the country.       
 
INSTITUTION of Neutrality 
Once again, North (1995) defines institutions as “rules of the game”.  Other 
authors broadly characterise institutions as structures and constraints the actors 
operate within.  Hence, institutions include existing laws and practices.  Moreover, 
the institutions also necessitate some of the officials’ interests.  For instance, 
during the earlier parts of the Spanish-American war, there was the institution of 
the neutrality the US tried to honour.  The previous subsection already explained 
the backdrop that the Spanish-American War complicated the Asia-Pacific 
Squadron’s mission.  The situation became complicated in the sense that in the 
eyes of the host ports, the squadron would violate neutrality provisions of the law.  
In other words, Britain and Japan, the hosts that controlled the ports in question 
did not want to get involved in the US’ war against Spain.  Under the principle of 
neutrality, US vessels and crewmen US risked being impounded by the hosts for 
violating such.  Officials were mindful of this.  Moreover, other parties have been 
reiterating how the US was nagging them to adhere the principle of neutrality, 
and it would leave an adverse impression if the US did not follow suit when it was 
them who needed to do so (Zelikow, 2017). 
 
As institutions constrain or facilitate the saliency of interests, the institutional 
norm of neutrality’s relationship with interests lies partly with the fact that the US 
wanted a foothold in the Western Pacific.  However, its path to pursuing such 
interests became complicated by officials committed to respecting neutrality.   
 
Likewise, as institutions may result from the construction of interests, it suggests 
that this constraint of neutrality resulted from officials’ desire to defend their 
interests.  Specifically, the thinking here is that neutrality was supposed to help 
officials defend and advance their interests, not least of which was the protection 
of US troops when pursuing sensitive mission as well as preventing unnecessary 
warfare.  Moreover, ideas make sense of institutions.  In this case, the fact that 
officials observe the institution of neutrality also implies that officials had an idea 
of what neutrality entails and what benefits it had.  Once again, the fact that there 
was an institution of neutrality suggests that it did not have an inherent meaning.  
Therefore, the benefits behind neutrality help explain why officials decided to 
observe it.          
 
IDEA - Filipinos unable to govern their affairs 
The Spanish-American war has been one of the first glimpses of what Americans 
thought of Filipino leadership.  One of the proposals McKinley considered was to 
give Filipino elites their territory once Spain ceded it.  But this was opposed to the 
notion that they would not manage their affairs in a way that would satisfy US 
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officials. Therefore, McKinley found it imperative to annexe the Philippines as part 
of the US (Rusling, 1903; Zelikow, 2017). 
 
Given that McKinley himself believed in the idea that upon acquisition of the 
Philippines, the Filipinos were not yet ready to govern themselves, it would also 
imply that they were not ready to exercise democratic governance in the way 
exercised back in the mainland.  For the time being, the US pictured the Filipinos 
as having fairly inferior abilities to manage their internal affairs.  Imperialists in 
Congress such as Beveridge, who considered Filipino calls for self-rule “aspiring 
for the impossible”, also shared this opinion.  Nonetheless, McKinley did not 
necessarily think it would take centuries for Filipinos to develop their abilities to 
govern themselves (Soberano, 1974: 45).           
 
Although the evidence of McKinley’s racism was “not good” (ibid), there were 
officials who openly admitted what they thought of Filipinos’ abilities, including 
McKinley himself. 
 
In conferring what would come next for the Philippines, the Treaty of Paris also 
demonstrates how some of its proponents conjured up the idea that Filipinos could 
not be trusted just yet to manage themselves.  The language that was put forward 
and passed is suggestive as far as Hall’s ideas, institutions, and interests are 
concerned.  Assuming the case that those who worded the Treaty did so to give 
the US maximum leverage, it implied that they were operating with the idea that 
the Philippines was not in a position (incapable) to determine what was “suitable”.  
This idea worked hand-in-hand with the interests of the US as pressing them to 
develop the islands to their satisfaction would mean they are facilitating the order 
they would need to do business there more smoothly.     
 
More specifically, on 6 February 1899, Sen Samuel McEnery put forward a joint 
resolution.  In it, it would be made clear that native inhabitants of the Philippine 
would not be entitled to US citizenship nor permanently make Philippine territories 
an “integral” part of the US.  However, the resolution also stated that a 
government that is “suitable to the wants and conditions of the inhabitants” that 
would facilitate the way for the possibility of self-governance, which in due course 
would allow them to promote both US interests, as well as that of the native 
inhabitants (United States Congress.  Senate., 1899b: p.13).  Further 
amendments to the resolution to clarify and reiterate the potential relationship 
and motivations of the US in the Philippines were put forward by Senators Nelson 
Aldrich and George Frisbee Hoar.    
  
The language of the resolution suggests broad room for manoeuvring, especially 
with terms like “suitable” and wording such as “islands as it will best promote the 
interests of the citizens of the United States and the inhabitants of the said islands” 
(ibid).  In it, the US government would decide what passes for ‘suitable’ and ‘best 
promote the interests of the citizens…’ and when Filipinos achieved that threshold.  
One could imply that at the time, it could leave room for the US and provide 
officials with territorial ambitions an excuse to keep the Philippines indefinitely 
without the native inhabitants of the acquired territory necessarily able to enjoy 
full rights that US citizens in the mainland enjoyed.  On the other hand, such a 
resolution would also bring the hope of keeping the US on its feet because 
promoting the interest of US citizens would eventually mean restoring order and 




The 3Is framework suggests that prevailing US institutions at the time bolstered 
the idea of Filipinos being unable to govern themselves.  For instance, there was 
some long history of institutional racism against Asians, in general, that should be 
considered (cf. Hong, 2019; de Leon, 2020).20    
 
IDEA - American “Moral” Obligations 
Related to the idea that Filipinos were unable to manage their affairs, there was a 
notion among some politicians and officials of a “moral” obligation the US had to 
countries whom they considered to be “uncivilised” (cf. Love, 2004, Sebring, 
2015).  McKinley also relied on his political allies for guidance.  Invoking such 
brings up the idea of the US as exercising responsibility for moulding the territories 
that it would eventually acquire and that the US felt it needed to be the one to 
discharge it.  
 
These so-called “moral” obligations, however, are not to be read automatically as 
something to be done for their own sake.  One such recurring “moral”-related idea 
was the “White Man’s Burden”.  McKinley and his allies believed that whites were 
capable of engaging in a civilising mission to other parts of the world, hence the 
so-called “white man’s burden”.  Under that, there is a civiliser who appears 
reluctant but takes up arms to “relieve grievous wrongs”.  It also involves “dictates 
of humanity”.  The idea originated in the nineteenth century when the federal 
government attempted expansion further westward and invaded native American 
lands.  In it, officials sold it as a “Christianising” and “civilising” mission.  However, 
such language also meant that the other side was not “civilised” to the standards 
the occupiers wanted (in Sebring, 2015).  Ultimately, racial factors did not stop 
other officials and politicians from harbouring racial motives and subtly 
incorporating them into policies concerning the Philippines, even indirectly (Love, 
2004).   
 
Also important to this was the hopes of imperialists to assert the federal 
government’s authority as a rising power.  By doing that, officials felt the need to 
view colonial inhabitants and institutions as not at the same level as the US.  Thus, 
officials needed to treat the colony as such.  The idea of the Filipinos being unable 
to govern themselves was also related to the idea that Americans had a “moral” 
obligation.  For one, the latter presupposes that the former is to the mind of the 
Americans, lacks a satisfactory “moral” standard. For instance, Sen Albert 
Beveridge (33 Cong Rec 704-712: 1900), an ally of McKinley, was adamant with 
keeping the Philippines.  He insisted that the territory belonged to the US 
perpetually.  In addition to the economic grounds, Beveridge also saw the US’ 
mission in the Philippines on moral and religious grounds.  Beveridge was adamant 
that the American race had a “moral” stake and that a divine power sent them to 
the Philippines and that abandoning or withdrawing from the territory would be 
irreversibly catastrophic.  In this context, “abandoning or withdrawing” may mean 
letting the Filipinos manage themselves.  Given that officials characterised the 
 
20 For instance, de Leon (2020) suggests that in the nineteenth century, white nativists 
had released propaganda against how Chinese ‘unclealiness’ in San Francisco, which 
played a critical role in the Chinese Exclusion Act.  At this point it was the first law that 
restricted migration to the US based on one’s race.  Additionally, de Leon also shows US 
officials would also look negatively at Filipinos based on what they thought of as “unclean 
and uncivilised bodies”.   
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consequences as catastrophic, the idea was lurking that was would be catastrophic 
was the result of Filipinos trying to manage themselves without guidance which 
US officials thought Filipinos needed.  Although Beveridge invoked economic 
grounds for conquering the Philippines, even if that was not the case, he still 
believed in the “moral” imperatives he invoked.     
 
The “moral” ideas also influenced the kind of relationship advisers thought the 
Philippines would As the Spanish-American War was underway, one of the options 
was to turn the Philippines into a US protectorate.  Officials widely regarded that 
status as inadequate.  There was a wide belief that given the US’ eventual right 
of sovereignty, only the Americans were in a position to re-establish order in the 
Philippines and provide guidance to them.  The hope was by exercising sovereignty 
over the Philippines, both Filipinos and Americans can receive protections from 
dangerous complications arising from the prospect of the former being the latter’s 
protectorate (Olcott, 1916).    
 
US Senators invoked these “moral” obligations when they ratified the Treaty of 
Paris.  As ratification needed more than a simple majority, there were critical 
voices that weighed in.  In the process, supporters of President McKinley continued 
to defend what the Treaty accorded the US.  For instance, Sen Knute Nelson cited 
the US’ duty of spreading “Christian civilisation” and reiterated that the US did not 
enter to act as despots, rather as “ministering angels” (Bowden, 2009: 227).  The 
“moral” undertones were used by opponents of the Treaty as well to at least 
express initial reservations.  For instance, George Hoar, a member of the 
McKinley’s party, was initially opposed to the Treaty as he feared it would turn the 
US into a “vulgar, commonplace empire” that exercises control over “subject races 
and vassal states, in which one class must forever rule and other classes must 
forever obey” (ibid).  Hoar further clarified his position by tabling an amendment 
to the Treaty that would suggest protecting the rights of Filipinos.  His 
amendments were given an affirmative vote by 45 Senators and a negative vote 
by 34 of his colleagues.  Based on this, Hoar did not want the US, even under the 
administration of his party, to act hypocritically vis-à-vis what it stood for in 
principle.  For all the advances that the Treaty has given the Philippines, intended 
or not, some of Hoar’s fears, especially those concerning class developments, 
would have some foundation.     
 
Amidst the ideas of “moral obligations” and “Christianising mission” involved, one 
needs to consider what interests US officials had in relation to them.  Given that 
there was opposition to it even from McKinley’s party, such would suggest that 
there are questions about whether “moral obligations” and “Christianising mission” 
were ends in and of themselves.  For instance, if officials acted based on “moral 
obligations” and “Christianising mission”, what would they satisfy or achieve?  One 
should consider the interest of officials to improve America’s image as a rising 
power.  As mentioned previously, officials wondered how to achieve this.  These 
two ideas, which for officials connoted American power, reflected the desire of 
such officials to demonstrate emerging American power.   
 
Is INVOLVED IN ECONOMIC EXPANSION 
Officials often cited economic considerations for why they would recommend 
acquiring the Philippines.  Some of the ideas and interests were consequences of 




   
IDEA OF “Glut” thesis 
The “glut” thesis is an idea advocated by some scholars and adopted by some 
officials that tried to deal with the production surpluses the US was experiencing.  
The idea behind this was that as domestic markets reached a point of saturation, 
producers needed to find a new market to sell their goods (Osgood and Etheridge, 
2010).   
 
Business and political elites recognised that the domestic market was at the time, 
reaching its limit in terms of potentials for profitability. The consumer market back 
home was thus insufficient for the needs of domestic industries.  Furthermore, the 
fact that the US emerged from the economic depression that lasted from the 1870s 
to 1880s exacerbated the need for new markets.  In this era, American political 
and business elites thought that one of the causes of the country’s economic 
stagnation and social instability during this time was industrial overproduction.  
Hence, there was a need for US firms to look elsewhere to sell their goods 
(McCormick, 1963; Gould, 1980).   
   
This glut thesis gave rise to expansionist ideals before McKinley even assumed 
office.  For instance, it became one of the bases for some Secretaries of State 
such as Henry Seward to envision an American commercial empire that covered 
the Caribbean, Gulf of Mexico, and Pacific (Osgood and Etheridge, 2010).    
McKinley eventually subscribed to the idea of overproduction. 
 
Based on all of this, given that the domestic markets were not in good shape but 
that there was some produce of goods that remained unconsumed, elites needed 
to sell them elsewhere. 
 
The Philippines fits into the glut thesis as it suggested that Latin America was 
among the regions the US thought of finding markets in.  Cuba was a direct target, 
but as a consequence of the Spanish-American War, officials also acquired the 
Philippines and thought of it as a gateway to China (Paterson, 1996: 351).   
 
Ideas help agents make sense of their interests.  Specifically, Poteete (2003) 
argues that ideas help agents interpret interests.  Given that scholars consider 
ideas to be widely held beliefs, the glut thesis was thus seen as a guide and 
starting point for officials to help interpret how to achieve their interests.  In this 
case, one of the interests that officials had was to help the domestic economy 
overcome its surplus problem.  They also had business allies with existing ventures 
abroad.  Moreover, their subscription to the notion that the domestic market was 
saturated convinced them that they needed to recover the losses they made by 
going somewhere else.  The glut thesis thus acted as a way for US firms to justify 
their search for activities abroad.   
 
Moreover, as institutions limit or facilitate the effectivity of ideas, a prevailing 
institution that facilitated the saliency of these ideas was the prevalence and 
encouragement of profit-seeking behaviours prevalent in the US.     
 
INTEREST OF Growing and Retaining Access to China 
There are debates about whether possessing the Philippines gave the US an actual 
or tangible advantage.  Some like Zelikow (2017) have argued that it did not.  The 
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later chapters would show that in decisions to liberalise institutions in the 
Philippines, the China trade was not a direct factor nor was it invoked in such.  
However, the fact that officials used the potential of accessing China to rationalise 
their possession of the Philippines pointed to their belief in what the Philippines 
would potentially offer irrespective of what actually turned out.  Even if it was not 
the case, officials welcomed anything that would facilitate their trading position. 
 
North Atlantic maritime powers have long sought access to Asian trade routes.  
For the part of the US, formal commercial contact between the US and China 
began in the 1780s.  The need for bases to China increased in the late nineteenth 
century owing to increases in production capacity, higher support for the Panama 
canal and development in the mainland’s West Coast (Schoonover, 2003: 35, 52).  
The China market was valuable at the time.  As of 1897, officials estimated the 
value of Chinese foreign commerce at $286 million (Beveridge, 1900). 
 
However, although US merchants were doing business for some time, their 
position was threatened.  They were looking to maintain their influence.  Under 
China’s “Open Door policy’” American businessmen had been able to enter China 
relatively easily since the middle of the nineteenth century.  But later in the 
nineteenth century, more established European and Japanese powers vied for 
exclusive rights to develop and control certain ports.  The Chinese Empire has 
withdrawn from free trade as different powers had exerted their influence over 
various parts of China to the point of closing off Americans and nearly splitting 
China into multiple colonies. For instance, France secured a promise of preferential 
rights in exploiting mines in three southern Yunnan provinces. Russia, in turn, was 
given first preference in constructing railways north and northeast of Beijing, as 
well as the granting of the status of a sphere of influence in Mongolia and 
Manchuria. Third, Britain received preference to remain head of the customs 
service as it secured a non-alienation agreement in the Yangtze area. Japan 
received a preferential agreement in Fukien province that would result in the 
exclusion of other partners. Finally, Germany was given preference rights for 
capital (investment?) in Shantung and allowed to lease Kiaochow, a naval base 
south of Port Arthur (Dennett, 1941). The advance of European powers (especially 
Spain, Britain, The Netherlands and Portugal), which threatened the independence 
of Chinese territory, had also forced the Chinese government to abandon its liberal 
“Open Door” policy and restricted trading practices to areas that were furthest 
away from Beijing. The Opium War (1841) also led the European powers operating 
in the region to annexe parts of China for themselves (Pumpelly, 1868: 608).   
 
Further complicating and undermining the future of the “open door” threat was a 
change in regime in China.  In 1898, a coup occurred where more conservative-
leaning Chinese forces toppled the ruling pro-Western government.  It implied 
more inward-looking trade policies within China (McCormick, 1963: 167).   
 
Russian involvement was also a potential concern as half of the textile exports of 
the US to China passed through areas under Russian control.  The US also charged 
Russia of unfavourable policies in Manchuria.  Officials regarded such a 
development as an urgent reason to retain the Philippines as a base in case 
aggressive action would become necessary.  A majority of peace commissioners 




McKinley himself was also candid about what he believed was the economic or 
commercial value the Philippines had for the US, particularly as the US tried to 
maintain the prized “Open Door” policy towards China. Such a policy could be 
preserved if the US could prevent other powers from colonising China, and this 
was considered to be the core objective of American expansionism in the Far East 
region (McCormick, 1963). Thus, McCormick also characterised American 
imperialism as a paradox. It was also revealed that McKinley was encouraged and 
prodded to annexe the Philippines by American businessmen already based in 
China. One of the strongest advocates for expansion was the American Asiatic 
Association, where they emphasised that they should pursue such annexation to 
protect and enhance American commercial interests in the region (Soberano, 
1974).   
 
These values were brought up by McKinley’s allies in Congress who supported 
expansionism.  Senator Henry Cabot Lodge was also a staunch supporter of 
American expansion in the Far East and agreed with the notion that at least the 
capital city of Manila would provide the US with a foothold in trading in the Far 
East (ibid).  Other than finding avenues to sell the surplus from domestic 
production to, US officials feared that trade and investment barriers would be 
erected by many countries especially as other colonising powers would feel 
encouraged to acquire more colonial territories.  Moreover, some officials opined 
that Britain had reached the climax of its hegemonic power and that 
internationally, powers such the US had to take over the reins of global 
governance at the turn of the century (Miller, 1982).    
 
Thus, to maintain access, the thought that was going through the minds of officials 
was that of constructing a new port to continue facilitating businesses.  Manila 
was one such prospective spot.  In particular, officials considered Manila to be one 
of the “best harbours”.  Consequently, Manila was a target for those in favour of 
expansion in the 1890s (Schoonover, 2003: 35, 52). 
 
The interests of expanding into China were based on ideas such as the glut thesis.  
The glut thesis states that by seeking overseas markets, US firms would help 
relieve the domestic problem of surplus production plaguing the country during 
the latter part of the nineteenth century.  Thus, given this idea, they found a 
further rationalisation to strengthen their existing links to the Chinese market.  
Given the challenging political conditions, officials and firms needed a 
rationalisation to continue.  This “glut thesis” idea was thus a way to help shore 
up and remind them of their interests in continued access in the Chinese market.  
Thus, officials did not suddenly develop interests of Chinese expansion.  Instead, 
the idea of the glut thesis provided a basis for officials to pursue this interest in 
China. 
 
IDEA: “Moral” obligations revisited 
Officials also used the notion of the US’ “moral” obligations (e.g. “white man’s 
burden”) discussed in the previous section to rationalise American overseas 
economic policies.  In particular, the notion of the US’ moral obligations included 
the spreading of economic capitalism (to the standards of those who expanded) 
of those territories that the federal government touched.  In particular, McKinley 
believed that spreading the country’s economic influence, in particular, US-style 
capitalism overseas would ultimately serve the country’s broader interests and 
 
 88 
that spreading such an ideology allowed the country to attain “morally defensible” 
objectives.   
 
However, ideas may reflect interests.  The reality was that the economic health of 
the US was a constraining thing.  McKinley was mindful of this even as he 
characterised trade and foreign commerce as desirable objectives (Gould, 1980).  
The idea of “moral obligations” reflects interests to the degree that it included a 
reference to improving economic prospects in the colony, which officials in turn 
hope would translate into more lucrative opportunities for American businessmen.   
 
As institutions also constrain or propel certain ideas, the “moral” obligations, 
particularly the economic portions of it, was given support by the 
institutionalisation of promoting capitalism.         
 
OTHER Is INVOLVED 
Religious Interests and Institutions 
Institutions limit or strengthen ideas.  In the context of religion, that would 
suggest a strong interplay between “Christian” 21 ideas and the institution of a 
Church.  As mentioned in an earlier section, there was a “Christianising” mission 
involved.  This idea of Catholic values needing to stay supreme also suggests that 
the institution of the Catholic Church in the US was also keeping its presence 
intact.  Furthermore, institutions also facilitate or constrain the saliency of 
interests.  This one drives the notion that the institution’s interests may face 
somewhat of a threat if the US were to come in because it would mean them losing 
influence at the expense of non-Catholics, to which McKinley was a part of.  
Domestically, however, the Catholic and Protestant sects looked the prospect of 
colonising the Philippines differently.  Given that the Philippines was a colony of 
Spain, the Catholic Church was keen to protect its legacy in the colony.  Hence, 
Catholics in the US were primarily opposed to the federal government annexing 
the outgoing Spanish territory.  They were primarily afraid of non-Catholic 
Christians spreading their influence in the predominantly Catholic colony.  In other 
words, the Christian basis for McKinley’s acquisition of the Philippines had support 
from the institutionalised Christian churches.    
 
Support among Protestants was rather mixed, however.  On the one hand, they 
did not think annexation was something that would uphold American values.  On 
the other hand, the Protestants were open to anything to try to counter the 
established Catholic influence in the colony (Soberano, 1974).   
 
The Institution of Property Rights Laws and Treaties 
Related to the interest that the US had to preserve its reputation as a rising power, 
it needed to show that was capable of and serious in respecting property rights.  
It was manifested during the Treaty of Paris negotiations, as well as in McKinley’s 
instructions to acquire the Philippines.   
 
On 19 May 1898, Major-General Wesley Merit was instructed by McKinley to 
publish a proclamation which says that Americans were not in the Philippines to 
wage war against the Filipinos or a part of them and that Filipinos who aide US 
 
21 Christianity, as used here, refers to the Christian churches in general (Catholicism plus 
the various Protestant sects).  
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forces would receive rewards.  The proclamation would also state that all personal 
and religious rights would be protected (in McKinley, 08/09/1900: 16).  An 
apparent reaffirmation of commitment to property rights was indicated in a letter 
to the Commander of Philippine Armed Forces on 21 December 1898.  It 
specifically indicated to exert US authority within the islands to secure people, 
property and the former’s ability to exercise their rights over the latter (in ibid).      
 
McKinley also wanted to protect existing property rights, which is one of the 
characteristics associated with early would-be democracies.   On the one hand, 
the likes of William Taft, initially appointed by McKinley to become Governor-
General of the Philippine colony, may have wanted a small form of self-rule.  
However, most of the businessmen who operated in the territory wanted the 
administration to prioritise the restoration of law-and-order.  In the process, this 
preference ultimately led to the subjugation of civil liberties, and lives were lost 
as the American forces battled to defeat insurgents who opposed US sovereignty 
over the colony.  For the first few years, the Philippines was under US military 
rule.  Such measures also highlighted the opinions of senior officials that the 
colony was not yet ready to enjoy the rights that McKinley talked about.  
 
As mentioned in Chapter 3, institutions help constrain and/or facilitate the salience 
of ideas and interests.  Respecting the institution of property rights should be 
considered in light of the interest that US officials tried to improve the global 
reputation of the US.  As respecting property rights was a norm the US adhered 
to, it necessitated the thought that by violating this institution, the US would risk 
becoming discredited.  Granted McKinley’s instructions to seize the Philippines, 
the fact that there were issues of property rights meant they could not just do 
what they pleased just yet.  Although the US was the victor in the Spanish-
American War, the fact that property rights were at stake meant that they had to 
tread carefully in this regard or risk losing face.  It meant that between seizing 
the Philippines and preserving its image, it implied that the incentives to pursue 
the former needed to be tempered even as the US would go on to pursue on.      
 
The point here is that the rules or institutions such as property rights limited the 
ability of the US to project itself as a rising power. 
 
There are, however, questions about whether the notion of property rights was a 
free-standing institution.  As institutions are constructed to help protect an agent’s 
interests, one may need to look at property rights as being a necessary tool to 
protect the rightful claims of owners and minimise chaos in the free market 
system.  Also, the fact that this institution existed suggests that there was an idea 
behind it of property rights.   
 
CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS   
The Philippines started out as an afterthought.  There were no firm plans to acquire 
it.  However, the underlying reasons that officials seized on to rationalise the 
taking of the Philippines had their roots in the US’ broader economic goals which 
were decades in the making as well as a desire to ward off European powers.  
Another key element in this was the notion of how officials thought of exerting 
their power and demonstrating subtly the idea that they “moral” obligation to 
colonise parts of the world.  Furthermore, amidst McKinley’s initial reluctance on 
the Philippines, he considered the acquisition of the said territory the crown jewel 




Ultimately, given McKinley’s reluctance, his advisers were influential, and the 
circumstances that aides presented him with made inaction futile.  The McKinley 
administration’s approach also reflected, to a significant degree, the realities the 
US faced at the time.  It also encapsulated the mindset and ideas McKinley himself 
exhibited through the early days of his presidency.  Support for the annexation of 
the Philippines came from businessmen, military officials, and clergymen, all of 
whom looked for opportunities that may or may not be found inside that territory.  
The interests that these players had in taking the Philippines appeared significant 
enough for the US government to consider it.  It was evident from the preceding 
accounts in this chapter that interests played a key part in why the Philippines 
was acquired, albeit reluctantly.  It was also evident that colonising the Philippines 
was not itself the main end but the means towards other things, most notably to 
facilitate the defeat of Spain in the Spanish-American War and the prevention of 
them trying to infiltrate the US’ West Coast and the prevention of European rises 
to power.   
 
Amidst the end of the Spanish-American war, US officials emphasised the need to 
undercut European colonial powers, and not stepping in to take over from Spain 
in the Philippines would cause instability to undermine the US’ attempt to build its 
influence.  The attempts to redevelop the Philippines economically and politically 
could be a way for the US to not only facilitate its own economic prospects (e.g. 
through trade) but also bolster its geopolitical credentials.     
 
In this process, some of the Is invoked in the acquisition of the Philippines were 
complementary.  For instance, the idea of the “glut thesis” was something that 
provided opportunities to pursue the interests of some of the business and political 
elites to adopt a more expansive policy.  To be sure, their interests of making 
money had predated the financial crisis of the late nineteenth century but the idea 
of “glut thesis” had given these elites another opportunity to pursue their 
economic interests by venturing overseas.  In other words, they needed to make 
money, but they were at the same time wound up by the mindset that their failure 
to make enough was a consequence of not appealing to markets outside their 
domestic domains.  That is important when it comes to why the US would go to 
the Philippines because given that officials invoked what the Philippines could do 
for the China or Asian Pacific trade, it begs the question of why the US wanted to 
do business and go to such regions in the first place.        
 
Moreover, the idea of the Filipinos being unable to manage their affairs was also 
related to the idea that Americans had a “moral” obligation.  For one, the latter 
connotes that the former is to the mind of the Americans, based on inferior moral 
underpinnings.   
 
However, the idea-, interest-, and institution-based reasons are, in and of 
themselves, not always sufficient to explain the US’ decision to acquire the 
Philippines.  For instance, one can identify the relationship among them when the 
US had to do something that involved respecting laws and treaties such as 
neutrality.  As norms encapsulate institutions, the norm of neutrality interacted 
with the interest of finding a base.  The decision to enter and eventually take the 
Philippines was partly a product of the fact that Americans needed a base to 
consolidate their position against the Spaniards.  However, the fact that they have 
respected neutrality for quite some time necessitated the interest of them wanting 
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a base to operate.  One can say that this is related to the US’ interest in trying to 
build its reputation.  This norm also provided the constraints that the US had to 
observe and work with as it developed its image.  If the US did not feel constrained 
by the institution of neutrality, some questions would emerge about whether the 
Philippines would be considered for a base at that point, given that officials and 
McKinley himself did not consider acquiring the Philippines until the last minute.  
It would not necessarily hold off the US from acquiring the Philippines, but if the 
US did not observe the said norm, there would be one less strategic military reason 
for doing so, given what was just described.  
 
As will be seen throughout later chapters, developing the islands was a trial-and-
error endeavour which the US had limited prior experience engaging in.  
Regardless of their ulterior interests, they would manage to develop the 
Philippines to some degree, and partially achieve what the joint resolution 
discussed earlier hoped it would accomplish.  But given the trial-and-error nature 
of how they governed the Philippines along with other interests that the US would 
have to fulfil, one of its consequences would also be to empower natives whose 
hearts did not lie in promoting democratic values the US claimed to espouse at 




CHAPTER VI: PHILIPPINE ORGANIC ACT: POLITICAL 
ASPECTS AND 3Is IN ITS ESTABLISHMENT 
 
INTRODUCTION 
This chapter sheds light on the process of establishing a new government in the 
colony.  It examines the factors that led to the establishment of the political and 
governmental features of the 1902 Organic Act, the act to provide the Philippines 
with a constitution.  The chapter connects the wider external context surrounding 
the law's passage with the passage itself, as well as the features that it mandated.  
For instance, the Organic Act contained provisions to establish the lower house of 
the Philippine legislature or the Philippine Assembly, but it was not established 
until five years after the law's approval.  The Organic Act was also monumental 
because it codified a Bill of Rights for the Islands' inhabitants (Piedad-Pugay, 
2012).    
 
This chapter uses Hall's 3I framework to understand why including an Assembly 
in the Organic Act was contentious well as explain why senior US officials acted 
the way they did when they proposed and established the Insular government 
that prevailed in the Islands.  As will be demonstrated later, the addition of an 
assembly was not an overwhelmingly popular proposal among senior politicians 
at first.  At the same time, there was also evidence of restraint as to the powers 
they thought should be granted to the assembly.    
 
The core findings that this chapter will develop are that the developing reforms 
such as the Organic Act and the assembly emerged from the idea that Filipinos 
could still not be trusted to manage their affairs as well as the “policy of attraction” 
that Taft would put forward.  However, one should also analyse this idea by 
considering the interests of officials who want to secure the islands and improve 
the local economy. 
 
In order to do that, the chapter will first identify and summarise the ideas, 
institutions, and interests involved.  These ideas, institutions, and interests will 
then be seen and used in a historical context when this chapter will then trace the 
steps in how the Philippine Organic Act was established and the legislative process.  
It is here where one can find the prospects for the opposition and the purported 
reasons, which will get examined later.  Just as in the previous chapter, this 
chapter will also assess whether the ideas, interests, and institutions identified in 
the course of this analysis are sufficient reasons and the degree to which they 
were products of interactions with each other.  Thus, the chapter aims to suggest 
that although each of the ideas, interests, and institutions warrant valid 
considerations, one should not consider each of them as sufficient reasons.  
Instead, one should realise that they have roots in other ideas, interests, and 
institutions.  The chapter will revisit the ideas, interests, and institutions towards 
the end to attempt to assess their relationship to each other.   
 
 
IDEAS, INTERESTS, AND INSTITUTIONS RELATED TO THE ORGANIC ACT 
PASSAGE: A BRIEF OVERVIEW   
This section provides a brief overview of the relevant ideas, institutions, and 
interests.  They will be elaborated and analysed in the subsequent sections but 
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stated here to help provide to the prevailing factors when the narrative of the 
Philippine Organic Act and the Philippine Assembly are set.   
 
IDEA 1: Filipinos unable to govern themselves 
The Filipino's inability (in so far as colonial officials are concerned) is a recurring 
theme not just in this chapter but throughout the other chapters in this thesis.  
US officials felt convinced that the Filipinos they found could not be trusted to 
manage their affairs.  It was something President McKinley, a reluctant coloniser, 
even agreed to.  War Secretary Elihu Root used words like "but little advanced 
from pure savagery", "childlike in their lack of reflection, disregard of 
consequences, the fearlessness of death, thoughtless cruelty, and unquestionable 
dependence on a superior" to describe Filipinos.  Based on this characterisation, 
Root felt that the Islands were not ready for a government based on popular 
consent (Stanley, 1974: 60-61). 
 
IDEA 2: “Policy of attraction” 
Governor-General Taft's policies toward Filipino governance make up the “policy 
of attraction”.  The overarching principle was that by introducing institutions 
associated with liberal democracy (even if they did not constitute liberal 
democracy itself), there would be fewer incentives for Filipinos to lobby for further 
independence (Burns, 2010; Burns, 2013a).   
 
INTEREST 1: Security and Business-Friendly credentials 
The security interest has to do with preventing insurrections.  The insurrections 
were particularly keen on calling for outright independence.  Officials in the colony 
had fresh memories of the insurrections that led to the Philippine-American War.  
In this way, the colony would be secure not just for colonial officials to operate in 
but businesses as well.  US-based firms also pleaded to colonial officials to 
prioritise law-and-order to be able to operate.  Officials would invoke security 
concerns to provide incentives to colonial elites to participate in government 
affairs. 
 
INTEREST 2: Establishing a Naval Base 
One of the reasons for acquiring the Philippines was to establish a Naval Base in 
the Far East.  President Roosevelt especially emphasised that.  He wrote that if a 
naval base was not established, he would rather surrender the islands altogether 
(Roosevelt to Taft, 31/5/1905, in Morison V4, 1951: 1198).   
 
INTEREST 3: Electoral Politics 
As will be shown in more detail later in the chapter, the ruling party's manifesto 
tried to tout its accomplishments in the Philippines to varying degrees.  Politicians 
stressed these accomplishments partly to show the electorate it was determined 
to secure its accomplishments and show its foreign policy and national security 
credentials.  More importantly, officials such as Roosevelt read that the political 
mood was not completely in favour of maintaining the islands permanently.  
Officials believed such a political mood might undermine their purpose in the 
islands.    
 
INSTITUTIONS  
US officials tried to be conscious enough to observe the bill of rights to the extent 
they could be applicable in the colony (cf Stanley, 1974; Hutchcroft, 2000).  
Moreover, as the US was also in the midst of broader institutional changes 
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domestically, officials concerned with the Philippines were not up to breast with 
such institutional changes and operated under the mindset the older institutions 
promoted (Skowronek, 1982).   
 
Finally, another institution that warrants attention is the elites spawned from the 
pre-American social structures.  Although Taft publicly pronounced that he had 
problems with how the local elites conducted themselves, he was constrained to 
work with them.  He had no choice but to trust them.  These local elites were a 
product of the social relations detailed in Chapter 4, and the choice to work with 
them was made to address broader security concerns.  These local elites were 
then the subjects of the administrators' incentives. 
 
EXECUTIVE VISIONS FOR INSULAR GOVERNMENT 
Since the US assumed sovereignty over the Philippines, administrations had 
envisioned governance structures for the newly-found possession.  President 
McKinley instructed the Taft Commission to help the Filipinos establish a 
government "designed not for our [American] satisfaction or for the expression of 
our theoretical views, but for the happiness, peace, and prosperity of the people 
of the Philippine Islands".  At first, this sounds like McKinley trying to wash the 
US' hands of what negative effects would happen.  It was also clear that others 
thought of imposing the American worldview on its newly-acquired archipelago in 
the Far East (United States. President, 1900).   
 
Before the Organic Act's passage, governance of the Philippines was subject to a 
provision in the 1901 Army Appropriations Act or the Spooner Amendment (1901).  
In particular, the presidency was responsible for directing "all military, civil, and 
judicial powers" needed to govern the Islands (31 Stat. 895, 1901: 910).  It meant 
that the Islands were under the direct jurisdiction and control of the executive 
branch of the Federal government.  Filipinos only had representation on a local 
but not a colonial level until the 1900s.  Even then, local representation lacked 
organisation as late as 1893.  During the short period of US military rule between 
1898 and 1901, the administration expanded the franchise only to gradually 
restrict it again (Hutchcroft, 2000).     
 
In a letter to fellow party member Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, Taft envisioned 
that relevant legislation that would replace the Spooner Amendment.  Such 
legislation called for an insular government consisting of a Civil Governor, an 
Executive Council consisting of eight members – four department heads and four 
others with the Civil governor as presiding officer, and a popular assembly made 
completely made out of Filipinos (Taft, 22/10/1901: 1-2).    
 
The exercise of sovereignty over the Islands came as the mainland was also 
undergoing institutional changes to the state structure.  Institutions were born 
independent of the old or prevailing party system, direct/centralised court 
supervision, and "localistic orientations" (Skowronek, 1982: 15).  However, as this 
newer version of the American state was taking shape, colonisers developed the 
Islands to have institutions that resembled more the older version of the state 
(Hutchcroft, 2000: 285). 
 
As mentioned previously, President William McKinley wanted the US military 
administration based in the Philippines to "win the confidence, respect and 
affection of the inhabitants of the Philippines, by assuring them in every possible 
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way that full measure of individual rights and liberties…, and by proving to them 
that the mission of the United States is of benevolent assimilation, substituting 
the mild sway of justice for military rule." (McKinley, 21/12/1898).  Executing 
such instructions meant establishing a form of government and bureaucracy that 
would ensure the fulfilment of those objectives.  Nonetheless, a civilian 
administration would eventually replace the military government. 
 
As discussed in more detail in the previous chapter, institutional problems awaited 
Americans upon arrival in the Islands.  To summarise them, the Philippine 
Commission (1900: 81-2) found what it called "prominent defects" in the 
Philippine system of governance left by the Spaniards.  They included the 
following: 
a) Governor-General's "boundless and autocratic powers'" 
b) Powers concentrated in the capital Manila 
c) A lack of a parliament or a representative body that provided locals with 
a forum for their views 
d) Onerous taxation regime 
e) Officials who lived in the rural areas whereby with their sheer numbers, 
managed to obstruct public business 
f) Division of minor responsibilities done through the establishment of rival 
bureaus 
g) High costs of the institutions and corruption associated with it 
h) Confusion between the role of Church and State 
 
Given that the Commission found and considered these as problems, this implied 
that Congress had the challenge to rectify them through the organic laws they 
passed.  The Commission prioritised enumerating the problems of the governance 
structures.  Even as power remained concentrated in Manila, Chapter 3 also 
highlighted that a personalistic social structure was prevailing among insular 
politicians.    
 
In the second set of instructions to the Philippine Commission, McKinley (1900), 
similar to his first instructions, requested the commissioners to ensure whatever 
government they establish should not be for their satisfaction but for that of the 
Islands' inhabitants and that the moves adopted should also conform to local 
customs.  In this instance, McKinley further reminded the Commission to impress 
upon the inhabitants that in forming a government, certain 'great principles' are 
applicable and essential to preserve an atmosphere of the rule of law and 
individual freedoms. 
 
When Roosevelt became president, his first War Secretary Elihu Root described 
most of the Islands' inhabitants as "but little advanced from pure savagery", 
"childlike in their 'lack of reflection, disregard of consequences, fearlessness of 
death, thoughtless cruelty, and unquestionable dependence of a superior".  He felt 
that based on this characterisation, the Islands were not ready for a government 
based on popular consent (in Stanley, 1974: 60-61).  It meant Root believed 
Filipinos should not experience democracy straight away.  However, Root still 
acknowledged that despite the US exercising sovereignty over the Islands, the Bill 
of Rights limited what the US government was permitted to do while in the Islands 
and that "moral restraints" found in the nature of US governance's dealings with 
other people regardless of their legal status existed (Stanley, 1974: 60; 




As for the judiciary, the Philippine Commission, in a letter to Secretary Root 
(14/07/1900: 13), thought that the islands' system of justice needed "complete 
reformation".  The Commission also suggested that US judges should preside over 
the courts.      
 
Before assuming the presidency, Roosevelt was strongly in favour of establishing 
a presence in the Islands.  During the early days of his administration, Roosevelt 
sounded passionate about retaining the islands unconditionally for as long as 
possible.  He criticised politicians who put promoted independence to the islands 
in their manifesto, saying this promise cannot be made (Roosevelt, 1954: 938-
939).   
 
Roosevelt thought early on, US officials were doing the islands' inhabitants a 
favour by the former exercising its sovereignty over the latter and that if the US 
were to withdraw, it would hamper the progress already made and the Filipinos 
would lose out.    Based on Roosevelt's letter to politician JG Cannon (12/9/1904: 
341-343), the former claimed that the US has governed the islands in the 
"interests of their own [Filipino] people" and that Filipinos have benefitted most 
by the American presence.  At the same time, Roosevelt also admitted the islands 
was a "very great advantage" to the US and claimed that the US has been 
spreading knowledge about so-called "free popular government" through its 
actions there.  Roosevelt continued to be adamant that he viewed what they were 
doing in the islands as a "solemn obligation" utilised in the "interest of mankind".  
In this light, he expressed his preference not to change course over the prevailing 
national policy toward the islands at that moment.   
 
Roosevelt did not see the Philippines become independent during his presidency.  
It would take nearly four decades for the Philippines to receive full independence.  
However, Roosevelt's presidency, with the help of Taft (then Secretary of War), 
oversaw the establishment of the Philippine Assembly in 1907.  Roosevelt initially 
dubbed this as an "experiment" rather than as a "step" towards full self-rule, and 
he had qualms about granting it as much power as a traditional national legislature 
(in Morrison 1954: 941).  Roosevelt continued to write to Cannon (in Morrison 
1954: 340) that promising the Filipinos a definite date for independence would be 
tantamount to deceiving the islands' inhabitants.   
 
Despite Roosevelt's attitude toward the Islands, he did not write or personally 
lobby legislators to favour of the Organic Act directly.  Scholars have given more 
credit to Taft for this issue, who was at the time the Islands' Governor-General 
(Alfonso, 1970: 92-93).   
 
CONGRESSIONAL OPINION, HEARING AND DELIBERATIONS 
President McKinley's party mate, Senator George Hoar, was among the strongest 
critics of US involvement in the Islands.  In a floor speech, Hoar criticised the 
administration for turning the Monroe doctrine from something characterised by 
"eternal righteousness and justice" to something characterised by "brutal 
selfishness" and that the country was looking for its own interests.  Hoar also 





In the process, the then-opposition Democrats proposed bills of their own.  The 
highlight of the bill was that within a year of the cessation of hostilities, a 
Constitutional convention would take place.  Moreover, under their plan, the US 
would continue to govern until the Philippines was in a position to establish its 
own government and that amnesty be granted to inhabitants who committed 
political crimes against the US. At issue for them was whether under the guise of 
having a civilian government if a policy they saw as "unjust and cruel" to the 
Philippines' inhabitants be instituted indefinitely.  They opined that it would violate 
the treaty the US entered into with Spain (New York Times, 1902a: 13).  The 
majority party rejected this minority's proposals and amendments on the floor 
(Hamilton County Ledger, 1902: 6).    
 
Among the highlights of the government party's bill, The Bill of Rights of the US 
Constitution was to be made applicable to the Islands.  Exceptions included the 
rights to bear arms and a jury trial.  In Taft's testimony to the House of 
Representatives' Committee on Insular Affairs on 26 February 1902, he cited the 
fact that inhabitants who were otherwise eligible in terms of literacy have lacked 
the elements necessary to soundly execute a jury-style trial.  Taft also mentioned 
that the inhabitants simply did not have any experience in jury trials.  He was also 
wary that prevailing corruption in the system made it impractical to discharge it 
(in Compton: 1903, 95).    
 
The Philippine Assembly, on the other hand, was not an original feature of the 
Senate's version of the Organic bill.  Senators such as Albert Beveridge, Henry 
Cabot Lodge, and William Allison were under the impression that Filipinos could 
not govern themselves enough to warrant their own insular parliament (May, 
1980: 58).  Taft took note of their opposition, but he was still adamant that an 
Assembly was needed at some point.   
 
In 1901, Taft confided to Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, a staunch supporter of the 
Philippine conquest, regarding the form of government the Philippines should look 
like.  First, Taft wanted Congress to vest in the Commission the same powers the 
then President McKinley provided in his instructions.  He was aiming that by 1904, 
to have a government that would consist of a Civil Governor, an Executive Council, 
and a popularly-elected Assembly with "full legislative power" which would be 
comprised of Filipinos.  Taft further said that it was necessary to have an assembly 
to make it easier for US authorities to pacify the locals (Taft, 22/10/1901: 1-2).  
For Taft, the assembly's ability to legislate would be shared with the US-appointed 
Philippine Commission whereby the assembly acts as the lower house, just as the 
House of Representatives does in the US Congress (Wertheim, 2009: 506).  
Although Taft argued that the assembly would open up opportunities for locals to 
join the Insular leadership, he was clear about what he thought was its other 
function: to facilitate pacification of locals.  It would be an indication that colonial 
officials placed their trust in locals for certain goals.  Most of these proposals by 
Taft would be realised in the passage of the Philippine Bill of 1902.   
 
MOVES TO INCLUDE FILIPINOS FOR GOVERNANCE 
In order to discourage rebellions, colonial officials offered members of the local 
wealthy class positions in the new colonial government.  Whilst Taft had 
reservations about enlisting their help given that he said they were "difficult 
persons out of whom to make an honest government", he felt it was necessary to 




Under the Organic Act, prior to the establishment of the Assembly, Filipinos 
already had some representation in the colonial government.  For instance, three 
out of the eight members of the Philippine Commission were Filipino.  One-half of 
superior judges and all of the magistrates sitting on lower courts were also Filipino 
(LeRoy, 1908: 847).  The Organic Bill, however, proposed that Filipinos have with 
two resident (Filipino) commissioners, who would serve as delegates to the House 
of Representatives in Washington to air what they thought were the needs of 
Filipinos.  However, the resident commissioners would not have any voting rights.  
 
As Taft pushed for an assembly, Roosevelt also saw it initially as an "experiment" 
whose results officials had to wait for before deciding whether to grant the islands 
further levels of autonomy (in Wertheim, 2009: 506).  Similar to Roosevelt, Taft 
saw the assembly as a component of political education of the inhabitants (May, 
1980: 58).  While Taft talked about the state of civil service institutions, he 
reiterated to Root that people should realise that he "shall not relax our hold on 
the Philippines".  He would rather make that position of his clear than yield to the 
opposition party making false promises about giving the islands' inhabitants more 
control over their affairs.  Roosevelt feared that a consequence of such false 
promises would include violence and plunge the islands into further turmoil.  He 
instead wanted Root to emphasise the highest standards of good government and 
thought that they had "the very highest grade of public service that we can get 
out there" which Roosevelt did not want to upset (Roosevelt, 7/6/1904).  He 
reiterated that the US was there to civilise Filipinos, not necessarily grant them 
outright independence.  If anything, Root considered establishing such institutions 
to be more of a means to the US' "civilising" mission in the islands, and not an 
end goal.  That was the case until at least 1907 when Root told Taft said that the 
US needed to prepare for the eventuality of giving the Philippines independence 
of a "more or less complete type", but Taft's position continued to favour the US 
holding on to the islands for as long as they could (ibid: 506-7).   
 
Taft made a proclamation "the Philippines for the Filipinos".  But in it, he made it 
clear that he did not necessarily mean giving Filipinos more autonomy or 
independence to manage their affairs.  Instead, he thought of this slogan as giving 
something that was "best" for the Filipino people and their "welfare" as US officials 
saw them (Taft, 1904: 3-4).  It implied and meant that for him, it was not for 
Filipinos to decide what constituted what he would consider 'best' for them.    
 
Roosevelt ultimately said in his correspondences that although he would have 
preferred to keep the islands under US sovereignty, one had to consider the 
differences between the US and a monarchy of any sort.  Politically, given the 
nature of the party system and public opinion, occupying the islands for altruistic 
motives was "chimerical in the long run".  Roosevelt also later privately confided 
to Taft that the American people were not "prepared permanently, in a duty-loving 
spirit…to assume control of the Philippine Islands for the good of the Filipinos".  
Geopolitically, this change also coincided with changes in Japanese-US relations 
as well as Taft's initial failure to get tariffs from Filipino goods reduced in Congress 
(in Wertheim, 2009: 508-509).  In other words, Roosevelt was later not sure that 
keeping the islands was the palatable politics for him or his party that he initially 




Roosevelt also wrote to Charles Eliot on 20 June 1904 that he was hesitant to give 
Filipinos a national government of their own "at the earliest possible moment" was 
"for the sake of the Filipinos themselves".  Furthermore, Roosevelt thought that 
priority has lain in discouraging any feeling that Filipinos had that would make 
them subordinate the duty of 'trying to become self-supporting, self-respecting 
orderly people' to the "cultivation of anything else" (Roosevelt, 20/6/1904: 2). 
 
ESTABLISHMENT OF PHILIPPINE ASSEMBLY 
The establishment of the assembly, however, happened three years after Taft 
intended establishment date.  Officials conducted a census, which would form the 
basis of apportioning districts or constituencies, in 1902 and published its results 
in 1904.  Furthermore, pacification appeared to be a major concern among US 
officials.  According to Governor-General Luke's proclamation, one of the things 
that needed to happen before Washington-based officials could grant 
authorisation for the assembly's establishment was peace-and-order to be 
widespread for two years from the commissioning of the census (LeRoy, 1908: 
847; National Historical Commission of the Philippines, 2012).     
 
As had been mentioned, the electorate to the assembly consisted of a relatively 
small group of people.  The law stated that to be able to vote, 23-year-old or older 
males had to possess at least one of the following qualifications (Conroy Franco, 
2001: 45): 
(a) those who held municipal office under the Spanish regime 
(b) those who owned at P500 in real property or P30 in annual taxes 
(c) those who could read and write in either English or Spanish 
 
One could classify the restrictions as either (a) incumbency, (b) property 
ownership or income, and (c) literacy.  Officials would not ease these restrictions 
until the recommendation of future War Secretary Garrison and the passage of 
the 1916 Jones Law and women remained unable to vote until 1937.   
 
Conroy Franco (2001: 45-46) further cites that across 390 municipalities with a 
total population of almost 2.7 million people, less than 50 thousand were able to 
qualify as electors to municipal elections.  Moreover, less than 105 thousand 
people or only 1.15 per cent of the islands' total population qualified as electors 
to the 1907 Philippine Assembly elections.  There were fewer restrictions than 
during the military administration of the Islands. 
 
When the Philippine Assembly was first elected, anxiety poured through the US 
and newspapers in the country have commented on the "ignorance of the Filipinos" 
which they thought was reflected by choice of the electorate's legislators.  Taft, 
who became Secretary of War during the time of the first election, was 
disappointed that he would have to work with those who were elected.  Some of 
Taft's friends even described that he "deplore[d]" the winners (South China 
Morning Post, 1907: 4). 
 
IDEAS, INSTITUTIONS, AND INTERESTS REVISITED: AN ANALYSIS 
Hall's 3Is provides a framework for explaining the passage of the Organic Act and 





One cannot exclude ideas to explain the Organic Act's passage.  For one, officials 
made it clear that their early priority was to pacify the Philippines' inhabitants.  
They had a prevailing idea that Filipinos could not behave themselves and had a 
tendency to rebel.   
 
Roosevelt was initially driven by the notion that the Philippines was colonised in 
the first place to be "civilised" and not necessarily be granted independence.  
Roosevelt also had the ideas that Filipinos would not even be ready for such moves 
in the next "half dozen or dozen years" (Wertheim, 2009: 506).  This implies here 
was that Roosevelt was bent on driving home inculcating ideas associated with 
what he thought was "civilising" them.  In other words, the Roosevelt 
administration, through its representatives in the Philippines, had an idea through 
the "civilised" image it wanted the islands to uphold and the administration was 
not willing to cede sovereignty to the islands until at least it was confident the 
Philippines would live up to the "civilised" image.  The Roosevelt administration 
believed that by moulding the inhabitants of the islands to live up to this 'civilised' 
image, it would be serving their interests as much as it would be serving their 
own.      
 
The ideas aspect of why American officials like Root and Taft instituted the form 
of government they did also seemed obvious.  Per Stanley (1974), Root had so-
called racist ideas about what Filipinos behaved. Root's ideas of them being "but 
little advanced from pure savagery", "childlike in their' lack of reflection, disregard 
of consequences, fearlessness of death, thoughtless cruelty, and unquestionable 
dependence of a superior" were, for him, justifications for why a completely 
democratic government within the Islands could be ruled out.  Similarly, this was 
also why Taft felt that they could exempt Filipinos from a right to a jury trial: he 
had ideas of Filipinos whereby most of them were not trustworthy enough even if 
enough of them were deemed sufficiently educated to sit in a jury.  Key Senators 
who were allies of Roosevelt also made their ideas clear when they did not include 
as part of the original Senate version of the Organic bill the elected legislature.  
Especially in further moves to devolve the Islands, ideas like this prevailed. 
 
The voting franchise during the time, which represents who is able to participate 
and have a say in governance, also seems to be rooted in ideas.  Would-be voters 
could qualify through incumbency, income/wealth, or literacy requirements.  
Given that the franchise was tightened between the military and civilian era of 
governance, one of the cited reasons to do so was that there were too many 
illiterate voters, something that coincides with the idea that Filipinos were not yet 
ready to govern their own affairs.  Root also maintained the idea that as at the 
time of the conquest, Filipinos were not ready to govern by what he called "popular 
consent".  That meant Root was not keen on immediately granting the right to 
vote to all Filipinos just yet.  More fundamentally, restrictions of voting franchises 
on the basis of property or literacy and the reasons behind them were not new 
during the time.  During the civil war era, there was a belief among Americans 
that limiting the voting franchise was essential to the founding fathers' concept of 
safe government.  Although property requirements for voting were gradually 
relaxed, more states restricted voting on the basis of race and gender, citing that 
African Americans and women were considered "unsafe" voters (Free, 2016: 10).  
Even if property requirements were less present in the mainland and more 
prevalent in the Islands at the turn of the twentieth century, what was common 
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under both settings was the idea that an expanded voting franchise would invite 
what officials thought of as undesirable voters in each setting to dictate the 
agenda, thus undermining the agenda the government had set out.   
 
Free (2016: 31) also cited instances of how white males back in the nineteenth 
century believed 'whiteness' was under attack whenever there were opportunities 
to mingle among different races and genders.  Free also wrote how ideas of a 
white male-dominated social circle crystallised.  This is instructive when it comes 
to the construction of ideas of whether Filipinos were ready for governance in the 
eyes of the colonial government.  Based on Free's logic, whenever there was a 
notion that "whiteness" was under attack, it is implied that the white men in 
government felt that their entitlement to spread what they considered civilised 
values was under attack.  Officials even had to discharge their duties in the Islands 
under the guise of a "white man's burden", further suggesting that their notion of 
governing and living was the way to go.  Therefore, it then justified their notion 
of tolerating the exclusion of groups who in their judgement were not worthy of 
participating in the political process, especially by invoking whatever suggested 
the white male's superiority.  This was on display in the Islands as well, especially 
as manifested in Root's and Taft's thinking.       
 
However, Root and Taft recognised that the Bill of Rights needed to apply in some 
form lest they lend credence to criticism from the opposition.  Given as well that 
they needed to enlist the cooperation of illustrado classes to keep insurgents under 
control, the voting franchise being extended to the likes of them may have not 
just been an expression that they were qualified, but it also acted as an incentive 
for supporting the administration's aims.  
 
The ideas that portray Filipinos in an adversarial light may have been partly rooted 
in the ideas against Asians, in general, living in the mainland (though not 
necessarily specifically directed at Filipinos).  Sentiments against Asians ran raw 
in the US and were a consequence of the experience of US citizens with Chinese 
working on the west coast.  A majority of members of Congress rewrote the 
constitutional amendments concerning slavery and birthright citizenship in such a 
way to exclude Asians and single them out in subsequent laws on immigration and 
naturalisation (Daniels, 2002: 20).  Although Filipinos were not directly targeted, 
the fact remained that US citizenship was back then only extended to people of 
European and African descent.  This naturally gave a licence for Americans to look 
at Filipinos with contempt whenever instituting policies that would grant them 
further liberties.  This could be implied in Roosevelt's and Taft's statements, on 
Filipinos for the Filipino people.  In this context, Taft said there that he would do 
what he believed was "best" for Filipino people but that it did not necessarily 
constitute democratic forms of government straight away, let alone outright 
independence.   
 
The thing depicted by officials' reactions to the establishment of the assembly is 
they wanted Filipinos to be "civilised" to the former's own standards.  It was the 
criteria set by US officials that the islands' inhabitants would be judged against as 
to whether they ought to be taken a further step toward self-government.  Clearly, 
the preference was to make inhabitants "civilised" rather than ready to govern 
themselves and that any attempts at the latter would be just as an incidental 
consequence of the former. McKinley's instructions to commissioners forming a 
government that satisfied Filipino cultures should also be juxtaposed with ideas 
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such as the "rule of law".  Taft also made it clear that restoring colonial security, 
especially in light of the request of business interests, was also a priority.   
 
Taft was also known to put forward a so-called “policy of attraction”.  The idea 
here is that by introducing institutions associated with liberal democracy (even if 
they did not constitute liberal democracy itself in its entirety), there would be 
fewer incentives for Filipinos to lobby for further independence (Burns, 2010; 
Burns, 2013a).  Taft was advocating for an elected assembly even as his fellow 
party-mates in Congress (e.g. Lodge, Beveridge) were against its initial inclusion.  
This institution was borne out of Taft's idea whereby promoting similar institutions 
were there to paradoxically discourage campaigns for outright independence 
(ibid).  Juxtaposing this with the idea of the likes of Taft that Americans were in 
the colony to civilise its inhabitants, the officials were also trying to promote the 
idea that by introducing quasi-democratic institutions, they would give the 
impression that Filipinos would live miserably outside US sovereignty. 
        
Ideas also shaped the opposition to the law.  Senator Hoar, a member of the 
president's party, had opposed the annexation of the Philippines from the 
beginning of American involvement in the islands.  By citing incidents such as the 
murder of "hundreds of hundreds of Filipinos" without trial, he was clearly calling 
out the hypocrisy of promoting American ideals (35 Cong Rec. 5788, 1902).  He 
also said that the Monroe doctrine, which called for spreading American ideals, 
evolved to a doctrine characterised by "brutal selfishness" and went as far as 
saying officials "vulgarised the American flag", "put children to death", and 
"baffled the aspirations of a people for liberty" (ibid: 5796).  Based on this, even 
some party-mates believed that the US would display its hypocrisy and undermine 
its own credibility in the process.  Although there were instructions by McKinley to 
promote the idea of liberty and the rule of law, in practice, those on the ground 
were clearly more keen on the latter as the opposition pointed out problems with 
the former.  
 
Based on the foregoing, although Filipinos were perceived to be unable to manage 
their affairs, it is questionable whether this idea alone was a basis.  From this, one 
would suggest that the idea of Filipinos unable to manage their affairs is not 
enough of a reason for the Organic Act's passage.  Instead, institutions in the US 
and Philippines like the social structures and prevailing practices operated 
together with such ideas.  Furthermore, as other societies are were in a similar 
state, one could ask why the US did not involve themselves in such.  Hence, it 
makes the prospect of ideas acting alone insufficient.  
 
Interests 
One of the reasons for acquiring the Philippines was to establish a Naval Base in 
the Far East.  Even as Roosevelt had continuously indicated publicly that the US 
to continue exercising sovereignty over the islands, he was mindful of one of the 
rationales for the islands' acquisition.  Scholars have characterised Roosevelt as 
an imperialist.  Given all of these, Roosevelt wrote to Taft on 31 May 1905 that if 
the US was not ready to establish a strong and appropriate Naval Base in Subic 
Bay, he would much rather give up the islands altogether (in Morrison, 1954: 
1198).  That also indicated a critical value that Taft thought the Philippines should 
be to the US and implied that at that point, Roosevelt perceived the Islands as a 
cost and that there were other powers in the wings waiting for developments out 
of the Western Pacific to take shape.  Roosevelt thought that economically, the 
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Islands was not adding value and the US instead continued to find itself in a 
position where it needed to bail out the Islands.  Thus, Roosevelt thought the 
economic justification for the US possessing the Philippines would not be worth it.  
In this light, there was some concession that sometime in the future, the US would 
need to relinquish sovereignty over the Philippines.       
 
In addition to geopolitics, domestic electoral considerations were also weighing 
heavily in the mind of Roosevelt.  In politics, interests refer to whether agents are 
able to make electoral gains amongst others.  It was unclear what role the 
Philippine question played in the electoral success, though, in the 1904 Republican 
Party manifesto, there was only a brief mention of the Philippines.  However, they 
touted their accomplishment by saying they had "suppressed insurrection, 
established order, and given to life and property a security never known there 
before".  They had also touted their achievement in giving the inhabitants "the 
largest civil liberty they [had] ever enjoyed".  They also claimed a geopolitical 
victory whereby with the capture of the Philippines, they thought to have 
successfully relieved diplomatic personnel in Beijing and "played a decisive part in 
preventing the partition and preserving the integrity of China" (Republican Party, 
1904).  Meanwhile, in 1908, the manifesto mentioned of the Philippine focused on 
economic liberty, but they have already suppressed insurrection (Republican 
Party, 1908).  Further moves for self-governance were not mentioned.   
 
After 1900, the opposition party's manifesto only mentioned the Philippines 
briefly, especially in light of what the party claims would be consequences of 
continued occupation.  More specifically, what the party characterised as 
"speculative exploitation" would lead to "lead to entanglements from which it will 
be difficult to escape" (see 1904).  The 1908 manifesto made independence for 
the Islands a more explicit position.   
 
Roosevelt was aware that under the American party system, the opposition party 
had a reasonable chance of replacing his party.  He was also aware that that reality 
and public opinion made it difficult to execute acts with "altruistic" motives in the 
colony (Wertheim, 2009: 508-9).  Ultimately, Roosevelt confided to Taft in a letter 
that Americans were not ready to take responsibility for the Philippines 
"permanently, in a duty-loving spirit".  He admitted that the Americans were 
"unlikely" to treat the Filipinos benevolently, which would "undermine" their so-
called "civilising mission" (Roosevelt, 21/8/1907: 392).   
 
McKinley, Roosevelt, and Taft's party retained control of the lower house for 16 
years, only to end in 1911.  This meant that whatever Roosevelt proposed at that 
point would need to consider that the opposition party controlled the said 
legislative chamber.    
 
Interests also take the form of economics and geopolitical realities.  At the time 
of the passage of the organic act, the governing Republican party was widely 
regarded as the more pro-business party.  Instituting a form of government the 
provided for in the Organic Act helped the governing party boost their credentials 
in front of their business-oriented base.  During the acquisition of the Islands, 
businessmen called on the likes of Taft to prioritise the restoration of law-and-
order to be able to facilitate the course of business.  Without formal and fixed 
laws, there would be chaos and confusion as to what the rules of participating in 




Still In the realm of interests, Hoar cited the Philippine-American war that had so 
far cost taxpayers $600 million and thousands of lives of US soldiers.  He also 
alleged that the government "sold out the right, … to speak out the sympathy 
which is in our hearts" (35 Cong Rec 5788.  On this count, Hoar did not think that 
any further moves for the US to be involved in the Islands were not financially 
viable, given that he thought the US was not keen on eventually letting the Islands 
become independent as seen in the text of associated legislation.  Thus, Senators 
like Hoar thought that it was no longer in the financial interests of the federal 
government to enshrine into law commitments to hold the Philippines and be help 
it form a government.    
 
Given that Roosevelt changed his opinion on the Philippines, it implies that his 
idea of the Philippines' viability for the US must have changed.  Therefore, 
Roosevelt's idea of how viable the Philippines was for the US became the basis for 
Roosevelt's interest in the Philippines.  Furthermore, there seemed to be 
constraints such as financial and economic considerations that weighed on 
Roosevelt's mind to have a change in tone. 
 
As this subsection had just mentioned, the idea of the "benevolent assimilation" 
was invoked again in assessing whether it was in the Roosevelt administration's 
interests to keep the Philippines.  In that case, one should consider the interests 
of Roosevelt in the context of benevolent assimilation to make sense.  Based on 
that, interests alone are insufficient explanations.    
 
Institutions 
Meanwhile, the powers that US officials exercised in the islands highlights the role 
of institutions.  For one, such roles were manifested in the officials' observance of 
the Bill of Rights (per US Constitution) in the Islands (albeit to a limited degree) 
and their attitudes towards the same (per Stanley, 1974 and Hutchcroft, 2000).  
Amidst the criticism from Hoar and his allies from the opposition party, institutions 
like the Bill of Rights restrained officials like Root and Taft, who believed in US 
sovereignty over the Philippines.  Given as well that there was a belief in the 
principles and institution of limited government, particularly among members of 
the then president's party, it provides room to argue that the same was sincere 
about instituting rights and liberties of the islands' inhabitants, subject to how 
ready officials thought they were.  However, they figured out how to uphold these 
institutional upbringings without necessarily committing to further devolution or 
liberalisation of governance beyond the minimum stipulated in the US Bill of 
Rights.   
 
In addition, amidst Taft's wish to work with insular elites who had a less shady 
background, he was also driven by and resigned to prevailing institutions in the 
Islands such as working with those whom he characterised as "difficult".  This 
meant giving some of the old cacique class key positions in the Commission, and 
when the assembly was in place, these politicians apparently carried their 
previously nurtured habits into their new positions.  These elites whose assistance 
Taft enlisted belonged to the illustrado class, which (as described in Chapter 4) is 
a group of educated middle-class men alienated from governance during the 
Spaniards' colonisation.  The illustrados were largely sceptical of outright 
independence.  They had ambivalent stands especially toward the Philippine 
Revolution and instead insisted on reforms to Spain's governance which would 
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include recognition for their role in shaping society and greater freedoms.  Their 
politics was characterised as often "erratic or opportunistic" (Stanley, 1974: 52).  
Thus, the institutions in the Philippines spawned into a life of its own.  As far as 
Taft was concerned, he had no choice but to work with the institutionalised 
behaviours these elites had brought with them from the previous colonial era to 
get the job done. 
 
 
Furthermore, McKinley instructed the Philippine Commissioners to form a 
Philippine government that is compatible with such institutionalised behaviour in 
the Islands.  He issued a challenge that, on the one hand, promoted the ideals 
that American governance was purportedly famous for (e.g. the rule of law, 
freedom and liberty), and on the other hand, something that would be well-suited 
to the institutions prevailing in the islands, which some American officials, 
including former War Secretary Elihu Root, had denounced as corrupt.  It meant 
the illustrados would experience the benefits of these so-called American values 
ahead of everyone else if only to enlist their cooperation.  At any rate, amidst the 
instructions to supposedly serve the Filipinos' desires, the fact remained that Taft 
and others wanted first and foremost their enlistment as a means to discharge 
what the US planned to do in the Islands.  US officials also took advantage of the 
fact that at least some of these illustrados were not pushing for outright 
independence so as not to upset their (elites') place among prevailing Filipino 
institutions.  Based on this, one can surmise that Americans could justify holding 
off giving further self-governance to Filipinos because the illustrados felt they 
could achieve their interests under a system short of outright further devolution.   
 
Despite McKinley's instructions to establish a government that supposedly satisfies 
the islands' inhabitants, what however sparks curiosity is Skowronek's (1982) 
observation that the US was in the midst of institutional changes since he found 
that officials transplanted the older institutions into the colony.  One can argue 
that the older institutional arrangements informed the outlook of colonial officials 
towards the Philippines.  It also implied that the institutional arrangements before 
the said changes back home were not hospitable to the democracy and liberty 
that critics said were lacking from the federal government's proposal for the 
Islands.  As previously mentioned, amidst the instructions to form an insular 
government that is compatible with existing institutions, the fact that a clause 
related to upholding the "rule of law" and "freedom and liberty" were added means 
that it was the US and not the Filipino officials who would be the judge of the 
developments in the Philippines.              
 
Institutions and ideas also drove opposition to the form of governance that the US 
awarded.  Just like the government believing it tried to spread American ideals in 
the Philippines, the opposition also invoked the hypocrisy against those who 
wanted to keep the Philippines.  In particular, the opposition believed the cruelty 
and unjustness they saw the government perpetuated.  Given that there was an 
idea of Americans as a promoter of liberty, one can imply that the opposition 
would have grounds to say the government was not promoting this when they are 
outside the mainland.    
 
Additionally, the opposition, largely based in the southern part of the US, also had 
a constituency that was wary of the Islands' inhabitants being part of the US.  It 
would then imply that a sincere commitment to bestowing liberties among the 
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Islanders was not the primary motive of some of the opposition.  The opposition 
party's history of approaching race relations at that point, as evidenced by their 
opposition to the passage of the 14th and 15th US constitutional amendments, 
which both extend rights to non-white slaves further rights (Steed et al., 1980; 
Kerns, 2017).  Their idea of how they see people who do not resemble them may 
have helped influenced why they do not want to have anything to do with the bill 
or with the US being in the Philippines; it just so happened that if this was indeed 
the case, the opposition members found an excuse in calling out the hypocrisy of 
the measure's proponents.  Moreover, their ideas about Filipinos may not have 
been different from the proponents'.  However, the opposition's approach to 
express their position and the way forward was different from the government's.   
 
Interaction among some key Is 
As compelling as the each of ideas, institutions, and interests discussed in this 
chapter are, each of them is not always sufficient in understanding why officials 
gave the Philippines an Organic Act and Philippine Assembly.  As mentioned 
earlier, institutions limit or facilitate the effectivity of ideas.  For instance, on the 
notion of the "civilising mission", it should be questioned about whether this 
mission was done for its own sake given the other institutions or norms that were 
prevalent in US society such as prevalent racist views.  It does not necessarily 
point out to malice on the side of officials.  Instead, it means this idea of a 
"civilising mission" may have had underlying roots in institutions.   
 
Furthermore, ideas may also reflect the interests of agents.  Considering that it 
would take massive resources to undertake a "civilising" mission, particularly 
when there are other regions, and that the US acquired the Philippines at the last 
minute, it is difficult to separate the interests that would be at stake from such.  
Such examples, which were discussed extensively in more detail in Chapter 5, 
included the interest of helping the US build its image as an emerging empire.  At 
this point, it is not to say that this was indeed the direct cause of why the 
"civilising" ideas emerged, but that an attempt to look at the "civilising" mission 
in context of the agenda of other officials means that there is reason to think that 
considering the idea of "civilising" the Philippines as a sole cause for introducing 
such measures is insufficient.  
 
In relation to that, there is the recurring idea that Filipinos are unable to govern 
themselves.  When accounting for the decisions to hold back initial attempts to 
liberalise the Philippines, such as restricting the voting franchise, the idea sounds 
compelling.  However, one should ask about the consequences for officials if 
Filipinos are unable to manage themselves.  For one, they had an agenda in the 
Philippines, such as improving colonial security.  This security could help serve 
two other interests: credibility with business allies, who were using the Philippines 
for business interests, and the reputation of the US to be a responsible emerging 
power.  Hence, this idea that officials harboured of Filipinos unable to manage 
their affairs reflected the security, economic, and diplomatic interests.   
 
Taft's “policy of attraction” was a case that manifested how ideas help agents 
make sense of the meaning of their interests.  At its core was the belief that in 
order to pacify Filipinos, Americans needed to offer Filipinos institutions that gave 
the impression that there were desirable perks with staying under US rule.  It 
meant that the Taft administration and its successors introduced some institutions 
or reforms otherwise associated with liberal democracy (to the extent that it was 
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allowed) with the hope of securing the Philippines.  However, it must be stressed 
that although Taft introduced such institutions or reforms, he was not willing to 
grant full independence at that point.  Taft, in other words, had an idea of the 
limits of the incentives he was seeking from Filipinos.  Furthermore, to secure the 
Filipinos from rebellion meant occasionally and strategically scattering them with 
institutions resembling a liberal democracy to the extent possible.  Therefore, the 
idea of Taft's "policy of attraction" was essential to helping colonial officials realise 
how else to secure the colony from insurrections. 
 
Institutions also facilitate and/or constrain interests and ideas to thrive in.  As 
mentioned previously, the US was going through broader institutional changes 
back home, but officials concerned with the Philippines were not up to speed with 
them.  It meant that officials were not practising these new practices, and thus 
operated under the belief that the Philippines and other territories under their 
jurisdiction should not fully be subject to the liberties these reforms would 
otherwise encourage.  It does not necessarily contradict the reforms that officials 
introduced.  As for Taft, he knew his limits and was doing it as a means to secure 
the islands.     
 
Another manifestation of institutions acting to constrain or facilitate the effectivity 
of ideas is evident in the social structure Americans uncovered in the Philippines.  
For these officials, such a social structure helped provide a basis for the notion 
that Filipinos were unable to manage their affairs.  In addition to this, there is also 
a question where interests need to come in.  The security interests would reflect 
such a notion of Filipinos unable to manage their affairs.  US officials made no 
secret of the fact that they had geopolitical interests for acquiring the Philippines.  
At the same time, they also felt they needed to secure the territory.  Given such 
a recurring notion, that idea seemed to be reflected in security interests.  As such, 
it was considered as part of the security factors behind introducing reforms in the 
Philippines, and the degree officials could do so.   
      
The Bill of Rights was a norm US officials and politicians observed and invoked in 
the process of forming the Organic Act.  It also provided a platform for officials 
and politicians to express their views and beliefs about what their colonial 
colleagues have done.  That was the case when Hoar laid out his case for opposing 
the Philippine Organic Act: he claimed he received guidance from the norm of 
observing the Bill of Rights and based on it, believed that the US was there to 
exploit the Philippines.  Root also believed his observance of the Bill of Rights 
constrained other things he would have otherwise thought of doing to the 
Philippines.  Although there is nothing that directly says his mindset was a 
consequence of observing the institution of the Bill of Rights, one can imply that 
given that the decisions were made based on their belief that it was in compliance 
with such as institution.   
 
The social set-up in the Philippines that Taft and his team found there constrained 
Taft's ability to pursue his security interests there.  Given that Taft has regarded 
the Filipino elites with some contempt, he still needed to work with them and 
incentivise them accordingly to ensure he fulfils the US' security interests.  
Moreover, Taft's ability to secure the colony also depended on how well he could 




The institution of racism was also a norm invoked implicitly by some members of 
Congress, especially from the southern part of the US, in opposing the Philippine 
Organic Act.  The ideas harboured by southern lawmakers about non-white people 
helped reinforce the institutional racism that was underway.  Thus, as mentioned 
earlier, such a norm helped facilitate the belief that Filipinos should be isolated 
from the US and that the US should have nothing to do with the Philippines.  
Consequently, it also led to the belief that the passage of the Organic Act would 
undermine such a desire.   
 
CONCLUSION 
Hall's 3Is framework contributes to a better understanding of the reasons why 
politicians agreed to introduce the Organic Act and Philippine Assembly in that it 
highlights the relationship between the most commonly given reasons for such.  
It shows how such reasons are always not sufficient to account for what politicians 
and officials stood to gain.  Furthermore, it shows how their thoughts and the 
institutional set-up have influenced what they stood to gain and vice versa.  For 
instance, Taft's “policy of attraction” reflected a desire of officials to secure the 
colony by introducing policies to de-incentivising rebellions without repelling 
Filipinos.  When it came to the reasons on whether to introduce reforms, the 
institutional set-up in the Philippines formed part of the basis for officials to think 
that the Philippines are not ready for reforms that granted them more autonomy 
than what the Organic Act and Philippine Assembly provided.  
 
The senior leaders involved in Philippine affairs, particularly Root and Taft, may 
have displayed some ambivalence about what they wanted to achieve from the 
construction of the Organic Act.  However, their ideas of what typical Filipinos 
were capable of were on display through their statements: that although they 
desired an elected parliament in the Philippines, they were adamant that Filipinos 
were not at the point where they should all be given rights.  It governed the 
mechanics of when and how to establish the colonial legislature.   
 
Colonial officials and the executive branch also differed with Congress as to when 
such institutions should be established. 
 
The main theme of this chapter is in establishing a constitutional framework for 
the political system in the Islands, Washington-based officials navigated a balance 
between the ideas of the US upholding liberties for all people, and of their 
prevailing ideas about Filipinos being ill-equipped to appreciate what these 
American values stood for.  Likewise, it was a balance between those same ideas 
about Filipinos and the institutions Americans wanted to uphold both in them and 
in Filipinos.  There was interplay among ideas, institutions, and interests.  Based 
on this, it was no surprise for why some think that the US was ambivalent and 
sometimes bordering on hypocritical about their plan. 
 
The next chapter examines the educational reforms in the Philippines during the 
early colonial era.  It shows how the 3Is framework makes sense of it.    
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CHAPTER VII: AMERICAN EFFORTS FOR IMPROVING 
MATERIAL CONDITIONS (1898-1916) I: USING IDEAS, 
INSTITUTIONS, AND INTERESTS TO TRACE THE 
MOTIVATIONS FOR EDUCATIONAL REFORMS 
 
INTRODUCTION 
One of the longest-lasting legacies of US rule in the Philippines was public 
education.  Although the primary level of education was theoretically made 
compulsory during the Spanish era, it was in practice only implemented loosely 
and to varying degrees (Lande, 1965).  US education ultimately became much 
more extensive compared to what the Spaniards offered the Philippines.   One of 
its most salient features included the use of English as a medium of instruction 
across the entire colony (Karnow, 1989: 200).   
 
Although some scholars argue that education is associated with enlightenment 
and liberal ideals (e.g. Lande, 1965), it may seem counterintuitive and paradoxical 
for colonial administrators to introduce such reforms to colonial subjects.  
Moreover, it is also paradoxical that once enough colonial subjects underwent the 
programme and complete it successfully, officials would not firmly commit to 
giving them more control over internal governance.  That is especially stark given 
that the US was not keen on giving the Philippines outright independence or even 
limited autonomy anytime soon.   
 
Hence, given this thesis’ focus on the 3Is, the overarching question this chapter 
discusses is “What are the interests, ideas, and institutions that helped explain 
why officials instituted education programmes during the 1898-1916 era?”  As a 
result, this chapter argues that the initiatives to introduce mass-based educational 
programmes did not emerge from a mere desire to improve the material 
conditions in the colony.  This chapter shows that security, ideational, and 
economic motivations were important drivers.   
 
This chapter plans to proceed as follows.  First, it will begin by briefly explaining 
how education is connected to the broader project to develop the colony in 
general.  Second, the chapter will discuss the security interest, in particular, the 
context of trying to pacify the population and how officials thought that introducing 
education would be a way to secure the islands more effectively.  Third, the 
chapter would go on to discuss three related ideas of what officials thought their 
profile of a typical Filipino was and what the basis of their educational programmes 
should be: a) unable to govern themselves; b) “policy of attraction”; and c) Filipino 
as a blue-collar worker.  That section will highlight the links to the interest of 
securing the islands, given that officials have an interest in instilling such American 
ideas on locals.  That section will also briefly illustrate the elements of the 
educational curriculum and changes back and forth that reflected ideas of what 
US officials thought Filipinos should be.  The fourth section then discusses the 
economic interests that administrators considered.  It also contains some key 
refinements to the education system with an emphasis on identifying the course 
offerings that would serve the colony’s economic interests.  The fifth section will 
illustrate and remind readers of the institutional legacy that the Spaniards have 
left that in particular deal with educational aspects.  That is important as it also 
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identifies some of the important factors that constrained officials.  It also identifies 
an aspect that sparked differences of opinion among officials.  The conclusion will 
summarise the arguments made here and highlight in general some of the 
successes the educational programme has in store.  In the process, the chapter 
poses questions about whether such ideas, interests, and institutions, in and of 
themselves, could explain the outcomes.  It thus helps integrate this chapter’s 
empirical findings with the thesis’ framework.   
 
EDUCATION AND COLONIAL DEVELOPMENT 
In retrospect, officials had touted education as the “best safeguard for a 
democracy” (United States Information Service, 1999: 3).  This view is shared by 
Lande (1965: 344), who argues that among the most dramatic changes that took 
place during the Spanish and American rule were the introduction of tools that 
helped prepare Filipinos to become “intelligent voters”.  In particular, regardless 
of US intentions to introduce democracy in the colony, education had the 
consequence of enlightening the democratic citizenry.   
 
SECURITY INTERESTS AND CONTEXT 
The initial motivation of colonial officials to educate the locals was grounded on 
the early realities in the colony that officials felt threatened by.  Educating the 
Filipinos could be traced its origins to US military rule (1898-1901).  The first 
education superintendent back then was Captain Albert Todd.  As the era of 
military rule in the colony came preceded formal civilian rule, the priority was for 
the US to secure its newly-acquired possession.  Todd was among the first to 
admit publicly that the main priority of these original educational initiatives was 
to pacify natives.  Objectives which put material improvement of the natives at 
the forefront were introduced during the civilian era instead (May, 1980: 79).  
Thus, anything that administrators did to advance material conditions was 
secondary at that point. 
 
US officials were grappling with the issue of how to prevent insurrections against 
their forces from getting out of control and how to win over the locals who would 
otherwise become prone to following local leaders that did not welcome US 
sovereignty over the islands (e.g. Aguinaldo).  Such insurrections ran deep and 
long.  Aguinaldo had just declared independence a few months before the islands 
were formally ceded to Spain and assumed the role of the first president of the 
Philippines.  Moreover, after talks with US officials such as Colonel Spencer Pratt, 
Aguinaldo was under the impression that the US would respect the Philippines’s 
right to effectively govern itself as indicated by a telegram from George Dewey, 
then the commander of the Asiatic Squadron of the US Navy (Aguinaldo, 1899: 
10).  However, Aguinaldo discovered that US officials had other plans and his 
camp denounced such moves.  Aguinaldo then made a counter-declaration where 
he stood “most solemnly against this intrusion of the United States Government 
on the sovereignty” of the Philippines.  Officials such as General Elwell Otis 
equated it to a declaration of war (Agoncillo, 1990: 214-216).  Guerilla fighting 
continued as a result for a few years, and although Americans had eventually 
contained large parts of these insurrections, it faced massive challenges to secure 
such an outcome.  In fact, it was only in 1902 when the last major Aguinaldo-
supporting general, Miguel Malvar was captured.  When the US assumed control 
over the colony, amidst the motivation of “pacifying” the islands from those who 
opposed to their rule, US military officials put up public schools in key areas 
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(Constantino, 1975: 309).    One official noted that education makes Filipinos “less 
liable to be led by political leaders into insurrectionary schemes” (Faulve-Montojo, 
2018: 43).  Taft made promoting primary education a central tenet to his so-called 
“policy of attraction”, which is his policy used to win the hearts and minds of 
Filipinos (Burns, 2010: 57).  In Taft’s (26/7/1900: 463) letter to Root, Taft also 
cited that the impact of a first impression would be long-lasting.    
 
The bottom line of the preceding paragraph is that the motivations for 
insurrections that officials needed to pacify were deep and took some time (i.e. 
up to three years) to control.  Moreover, given such deep roots of the insurrection, 
it is conceivable that officials thought that it would take more than physical 
disarmament to disarm and discourage locals from clamouring for outright 
freedom.  The effectiveness of arresting and killing guerrilla leaders would only go 
so far.   Given how Filipino leaders had awakened the national consciousness of 
their compatriots (cf. Constantino (1975) and Agoncillo (1990)), it would have to 
imply US officials needed to alter the mentality of natives in the islands if it wanted 
the desired outcomes, including of that of security.  This notion was supported by 
Taft aide Daniel Williams, who indicated that the hope was that if Filipinos 
increased their knowledge, they would become aware of their limits.  Thus, they 
would have second thoughts before demanding freedom from US sovereignty (in 
Karnow, 1989: 200-201).   
 
Based on all of this, when it comes to the 3Is framework, there is a question of 
whether such factors will be enough to explain the introduction of education 
reforms.  Interests, including security-related ones, may constitute an agents’ 
ideas as the next section. 
 
IDEAS OF WHAT THE FILIPINO PEOPLE WERE AND NEEDED TO BE 
As plausible as the security concerns in the previous section were, they were not 
the sole explanations for introducing education in the Philippines.  It is worth 
reiterating that these interests may form the basis for ideas as ideas reflect what 
the agents’ (i.e. colonial officials) interests are.   
 
The drive to secure the Philippines from future insurrections, and consequently, 
the motive of educating the colony had a connection to the idea of what Americans 
thought of Filipinos and what ideas Americans wanted Filipinos to possess.   
 
In relation to the question of educating Filipinos, this chapter considers three 
related ideas.  The first is the notion that Filipinos – in the mind of Americans – 
were not capable of managing their affairs.  The second one is the “policy of 
attraction”, whereby by promoting elements of American ideals to the extent 
possible, there would be fewer reasons for Filipinos to want to rebel against US 
rule even if Filipinos were ready for governance. The third is that typical Filipinos 
were fit primarily for blue collar-based education. 
 
LACKING CAPABILITIES TO MANAGE THEIR AFFAIRS 
Americans had an idea of Filipinos as lacking in the skills officials thought the locals 
needed and had limited potential to develop skills that would be as good as how 
they saw whites.  Thus, War Secretary Root prioritised developing a primary 
education system that aimed to prepare the colony’s inhabitants for the “duties of 
citizenship and “for the ordinary activities of a civilised community” (in Worcester, 
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1914: 986-987).  These appear to be consistent with the ideas that were 
presented previously.  Given that Root’s idea of education had to do with the 
preparing the inhabitants to do activities for a “civilised community”, such a 
pronouncement presupposed that Root and others like him thought that a typical 
Filipino was not civilised, to begin with.        
 
As far as most US officials were concerned, Filipinos were not yet ready to manage 
their affairs.  Governor-General Taft’s conception of education was in line with 
making people ready to be able to govern themselves even though he had shown 
no intention of granting them this sense of autonomy anytime in the foreseeable 
future.  That was the case as he also said that the Filipino people must be capable 
of self-governing before the government he was responsible with leading could be 
turned over to them (Brands, 1992: 68).  Thus, colonial administrators utilised 
education policy to instil in locals patriotism and unity, as well as a preparation for 
democratic “self-government” (Sobritchea, 1990: 74-75), even if Taft and other 
officials had no foreseeable plans to grant such.  In 1902, Taft initially described 
the Filipino’s fitness for leadership positions in government as “uneducated 90 per 
cent”.  He further added that in terms of capacity for getting educated, the Filipino 
is “equal to that of any race, perhaps excepting the white” (in United States 
Congress.  House.  Committee on Insular Affairs, 1902: 96).  From this testimony, 
Taft was clear in his view that the Filipino race was not yet ready and had a 
somewhat limited potential relative to their white counterparts to get educated 
enough to manage their affairs.     
   
Given the fact that officials did not see Filipinos as fit to enjoy more colonial liberal 
reforms just yet, there was a worry in some circles about the education 
programmes that colonial administrators instituted.  It is also appropriate to 
entertain such scepticism about whether the curriculum’s contents would 
inadvertently encourage Filipinos to promote values which officials thought they 
were not yet mature enough to handle.  For instance, when it came to the issue 
of what language to use, there was a risk that by using English, it would be easier 
for Filipinos to operate on the premise that they were entitled to freedom and 
liberty.  Previous colonisers’ experience had exemplified that exposure to the 
colonisers’ vernacular made increased such risks.  However, amidst the avoidance 
of ideas which colonisers thought were anathema, the decision to introduce 
English as the main language of instruction was due to more practical 
considerations and given the reality that many dialects the colony has faced 
(Karnow, 1989: 201).  Moreover, the passage of pertinent laws by legislators 
alleviated worries about Filipinos harbouring thoughts against the US (ibid).  
Specifically, officials had established laws such as the Sedition Law in 1901 and 
Flag Law of 1907; the former made it illegal to promote Philippine independence, 
while the latter prevented the Philippine and revolutionary flags and other symbols 
from being displayed (Francisco, 2015).   
 
This chapter will discuss the rationale of blue-collar work in later.  To address the 
point of rebellions, however, one has to stress that some administrators worried 
that giving Filipinos education en masse was also a recipe for insurrections to 
occur.  Although one cannot say for certain yet that discouraging academic 
subjects was due to security reasons, the fact remained that in the early 1900s, 
officials still viewed Filipinos as savages when it came to demanding outright 
freedom.  Even if Filipinos were equipped with the basic skills of reading, writing, 
and counting, by shifting to more academic subjects, it was conceivable that 
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Filipinos would think sufficiently to call for outright independence.  That was 
something other colonisers feared (cf. Coloma, 2009).  Later on, officials would 
realise such fears as Coleman (1965) argues that because of teachings by the 
educational system that would be in place, local political elites would use it to 
demand that the colonial government transfer political power to them.   Coleman 
described this initial purpose of pacifying the locals as one of the “greatest ironies” 
between the Western colonisers and their colonies.  Feelings of Filipino nationalism 
continued to grow.  On paper, these may seem as if they do not contradict the 
instructions of the original colonisers.  The Philippine Commission’s objectives for 
their educational policy included being able to engage in the art of self-
government.  However, the objectives also contained elements of that taught 
locals patriotism towards the US. 
 
Policy of attraction 
Another key idea is what Taft’s “policy of attraction” was supposed to represent.  
For Taft, it was about “winning the hearts and minds of Filipinos” which Taft 
himself acknowledged could take “many, many years” but would be successful.  It 
entailed promoting policies which Filipinos would come to value  (Burns, 2011).  
The rationale for this policy was that if Filipinos were enjoying certain privileges 
associated with becoming part of the US realm, they would hope to stay to get 
more.  It meant introducing elements of American life to the islands that had the 
potential to be looked upon favourably by Filipinos to the extent that they would 
not need to demand independence.  As mentioned previously, a key element of 
this policy to achieve its aims involved the education of Filipinos.  The hope here 
was that the educational system would be one of the main avenues for American 
elements to be passed on to Filipinos.  The elements officials hoped to pass on 
were even found in the education process itself.  For instance, the English 
language in itself was a subliminal manifestation of the Americanisation officials 
hoped to impart on Filipinos (Karnow, 1989: 201).  However, as shown, this was 
slightly paradoxical since central to American ideals were ideas of freedom and 
liberty, the two things Taft hoped Filipinos would not demand from the US straight 
away.  Concerning the previous statement, education, became an area which the 
US took pride in when it promulgated colonial policy and a spirit of “American 
exceptionalism” was brewing among colonisers to make a mark that was different 
from what its European counterparts did in their respective colonies (Francisco, 
2015: 14).   
 
Karnow (1989) was critical of the education mission.  He went on to say that the 
mission was not for Filipinos to “Filipinise themselves” but for them to be grounded 
in the American way of life. Given the statements and the ideas stated so far, this 
view is not surprising.  For one, officials have seen that American values were the 
way to go.  Amidst the security experiences, “Filipinising” Filipinos for US officials 
meant returning to experiences the latter would worry about.  Thus, in this light, 
education was used as an avenue for the US to implant in the minds of Filipinos 
the superiority of US values in the hopes that the risks of Filipinos asking 
independence would be kept minimal enough to manage. 
 
As discussed in Chapter 6, the idea of the “policy of attraction”, although 
instrumental, was not a free-standing idea.  It, however, reflected the interests 
pertaining to security and economic gains for the colonisers.  Ergo, the notion of 
securing the Philippines by disincentivising moves associated with independence 
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was a motivation for the “policy of attraction”.  As “winning the hearts and minds 
of Filipinos” as Taft put it by introducing measures such as education, there was 
the hope that this would prevent an outbreak of insurrections.    
 
FILIPINOS, MANUAL LABOUR, AND DIGNITY 
Given the image that US officials harboured about Filipinos being incapable of 
managing their affairs, as well as the officials’ experiences with Filipinos during 
the war, they concluded that Filipinos needed to undergo education that 
encouraged the development of skills needed for performing manual labour 
efficiently.  This assessment was also based on the idea that education based on 
manual labour had a restorative function.  Atkinson (1905: 240), who also 
happened to be the first educational superintendent during the civilian era, based 
his description of Filipinos in general on the Filipino Negrito race, which he 
considered to be a race of a “very low type”.  Moreover, Atkinson continues to 
characterise Filipinos as “true savages” (ibid: 241).  The description of savages 
goes on solidify the idea officials had in Filipinos that they were a threat and could 
not be trusted to live a civilised life the way Americans hoped they would.  As a 
result, officials concluded Filipinos needed to undergo a programme to redirect the 
skills and energies they exercised.    
 
The association between Filipinos and a blue-collar-centric curriculum was also 
based on what policymakers did for African Americans after the Reconstruction 
era.  Atkinson was worried about overdoing liberal education (Atkinson, 1902: 
414).  In here, officials suggested a comparison between Filipinos and African 
Americans.  The fact that Atkinson had to use the US’ post-reconstruction African 
American experience implied a policy that involved stereotyping Filipinos.  That 
was, however, based on the pretence administrators had that Filipinos were to 
their mind reckless and untrustworthy with such affairs to the point that officials 
felt US interests in the colony faced a threat of being undermined.             
  
There was also an idea among US colonial circles that manual labour contained 
dignity in it.  That was not an idea that was in practice shared during the Spanish 
colonial era.  Americans saw Filipinos as “indolent” since the latter possessed a 
disdain for blue-collar work.  Although a blue-collar-centred education had some 
undertones of “inferior” people, those in the US considered such a curriculum as 
having a rehabilitative function.  Specifically, officials thought the curriculum 
builds a pupil’s character and instils the dignity of labour.  By educating Filipinos 
early on, officials hoped to provide “due regard and respect for the dignity of 
labour” (Philippine Commission, 1903: 697).  Kliebard (1999: 13) particularly, 
argues that such a programme is intended for those who “require remedial 
treatment for one reason or another”.  Additionally, during the early twentieth 
century, the US was said to have valued manual work more than other colonisers 
(Francisco, 2015: 38).   
 
As an initial consequence of the emphasis to institute a manual labour-based 
curriculum, the number of hours allocated to the subject of industrial work was 
given twice as much time as the more academic counterparts (e.g. reading, 
writing, arithmetic) (Sobritchea, 1990: 77). 
 
However, getting locals to accept agricultural and blue-collar-centred education 
had proven to be challenging.  That was because US officials felt the attitude of 
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Filipinos toward manual work “left much to be desired” (Leocadio, in Calata, 2002: 
95).  Additionally, US officials operating in the islands thought the Spaniards did 
not help Filipinos appreciate the value of honest work thus leading to the latter’s 
view of manual labour (Lande, 1965: 326; Calata, 2002: 95).   
 
Again, to demonstrate how this idea of blue-collar work relates to security 
interests, one would need to consider it in light of the security situation officials 
felt.  Officials believed that training for blue-collar-based education and work had 
a reformative aspect to it.  Given that there was a notion among officials that 
Filipinos acted in a way that officials considered “uncivilised”, one could argue that 
the idea behind blue-collar education reflected the fact that officials wanted 
security especially against perceived threats from Filipinos.  Also, the prevailing 
institutions in the Philippines helped give credence to the idea that Americans 
should institute a blue-collar-based education in the colony.       
   
ECONOMIC INTERESTS IN EDUCATION 
Officials have expressed obvious economic interests in establishing an educational 
system.  As mentioned in the previous section, officials such as Secretary Root 
wanted a primary education system that would prepare inhabitants for what he 
called the “ordinary activities of a civilised community”.  These so-called “ordinary 
activities” would also imply that the rationale for instituting educational policies 
also consisted of practical considerations.     
 
Given that the coffers were also limited when it came to what aspects of which 
curricular programmes to prioritise, it also meant that officials needed to be wise 
as to what would extract the best value for the limited funds.  During the early 
twentieth century, the focus of instruction changed slightly depending on who the 
head of the education bureau was.  For the most part, officials also had an idea 
that manual labour was an essential part of the colonial economy they wanted to 
grow and that Filipinos were more suited to this.  Although early colonial 
educational policy focused initially on establishing primary level schooling, 
changes were made to it to account for the changing needs of society.  In addition 
to the subjects the Commission mandated to be taught (e.g. arithmetic, reading, 
and writing in English), the primary education curriculum included a subject that 
would teach pupils the skills needed to carry out manual labour.  That was also 
the case for pupils in the first grade (Alzona, 1932; Acierto, 1980: 66).   
 
The economic interests in education were also not surprising given the economic 
position colonisers wanted the Philippines to assume in the first place when the 
US acquired the islands.  As mentioned in chapter 4, one of the hopes was for the 
Philippines to facilitate trade between the US and the Far East.  Moreover, officials 
felt that given that the colonial economy was underdeveloped, there was a need 
for extra manpower to take on the economic demands.     
 
Taft, in an interview with the National Geographic Magazine, indicated the 
importance of educating Filipinos with the English language as it was important 
for business, science, and politics (cf. Burns, 2010: 58).  More practically, he 
indicated that the educational system would use the English language to remove 
the memories of Spanish rule from Filipinos (ibid).  One other difference between 
the US and Spanish colonial eras was that the latter did not promote the use of 
their language early on.  Also, by introducing English as a medium of instruction, 
locals were able to avail themselves of more opportunities both in academia and 
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professional work.  One example of such was the pensionados, who were Filipino 
scholars sent to the US for further study (Calata, 2002: 91-92, 95).  
 
Although there had been a slight shift in the early 1900s between emphasising 
academic (liberal arts) and vocational subjects, by the latter part of the 1900s, 
the emphasis had been firmly more toward the latter end of the education 
spectrum.  Such was indicated in the 1907 Statement of Organization and Aims 
of the Bureau of Education, which states that third and fourth-graders would 
receive manual labour-based training.  The curriculum was continuously refined, 
and from an initial three-year curriculum, elementary education (consisting of 
primary and intermediate grades) branched out to six years.  In 1909, those who 
continued studying at intermediate grade levels had a choice of course in 
agriculture, housekeeping, household industries, trade, as well as business in the 
hopes of preparing pupils for a vocation (Acierto, 1980: 66, 69-70).  By 1911, the 
Statement of Organization and Aims of the Bureau of Education specifically stated 
that the programmes it had were in place to prepare pupils in a “practical way for 
the industrial, commercial, and domestic activities in which they are later to have 
a part”.  The operative words here are practical and industrial, as it meant that 
administrators would de-emphasise the more academic-leaning parts of the 
curriculum and instead focus more on utilitarian functions of giving Filipinos what 
officials believed were the physical skills needed for the workplace.   
 
As the 1900s progressed, crafts made by Filipino pupils were exported and 
displayed at various trade fairs.  One of them was the 1904 World’s Fair in St Louis 
Missouri, whereby the head of the Filipino exhibit had remarked that they were an 
“accomplish[ment]” of state-run schools (Philippine Islands, 1904: 35).  The blue-
collar-based curriculum fed into the export-based orientation that colonial officials 
hoped to achieve out of the colony (Coloma, 2009: 516). 
 
To highlight the interaction between interests and ideas here, it is worth 
considering two issues.  First, in the US, the idea of work and free enterprise 
prevailed.  It has been a discursive tool in the mainland without which, 
businessmen operating in the colony who otherwise demanded education would 
not think about it.  That would also give them the notion that they needed human 
capital of a sort, even if it was blue-collar-based.  The second way to articulate 
this notion is through the idea of Taft’s “policy of attraction”.  The “policy of 
attraction” was among those initiatives that reminded administrators that there is 
an economic dimension to what they were supposed to do.  It provided officials 
with guidelines and a statement of principles on what to pursue and the reasons 
to pursue them.  The “policy of attraction” identified the goal of profitability for 
firms operating in the colony and surplus for the US economy, and that education 
would facilitate this objective.  Thus, the ideas behind the “policy of attraction” 
provided officials with a guide on how to achieve the US’ broader economic goals 
through education.  Likewise, the educational ideas contained in Taft’s Policy of 
attraction reflected the economic interests the US had in the Philippines.          
 
INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT 
When the US assumed sovereignty over the Philippines, opportunities for 
education in the colony were limited, and the state of education was in flux.  
Chapter 4 has given broader socio-institutional structures the Spaniards had left 
the Americans with.  However, it is sufficient to say that irrespective of the 
motivations, US officials made improvements over what the Spaniards had offered 
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(Karnow, 1989).  Although former Spanish colonial government initially decreed 
compulsory education for the islands in 1863, a lot of its provisions were not 
properly enforced due to opposition from Church officials and budget constraints 
(Lande, 1965; Sobritchea, 1990: 71).  Spaniards were also not keen to provide 
the islands with widespread access to higher education for fear that it may produce 
a so-called “revolutionary class” among them (Ninkovich, 2001: 71).  Moreover, 
there were only a few higher education institutions such as the University of Santo 
Tomas and these were geared towards the selected few Filipinos who were part of 
illustrado or enlightened class, and a lot of them would go on to Europe to continue 
their studies and become professionals (Constantino, 1975; Coloma, 2009).     
 
When US officials started to formally invest in their educational programme, there 
was only one teacher for every 4,179 inhabitants when US colonisers started 
(United States.  Philippine Commission, 1900: 31).   
 
Moreover, there were social institutions that some officials would later worry 
about.  It would then prompt a temporary and slight shift in emphasis of the 
educational curriculum.  In particular, the Philippines had institutions that on first 
sight contradicted the ideas of liberty (to the extent that it was permitted) 
Americans wanted to incorporate there.  One such example of this was caciquism22 
or boss rule.  The worry was that such a system was holding Filipinos back from 
further developments and that a lack of academic-based education would make 
Filipinos vulnerable.     
 
Once again, one of the bases for educational initiatives was the idea that Filipinos 
were unable to manage their affairs.  In this case, that was exacerbated or given 
credence by the institutional set-up the Philippines had.  As institutions limit or 
facilitate how practical ideas are, the chaotic state of institutions made the notion 
that Filipinos were unable to manage their affairs more credible.  Hence, it helped 
build the notion that more investments in education were necessary.  The idea of 
Filipinos unable to govern themselves had to have a basis somewhere, and 
institutions provided such a basis.  
 
INTERACTIONS BETWEEN THE EDUCATION-RELATED Is 
As mentioned several times, institutions provide the platform to help sustain 
interests and ideas.  Specifically, institutions can facilitate or limit the salience of 
such.  One can argue that given the institutional set-up the Spaniards had left in 
the Philippines, it provided a challenge for US officials in the sense that the 
shortage in quality educational institutions helped determine how much they 
needed to do to satisfy their interests of growing the Philippine economy.  From 
this account, the institution did not define the interest per se but rather the means 
the US would have to take to get there.  It does raise a caveat that institutions 
may not necessarily change the interests, but affect how the interests could be 
satisfied.    
 
Given as well that the educational institutions left by the Spaniards were not to 
the standards the Americans desired, it could imply that this helped feed into the 
idea that Filipinos were incapable of governing themselves.  Given that the officials 
 
22 Caciquism is a term that is used in Spain and former Spanish colonies that emphasises 
the rule by local or village chieftains.  Anderson (1988) has an extensive review of this.  
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had educational programmes in place to address the ideas that officials harboured 
about Filipinos, it also implied that the previous institutions left by the Spaniards 
did not do a job that Americans hoped it would do.  
 
Although economic interests were a factor, there are questions about whether 
economic interests itself was sufficient to warrant educational initiatives.  As 
mentioned previously, the fact that economic interests existed implies that officials 
subscribed to an idea of an economic system that promotes economic growth.  In 
this case, it was the free enterprise system and the necessary elements for it.  
Those necessary elements included a productive workforce, which officials hoped 
the education system would solve.  A productive workforce would help contribute 
profits.  As such, the ideas associated with free enterprise helped officials make 
sense of the fact that it was in their interests to educate Filipinos.   
 
Moreover, one could argue that although education programmes meant to attain 
economic interests, economic interests, in turn, may not be an end goal.  As 
mentioned, the “policy of attraction” featured political and economic 
liberalisations, but officials instituted these with the view that Filipinos would have 
fewer incentives to rebel.  Hence, the economic interest could be subservient to 
the interest of keeping the Philippines secure from rebellions.  As such, the idea 
of attracting Filipinos directly and indirectly informed educational initiatives.   
 
Furthermore, the fact that the educational system centred on training pupils to 
become productive blue-collar workers.  As discussed in a previous section, 
officials considered blue-collar-based training to have a “reformative” value in 
addition to an economic value.  Officials used this notion of blue-collar work as a 
basis to consider their security interests.  On the other hand, officials considered 
white-collar-based education riskier.  There was a belief that academic 
(intellectually-based) subjects would increase the risks for rebellion, given that 
they encourage the learners to think critically.  Thus, the idea that blue-collar-
based education encouraged discipline and security as well as the notion that 
white-collar-based education for Filipinos undermined security reflect the security 
interests that agents had.             
   
CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
This chapter has demonstrated that amidst all the material benefits Filipinos would 
enjoy under an enhanced educational system compared to the Spanish era, it was 
not merely a product of altruistic wishes officials had for the Philippines.  While 
the US had shown a marked departure from its colonial counterparts in terms of 
implementing mass-scale schooling across the Philippines, it was evidence officials 
had something to gain, and that the ideas-based reasons reflected these.  To some 
degree, it was not a question of whether to educate Filipinos but what programmes 
to educate them with.   
 
Specifically, for the 3Is framework, this chapter has shown that the reasons for 
education stemmed from ideas that officials harboured about the Philippines.  
However, these ideas reflected the security and economic interests that officials 
possessed.  Moreover, ideas of free enterprise also provided a basis for officials to 
consider that it was in their interests to educate the colony. The institutional 
environment Americans found contributed in that it helped reinforced the ideas of 
Filipinos colonial officials had about them.  On those counts, ideas and institutions 




Specifically, on the aspect of interests, colonial officials also saw the need to 
improve the locals’ economic situation.  They recognised that increasing the levels 
of literacy through educating the populace was an important step to achieve this.  
Although some education superintendents focused slightly more on improving the 
islands’ intellectual/academic aptitude, most of the superintendents had placed a 
lot of emphasis on handicrafts and manual labour.  Moreover, the basis for the 
prevailing education system needs to be considered in light of the ideas officials 
had for the sort of programme they thought most Filipinos were suited for.  In 
relation to the emphasis on blue-collar education to provide for the needs of the 
economy, the officials followed the programme in place for educating African 
Americans.  That curriculum placed a huge emphasis on blue-collar work.  There 
was a belief by some key officials that Filipinos were by and large not suited for 
widescale university/academic-based scholastic programmes.   
     
Based on the foregoing, education, as something that had the potential to 
liberalise aspects of Philippine society had strategic imperatives during the pre-
1916 period.  On the level of interests, US officials needed to secure their position 
as the ones who had the right to exercise sovereignty over their recently-acquired 
territory.    To secure such an interest, they needed to devise something to change 
the mindsets of the islands’ inhabitants whereby they avoid rebelling against the 
occupying powers.  Thus, officials considered education an important means to 
achieve this.   
 
As for the broader institutional background that was around, it sparked a 
difference in opinion among the officials as to whether to prioritise blue- or white-
collar-based education more slightly.   
 
Thus, what started as a political measure also produced an economic legacy across 
the islands.  Despite the initial problems officials experienced and some confusion 
as to what the thrust of the education system should look like, the labour market 
in the colony became more attractive to prospective employers.  That was 
manifested in the increase in the number of goods produced in the colony.  Given 
that the Philippines was acquired partly for economic opportunities, the political 
and economic dimensions of education could not be easily separated.     
 
More importantly, the establishment of a colonial education curriculum has shown 
how inseparable some of the interests, institutions and ideas are.  That was 
because some ideas stem from the premises behind such interests.  The idea of 
US officials thinking Filipinos were unable to manage the government, as well as 
the idea that they were savages, were rooted in and strengthened by the interest 
of US officials trying to secure the colony, especially after a long-fought war.  The 
idea behind the “policy of attraction”, to which the educational programmes were 
a core element of, was also borne out of the security interests of the US to hope 
ordinary Filipinos would not want to break free of US colonisation.  Furthermore, 
the introduction of a blue-collar-based curriculum was based on the idea that it 
possessed a redemptive quality to it. The also reflected the security and economic 
interests officials had.   
 
Moving forward, some scholars have explained how the educational system also 
reinforced social structures.  In practice, wealthy Filipinos continued to be sent to 
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university and read academic degrees whereas the masses in the population had 
to bear with a curriculum based on improving blue-collar skills and know-how 
(Coloma, 2009).  That said, opportunities with social mobility grew especially with 
the introduction of the University of the Philippines during the late 1900s.  That 
was also true for Filipinos who had a modest means of earning an income, as they 
managed to accept middle- and higher positions in the colonial government.  
Although education itself was not the only factor for joining the circle of elite 
politicians, more Filipinos nonetheless took advantage of the increased educational 
opportunities according to better position themselves to join the ranks of those 
able to govern the colony (Casambre, 1982: 7).  UP was popular with Filipino elites 
as they sent their children to UP.   
 
Furthermore, as the number of Filipino university graduates increased, more of 
them began to seek a greater share of available colonial government places 
(Ninkovich, 2001: 71-2).  As at the final Philippine Commission Report available 
(1915), more than 525 thousand pupils enrolled in school as at September 1913.  
That represented an increase of 2,934 pupils from the same period in 1912.  It 
also represented an increase of approximately 375 thousand pupils from 1902.  
Moreover, as at August 1914, the attendance rate at state-run schools was at 89 
per cent (United States.  War Department.  Bureau of Insular Affairs, 1904: 59; 
United States.  Philippine Commission, 1915: 261).        
 
Based on the foregoing, achieving the goal of educating the Filipinos then set the 
stage for other liberal reforms in the colony.  The education system introduced by 
the US prepared the islands for later rapid industrial growth by helping to produce 





CHAPTER VIII: AMERICAN EFFORTS FOR IMPROVING 
MATERIAL CONDITIONS (1898-1916) II: EFFORTS AT 
LAND REDISTRIBUTION  
 
INTRODUCTION 
The previous chapter has discussed the motivations that US officials had for 
putting forward educational reforms in their Filipino colony.  As mentioned 
previously, one such motivation was to aid the colony in improving its economic 
situation.  In doing so, officials also hoped to satisfy their economic goals as well 
as that of their business allies.  Another consequence of the end of the Philippine-
American war was continued resistance to US rule.  That prompted the 
Commission to create a “postwar” order to help keep the resistance under control 
(Kramer, 2006: 170-171).   
 
Moreover, the Philippine-American war left the colonial economy in ruins.  As the 
Philippines was still primarily an agricultural-based economy, its major products 
were sugar and tobacco amongst others.  Agricultural land was largely vacated, 
but establishments allied with the Spaniards and Catholic Church still owned the 
most valuable parcels of land.  Officials both in Washington and Manila made 
suggestions on how to deal with the situation they faced, particularly improving 
economic conditions.  In the process, there were constraints and other interests 
that officials had to deal with as they tried to execute various reforms.   
 
Before proceeding further, this chapter begins the main discussion by explaining 
the rationale for land redistribution.  It will look at it in political and economic 
terms.  The rationale is to show that its goal is to facilitate political and economic 
improvements in the Philippines.  This way, some context on the institutions that 
constrained land efforts to pull land redistribution will be highlighted.   
 
From here, this chapter will show that the notion that growing the economy is a 
“civilising” act and Taft’s Policy of Attraction were important ideas that led officials 
to try their luck at introducing land redistribution policies.  These ideas will 
highlight the point that land redistribution was not done for its own sake but to 
satisfy ulterior motives.  The chapter then considers the interests that were based 
on these policies and interests that hindered further attempts at land 
redistribution.  Among the latter are security considerations, the view of America’s 
standing and the need to mobilise the Catholic vote.  Finally, given the scholars 
have suggested efforts at land redistribution have fallen short, this chapter 
discusses the role of institutions.  They include adherence of the US to property 
rights and the Treaty of Paris, the Catholic Church, and pre-existing social 
structures in the Philippines that resisted forms of land redistribution.  Based on 
those, institutions were an important constraining factor in realising land 
redistribution.  These pertinent subsections will highlight the essential features of 
US officials’ land redistribution efforts.  These subsections demonstrate the 
prevailing ideas, interests, and institutions and what their consequences were.  In 
the process, these will identify the frustrations officials had to deal with.  
 
Along the process, this chapter will also show that some of the ideas, institutions, 
and interests would provide the springboard for each other to develop in this realm 
of facilitating land redistribution.  This chapter will explore the interactions 
between the ideas, institutions, and interests involved.  Some of the underlying 
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ideas behind instituting land redistribution need examination vis-a-vis interests 
and institutions to understand the decisions that officials took.     
 
The chapter will conclude by reiterating the interactions between ideas, interests, 
and institutions, and looking and reflecting on their implications and importance. 
 
RATIONALE FOR LAND REDISTRIBUTION 
Initiatives for land redistribution and broader land reform are done to improve the 
political and socio-economic positions of those working in the lands.   
 
Land redistribution and land reform are associated with broader moves for 
democratisation.  Politically, successful land reform programmes have the 
potential to weaken feudal institutions.  In the process, it also opens the door for 
free enterprise to grow.  However, it is bound to run into problems in jurisdictions 
with prevailing forms of servitude.  Hence, much of the results depend on the 
implementation of such programmes in specific settings (Barlowe, 1953: 181).  
Democratisation does not happen overnight or automatically as social 
relationships need dramatic alteration. However, it provides the former peasant 
classes with an opportunity to participate in the political process.  It also facilitates 
the transformation of such relationships, given that certain anti-democratic 
practices have been gradually done away with (Senior, 1958).   
 
Economically, numerous scholars (eg. de Janvry, 1981; Roxborough, 1979; 
Wolford, 2007) have established land redistribution’s contribution to economic 
development in states and their territories.  It is, thus, an essential element that 
facilitates the growth and development of modern economies.  The American 
hegemony was partly premised on economic growth and based on the logic of 
what previous scholars have said, land reform should have made attempts to 
contribute to that.  Officials believed this would facilitate such efforts.    
 
Herring (1983: 262) has further underscored the political importance of land 
reform.  Although he had questions over the effect of land reform and 
redistribution was on productivity, his study had indicated that underutilisation 
arises from large parcels of land that were owned by relatively a few numbers of 
people.  The fact that this persisted nonetheless still gives rise to the suggestion 
that ownership of large tracts of land distributed amongst a broader segment of 
the population would increase the chances of such productive use.   
 
IDEAS 
Economic Growth as a Civilising Measure 
The previous section argued that land redistribution is premised partly on 
facilitating economic growth.  Economic growth was, in turn, something Taft, as 
Governor-General wanted to promote in the colony.  However, it is important to 
note that Taft and his allies had particularly characterised Filipinos as “uncivilised”.  
As the previous chapters suggest, the “uncivilised” notion had a connotation that 
a Filipino way of life was inferior in the eyes of the colonisers.  In other words, 
officials had still viewed Filipinos as unfit to manage their affairs.   
 
Hence, one way that Taft hoped to try to “civilise” the Philippines and demonstrate 
what Americans could do was to try to impart economic advancement.  
Specifically, Taft wrote to Lodge that “nothing will civilise them [Filipino people] 
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so much as the introduction of American enterprise and capital here” (Taft, 
17/10/1900: 3).  Thus, Taft thought that developing the Philippine economy was 
a core part of how they would put forward their colonial agenda and how they 
would spread American ideas.   
 
The idea of economic growth as a way to “civilising” the Philippines, as feasible as 
it is, should have had a foundation in other interests and/or institutions.  For 
instance, given how administrators found the institutions, they gave credence to 
the notion that ideas associated with “civilising” the Philippines had to be given 
put forward.  As discussed in previous chapters, ideas like these also helped reflect 
interests such as helping increase security in the Philippines and minimising 
insurrections.  
 
Policy of Attraction 
As discussed previously, William Taft’s so-called policy of attraction refers to the 
overarching series of measures that Taft administration rolled out discourage 
Filipinos from thinking about breaking away from American rule.  The measures 
may seem associated with introducing liberal institutions, but the paradox was 
that if the US kept introducing such both political and economic liberal reforms, 
Filipinos would feel encouraged to stay under US sovereignty.  In the process, 
there would be a “lasting imperial bond” between the Philippines and the US 
(Burns, 2011).   
 
As previous chapters have discussed, the idea of the policy of attraction needs 
consideration not for its own merits or sake but in conjunction with security 
interests.  Taft needed to find innovative ways of minimising incentives to rebel 
or create insurrections in the Philippines.  The incentives found in this idea 
reflected security interests.  Hence, one should consider any moves proposing or 
opposing land redistribution in the context of this policy and the security interests 




As the previous section shows, Taft felt determined not to let the Philippines be 
independent of the US.  As such, the colonial government felt the need to secure 
the colony.  Under the underlying ideas associated with the “policy of attraction”, 
Taft felt the need to deal with the colonial elites.   Administrators solicited their 
help to facilitate the suppression of nationalist sentiments in the islands (Burns, 
2010: 69).  Crucially, however, these elites possessed large parcels of land.  Some 
of them belonged to the Chinese mestizo and would go on to serve in the Philippine 
Assembly.  They included future presidents Sergio Osmena, Jose Laurel and 
Elpidio Quirino (e.g. see Tan, 1986; Simbulan, 2005).     
 
Furthermore, on the realm of security, Taft feared insurrections as a result of 
misdeeds carried over from the Spanish era.  Taft as much as possible did not 
want Spanish-based friars back in the lands they were forced to vacate when the 
US claimed sovereignty over the islands.  Based on the narrative above, Taft’s 
goal was to not ignite the resentment of locals against the Spanish friars once who 
occupied those lands and were technically still owners.  He understood that locals 
viewed friars as their abusers.  As demonstrated previously, Taft had also viewed 
the Filipinos as “uncivilised”.  Furthermore, based on such views on locals and 
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friars, given that they were in the early stages of American colonisation, Taft 
thought the resentment could increase the risk of unrest up to the point that the 
colonial government would find itself on the receiving end of such resentment 
(Taft to Roosevelt, 13/9/1902: 4-5).   
 
Propping Up America’s Reputation as a Rising Power 
As alluded to in previous chapters, the US was an emerging power.  Officials such 
as Taft were hoping to make a good impression in front of the world.  Officials 
alluded to that when they expressed concerns about the repercussions of selling 
the friar lands outright without further negotiations with the friars.  There was a 
fear of possible damage to the US’ reputation abroad if officials acting on behalf 
of the US would disregard the rights friars believe they had (Iyer and Mauer, 2009: 
11).   
 
In this context, one has to examine the interest of improving the US’ reputation 
vis-a-vis with several institutions.  It how institution facilitates and constrains how 
interests become salient.  One could argue that that relationship is manifested 
with the institutionalisation of the Catholic Church and Friar Lands.  In as much 
as the US wanted to improve its image by whatever possible means, it felt 
constrained by the two aforementioned institutions.  That is given that the US felt 
it needed to work with the institutions to attain their interests.  In other words, 
the options available US bureaucrats and politicians to pursue the interest of 
improving the US’ reputation resulted from the institutions. 
 
Electoral Politics: The Catholic Vote 
Electoral politics were a factor for efforts to redistribute land.  That was manifested 
in how officials treated the Catholic vote.  If Taft were to decide the Commission 
should seize the friar lands outright without compensation, the US would be facing 
threats to its diplomatic, legal, and political credibility.  Diplomatically, the US 
would be seen as less trusted by other nations when it would conduct such deals.  
Legally, given the property rights issue that the US had long upheld, the 
government could open itself to litigation.  Politically, there was a serious chance 
that Catholic voters which Taft’s party appeared to have counted on for electoral 
support.  Taft did not want the US and his party to suffer such consequences.  He, 
for instance, wrote to Roosevelt about their party’s losses in Gubernatorial 
elections in Maine which they thought was a consequence a backlash in the 
Catholic vote.   Moving further down the line, Taft additionally thought that the 
issue of the friar lands would stir up agitators in the Philippines who think a change 
of party would mean a change of policy toward the islands.  Even if Taft wanted 
the friars out to resolve the situation once and for all, he feared the consequences 
of Aguinaldo’s camp dealing with the Friars, something that he thought would 
become likely if the opposition party took over (Taft to Roosevelt, 14/9/1904: 4-
5).    
 
The fact that the Catholic vote was an interest, however, implies that it had some 
importance.  In coming elections, officials, in their capacity as politicians, needed 
to get as many votes as possible.  However, the Catholic Church acts as a 
constraining institution here in the sense that its presence and power requires 
satisfying the demands of the Church.  Hence, the fact that officials felt the need 
to negotiate with the Catholic Church to sort out the issues surrounding the Friar 




Limiting the Power of Some Interest Groups 
Although Taft wanted to promote business interests in the colony, he too wanted 
to impose some limits on what these activities should involve.  Thus, in relation 
to land redistribution issues, there was also a fear in Washington that domestic 
groups who would lobby for retaining the Philippines as a colony would emerge 
and exploit the colony’s potential too much.  As a result, the US government 
placed limits on how much land US-based corporations could own in the islands.  
Additionally, the prevailing US national banking system did not cover the islands, 
and the colonial government may not grant mining permits.  That was a deviation 
from other colonies, where other domestic-based firms may own and exploit as 
much land as they wish (Iyer and Maurer, 2009: 9).   
 
On paper, this would exhibit that the US appeared serious about regulating 
business interests, but the fact remains that US-based businessmen continued to 
operate in the islands.  Other colonial governments addressed business requests 
to maintain security in the colony.  However, it also does not appear to square 
with previously established reasons for colonising the Philippines.  Such reasons 
include economic considerations, given that American businesses continued to 
operate in the Philippines.  Moreover, in 1916 and 1935, when politicians passed 
legislation which provided more autonomy to the Philippines, a contingent of 
business groups both US- and Philippine-based continued to oppose such 
measures. 
 
Though there were attempts at land redistribution early on, as at the time the US 
took possession of the Philippines, the US did not feel the need to engage in 
serious land reform since officials did not encounter a similar problem back in the 
mainland (Salamanca, 1984).   
 
As for the pertinent interactions, this interest in regulating businesses was not the 
sole reason to justify land redistribution techniques.  Although there are no explicit 
references to the other ideas and institutions, one may suggest that this move 
should be considered in terms of prevailing ideas, particularly the policy of 
attraction.  In particular, land redistribution issues were a reason for why 
coloniser-colony relationships became difficult to manage, and the idea behind the 
policy of attraction is to be innovative in disincentivising Filipinos to clamour for 
independence from the US. 
 
However, as the reality has shown limited follow through as exhibited by the fact 
that businesses were still relatively unregulated implies how much of a force they 
were.  Although trying to satisfy business interests is indeed an interest in its own 
right, that interest would need to assume several other forces.  First, those 
business forces are institutionalised not only in the colony but also in the mainland.  
These would be a testament to the notion that the strength of such forces made 
it difficult for colonial officials to follow through on the interests of reigning in 
special groups if these officials were even serious about reigning them in, to begin 
with.  Second, there were ideas associated with free enterprise here.  Under such 
an idea, regulation should be limited.  To varying degrees, officials have expressed 
their commitment to such.  It also manifests itself in the policy of attraction.  
Hence, this idea of free enterprise is an important way to inform the interests of 





In concert with the “civilising mission”, growing the colonial economy was one tent 
officials such as Taft hoped land reform-related policies would pave the way for.  
Agriculture was considered a priority sector by officials.  In his report to the US 
Senate, Taft (in United States Congress.  House of Representatives.  Committee 
on Insular Affairs, 1908: 58) mentioned that although he thought mining was an 
industry that had the potential to develop in the Philippines, the future of the 
islands would improve through the agricultural resources found therein.  Abaca 
(or hemp) was the Philippines’ main agricultural product.  Dried coconuts, sugar, 
and tobacco were also important products for the islands’ economy.     
 
Governor-General William Cameron Forbes, who also served as the Commissioner 
for Commerce in the Islands from 1904 to 1909, had a different view of land 
restrictions that the 1902 Organic Act placed.  Forbes specifically thought that the 
restrictions on sugar inhibited the development of the local industries and 
suspected that representatives of the beet sugar industry in the mainland lobbied 
such restrictions (Forbes to Stimson, 16/10/1911). 
 
As far as the systems to be proposed were concerned, the aims of the US were 
not so much about promoting social justice as they were about efficient large-
scale commercial agriculture (Lande, 2001: 529).  The former was a derivate 
benefit of the latter.  In relation, the assessment was that agrarian-related policies 
were “designed for farmers rather than peasants”, the latter of which, comprised 
the majority of the islands’ population (Adas, 1998: 59). 
 
Once again, the interest in promoting economic growth worked hand-in-hand with 
the idea of the “civilising mission”.  Economic growth interest concerning the 
colony, thus, did not develop in a vacuum.  As the “civilising mission” was an idea, 
it had the role of helping officials make sense of their interest in pursuing economic 
growth to benefit the US.     
 
INSTITUTIONS 
Any efforts at land redistribution by Americans were subject to institutions both 
inside and outside the Philippines.  These institutions included pre-existing 
practices, as well as adherence to norms.  In as much as Taft wanted to introduce 
such reforms, he admitted the challenge to them.   
 
Also, given the interest in promoting economic growth and securing property 
rights, there was a need to account for who owned what land.  As such, the rest 
of this section also shows the consequences of these institutions.     
 
Respect for Property Rights 
Among the most important considerations were the institutions of protecting 
property rights and the established treaties, most notably the Treaty of Paris.  In 
the US, it was of paramount importance that parties to an agreement should 
demonstrate credibility when it came to their ability to respect the property rights.  
Some scholars such as Lamoreaux (2014) have suggested that property rights 
protection worked hand-in-hand as a consequence of suffrage (of white men), 
which was part of the idea of “American exceptionalism”.  The Treaty of Paris, on 
the other hand, also stated specifically that property rights of Spanish entities 
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would continue to be respected long after the Philippines were to be ceded to the 
US. 
 
Respecting property rights has also been central to economic growth that Taft 
hoped to achieve in the Philippines.  Scholars such as Coase (1960) and Besley 
and Ghatak (2010) have argued that insecure property rights have undermined 
prospects for economic growth.  This institution of property rights thus had 
implications for efforts to advance forms of land reform or redistribution.         
  
The Treaty of Paris, as Putzel points out, also provides credence to the notion that 
private property rights would generally be an area that US officials felt should not 
be interfered.  On the surface, this suggests a geopolitical motive which Beveridge 
hinted at in his speech on the Senate Floor.  The fact that one of the motives that 
Beveridge cited was to shore up the export crop market and supply the world’s 
economic needs and that any mention of assisting tenants of disputed lands on 
the islands was limited, would indeed point to where the priorities of Washington-
based politicians were at the time.  Even if on paper McKinley wanted to resolve 
disputes on large tracts of land, the fact that he also wrote in his instructions to 
respect private property also suggests that disputes should be weighed against 
such factors.  McKinley also reminded Philippine-based officials that as such 
processes were also widespread in the US, they should make a similar effort in 
the islands (in Putzel, 1992: 52). 
 
Early attempts at land redistribution were in a state of flux.  They have been at 
odds with the institutionalisation in the US of property rights.  In his testimony to 
the US Senate, War Secretary Elihu Root (US Senate, 23/1/1902: 49) indicated 
that their predecessors did not encourage private ownership of lands which to him 
and the US formed the basis of private enterprise.  Taft further corroborated that 
testimony in a hearing on 4 March 1902, where he said that land titles were mostly 
in a state of “uncertainty” (in Compton, 1902). 
 
The commitment of the officials to property rights was also on display when trying 
to figure out what to do with tracts of untitled land that they hoped to sell for 
development.  Officials were disturbed or taken at awe by that prospect. 
 
When US officials stepped foot in the Philippines, they found approximately more 
than 68 million acres of public lands (i.e. those effectively under US possession at 
the time the US the islands from Spain) and more than 4.9 million acres owned 
by individuals.  Taft thought it was up to Congress to resolve issues that involved 
public lands.  He also recommended the imposition of restrictions on the amount 
of land individuals and entities were permitted to own so that in principle, no single 
individual or entity would have a large concentration of land but only after 
considering the circumstances, especially when it came to cultivating lands with 
sugar (United States. Philippine Commission, 1905: 49-50).  An estimated 
200,000 to 400,000 Filipinos were squatters for many years on lands they did not 
own and that the Spanish colonial government imposed a poll tax.  It was here 
where Secretary Root initially proposed to give squatters a chance to acquire land 
titles to the lands they were squatting on (United States Congress.  Senate, 1902: 
49).   
 
Upon passage of the Public Lands Act by the Philippine Commission as authorised 
by the 1902 Philippine Organic Act, individuals were permitted to purchase up to 
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16 hectares or 40 acres of land while corporations were restricted to purchase up 
to 1,024 hectares or approximately 2,560 acres.  However, the law also stated 
individuals could rent as much land from the government as they wanted per 
Public Lands Law.  Taft also stated that corporations are also restricted to lease 
as much as they could own because allowing them to lease more effectively meant 
authorising them to engage in agricultural activities and control more than 1,024 
hectares of land.  Taft, however, thought the Commission should permit 
individuals and corporations to own or rent more than what was allowed then to 
stimulate investment, especially in the sugar industry (Taft, 15/10/1903: 8-9).  
What was on Taft’s mind in his conversation to Root was his thoughts on how land 
ownership and lease policies his Commission had passed could have better enticed 
more investments in the islands.   
 
Taft also communicated to Root that the situation surrounding land title 
registration in the islands was problematic (ibid: 13).  Thus, the problems 
inherited from the previous era had forced the Commission to allow landowners 
to obtain complete confirmation to their land title by simply proving they have 
been in “open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of 
public agricultural lands under a bona fide claim of ownership” in most cases.  By 
doing such, these landowners would be presumed to possess land through a grant 
from the Spanish government.  The Commission believed that the public benefit 
that settling land titles would provide would outweigh the risk of fraudulent claims 
to titles.  For instance, it would become easier for landowners to secure loans from 
banks and construct improvements to their land (ibid: 18-19).  Taft wanted to end 
the uncertainties and attempt to try to stimulate economic activities and sorting 
out issues involving land registration would facilitate this. 
 
The fact that property rights is being discussed here implies that it works in 
partnership with other ideas and interests.  One relationship of institutions to 
interests is that the institutions reflect agents’ interests.  The institution of 
property rights also acts a way to express the commitment of officials towards of 
taking care of free enterprise interest groups, as most notions of free enterprise 
suggest that an important aspect of it is securing property rights.  It is in this way 
that trust could develop and a sense of a serious commitment to free enterprise 
is shown.  Officials operated based on respecting such institutions.  Hence, these 
institutions were essential considerations in understanding the reasons for 
introducing the associated legislation.      
 
Catholic Church and Friar Lands 
In the context of attempting to enact land redistribution, the respect for the 
institution of property rights is related to the fears that politicians had with the 
institution of the Catholic Church.  In fact, there were attempts to resolve the Friar 
Lands to fulfil the US’ commitment to respecting property rights.  That was 
especially in light of the vacated Friar lands.  In particular, one of the first things 
that the Second Philippine Commission of 1900 had to resolve was the question 
of whether friars should resume occupancy of the lands they occupied before the 
Philippine revolution.  The quest to resolve such a dispute was based on the 
institutionalised thinking of respecting property rights.   
 
The Friar lands, as they were called, were lands that various orders of Spanish 
priests (e.g. Dominicans, Augustinians, Franciscans, Recolletos) occupied 
previously.  In 1890, the Spanish government conceded that the Catholic Church 
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and associated entities “to dispose of the holdings and possessions which they 
have in these [Philippine] provinces in accordance with the canon law and the 
legislation of the Indies”.  It came on the heels of the central government in Madrid 
allowing them to do what they pleased in the lands (Cunningham: 1916: 479-
480).  These religious orders were driven from their parishes during the Filipino 
insurrection against Spain but remained the legal owners of the lands they owned 
in Spain’s former colony.  Thus, when the Spanish-American War ended, these 
orders sought to regain possession of the lands they vacated.  Tenants, on the 
other hand, did not want to surrender possession and/or did not want to pay rent.  
US officials found that the prevalence of multiple interests around these lands 
would make the law-and-order situation challenging in the Philippines.  In Luzon 
alone, the Philippine Commission found more than 403 thousand acres of land 
that belonged to the different friars (1904: 43).  Such resentment was manifested 
in the so-called Constitutional Convention convened by General Emilio Aguinaldo 
where it nationalised the friar lands and placed them under the name of the 
“Republic of the Philippines”.  When the US colonisers implement a court system 
in the Philippines, the friars were entitled to initiate litigation and recover rents 
from their tenants that have been due since 1896, as well as to evict delinquent 
tenants (in United States Congress.  Senate, 1908: 20).     
 
A 1901 report by the Taft Philippine Commission (United States.  War Department, 
1901: 24-25) emphasised that this disputed Friar issue needed a resolution, 
especially in provinces of Cavite, Laguna, Rizal, Bulacan, and Bataan.  That was 
especially as the Philippines was no longer under military governance at the time.  
Officials suggested the possibility of negotiating with various religious at that 
stage.  Furthermore, the transactions could be executed without incurring financial 
losses.  However, the Commission also recommended to their superiors in 
Washington that they should get the authority to issue bonds to help finance the 
purchase of such land with the proceeds from the Commission’s sale to third 
parties used to repay the bonds.  The report also indicated that if Courts continue 
to rule in favour of the land’s real owners, unrest would break out.             
 
Leasing such lands also became an issue.  Taft made an issue about the tenor 
available to corporations to lease lands.  He preferred to reduce the power of 
corporations over such lands by reducing the amount of time they were legally 
permitted to lease them on the go rather than restricting the amount of it (or 
area) that they could hold. (in Committee on Insular Affairs, 4/3/1902: 118). 
 
On the one hand, Taft continued to describe the issue of letting the Friars come 
back as a “burning political question” in the islands (in United States.  War 
Department, 1901: 24).   The Friar lands constituted “thousands of hectares of 
the best land in the archipelago” (Cunningham, 1916: 465).  Taft felt convinced 
that doing so would undermine peace and order and locals would blame the US 
government for the rage that he thought should otherwise be directed towards 
the friars (Iyer and Maurer, 2009: 10-11).  Taft also wrote to remind other US 
officials that Filipinos that sympathised with US’ presence in the islands also had 
grievances against these friars and that they were highly anxious about the next 
course of action on the matter.  At the same time, Taft also acknowledged “a 
considerable number of Filipino priests” that could show some hostility to US 
presence because of “fear that the Catholic Church will deem it necessary on the 
restoration of complete peace to bring back the friars”.  Ultimately though, Taft 
concluded that addressing the “enmity among the people” against the US 
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government was a much larger consideration than the advantages that came with 
securing the allegiances of priests who thought that they were still under 
allegiance to the Spanish crown (United States.  War Department, 1901: 31).  
Even when native Filipinos did not question claims to certain lands, the fact that 
land titles were under the names of Friars made Taft worried about its impact on 
the peace and order situation in the colony.  For instance, he cited agricultural 
lands owned by three religious orders which were given to various persons and 
entities to manage (ibid: 32). 
 
On the other hand, even with such initial thoughts about trying to not agitate 
Filipinos into uprisings, Taft still recognised the Catholic Church’s leverage and 
eventually made decisions based on such recognition.    The institutionalised 
Catholic Church and property rights had been among those that hamstrung efforts 
to initiate swift reforms and redistribution.  Given the provisions in the Treaty of 
Paris which particularly pertained to property rights, (Iyer and Mauer, 2009: 11) 
argued that the US violating it in order to solve the Friar lands dispute would lead 
to problems such as harm to its international reputation, exposure to domestic 
litigation, and backlash among Catholic voters back in the mainland.  The last 
reason stated was quite similar to the dilemmas faced by the central Spanish 
government when it tried to reign in abuses by the Friars (cf. Cunningham, 1916).  
Furthermore, in a letter to Governor-General Luke Wright, Taft said he saw the 
recommendation of his Commission to exclude all friars as “too radical” and that 
he believed more could be accomplished by not looking bad in front of them, 
though Taft still hoped to keep the “four objectionable orders” out of the parishes 
(Taft, 22/6/1902: 2).  Furthermore, given the interest that the US developing into 
an emerging power, officials also felt that resolving the property rights-related 
issues associated with the Friar Lands was imperative.    
 
In other words, the issues surrounding Friar lands had potential serious 
diplomatic, legal, and political consequences for the US government if it did not 
resolve them carefully.  Whether US officials would be able to promote their 
interests in the colony and sprout their ideas and institute liberal land 
redistribution in the Philippines depended on how they threaded the institutional 
constraints and became mindful of their interests back home.  Similar to the 
Spanish era, attempts to dispense with land reform was constrained by factors 
outside the Philippine territory.  Even within the Commission, members were 
mindful of the political atmosphere back in the mainland.   
 
As a result, Taft recommended in the report to offer to the Friars for hacenderos 
(plantation owners) to purchase such from the Friars (in United States.  War 
Department, 1901: 32).  He went to the Vatican to commence negotiations to 
purchase such Friar Lands.  Negotiations became contentious as some religious 
orders demanded compensation for the improvements these orders made. 
 
That situation led Congress to establish a provision for the US Colonial 
Government in the Philippines to purchase such lands, and if necessary, to issue 
bonds for that purpose.  Moreover, occupants would get priority on who gets the 
first right to purchase the property (in United States Congress.  House of 
Representatives.  Committee on Insular Affairs, 1911: vii).  The colonial 
government paid $7,239,000 to the Vatican for about 165,000 hectares of friar 
lands that would be transferred to the former’s name.  Such land was later sold 
to tenants, but a majority of those who purchased the land happened to be estate 
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owners.  Formal withdrawal of the religious orders did not take place all at once 
to avoid offending the Spanish Crown (Sodusta, 1981: 258; Seekins, 1991).       
 
Ultimately after a prolonged legal dispute, the US Supreme Court ordered the US 
government to compensate the religious orders $6.9 million for the improvements 
(Iyer and Maurer, 2009: 11-12). 
 
Although the average value in Luzon was $114 per hectare (1 hectare = 2.5 
acres), the government would charge tenants $131 for the same because of the 
amount the government paid to the Friars.  The government offered loans to 
tenants that had a six-per cent interest for the land itself and a 12-per cent loan 
for the equipment and other improvements (ibid: 16).  Nonetheless, the friar lands 
were effectively still unaffordable for kasama sharecroppers.  The inquilinos 
tenants, those who belonged to the landed oligarchy, along with one US-based 
sugar firm, were the ones to purchase most of the friar lands (Putzel, 1992: 53).   
 
As was mentioned several times throughout this chapter, the fact that officials 
such as Taft were wary about the institution of the Catholic Church while trying to 
secure Friar lands for the former’s use suggests that this institution had a direct 
connection with the electoral interests of officials.  In the process of securing deals, 
Taft received a warning about the political consequences for undermining this 
institution.  Hence on this count, the institution constrained Taft’s ability to use 
Friar Lands for other interests which Taft acknowledged.  More importantly, 
however, the institutional strength of the Catholic Church propelled the interests 
of Catholic voters to the extent that officials such as Taft had to be sensitive to 
the latter in his dealings.        
 
Property rights revisited: Friar Lands Inquiry 
In the process of implementing the reforms of redistributing Friar Lands, 
politicians suspected corruption.  In particular, then-Congressman Martin of 
Colorado raised such suspected irregularities in the administration of the sale and 
issuance of leases of Friar Lands in the Philippines.   
 
The issue of alleged friar lands irregularities the is relevant to the broader issue 
of land redistribution.  On the one hand, land reform is about equitable distribution 
of public lands so that those in the lower classes could get a decent share of the 
land.  On the other hand, it also raises issues of what gets counted as private 
property, and it also highlights the reality that private property should be 
respected.  Furthermore, it also demonstrates a commitment by some officials to 
abide by the institution of respecting property rights.  One demonstrates such by 
litigating how to properly account for such rights.  In other words, the issue of 
land reform also evokes a balancing act and an apparent paradox of respecting 
private property and distributing land among those who earn less, thus 
demonstrating the tension between this institution and the goal of liberal reforms.  
It also is was one area about the Philippines where Congress was intensively 
concerned with. 
 
One of the questions of the inquiry was whether the Friar Lands indeed qualified 
as public lands for which it would be subject to further regulation under the 1902 
Organic Law.  Even Secretary Root himself did not originally consider friar lands 
as public lands (US Senate, 1902: 51).  The House has concluded that the Organic 
Law only covered lands considered public at the time of the acquisition and that 
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laws concerning private property ownership would remain in effect.  Crucially, the 
report stated that the complainant was not able to show which sections of the law 
established Friar Lands as part of public domain (United States Congress.  House 
of Representatives.  Committee on Insular Affairs, 1911: xvii).  It was also 
confirmed in the Organic Act itself which states that Friar lands are not ‘‘public 
lands’ in the sense in which those words are used in the Public Land Act…, and 
cannot be acquired or leased under the provisions thereof.” (Friar Lands Act, 
1904) The complainant, therefore, had no case in this regard.   
 
In general, both the majority and minority reports agreed that there were no 
irregularities in the transaction involved (New York Tribune, 1911: 9).  In 
particular, Representative Martin’s colleagues on the committee disagreed as they 
said that such friar lands were not subject to the individual or corporate limit 
earlier set out.  The majority report concluded that the sale to E L Poole was not 
“injurious to the best interests of the [Philippine] islands”.  However, the report 
also recommended enacting pertinent legislation to clearly state whether US 
citizens may purchase parcels of public agricultural land in the Philippines that are 
in the name of the United States.  The Sugar Trust did not buy the disputed San 
Jose lands as Horace Havemeyer purchased them on behalf of the American Sugar 
Refining Company.   
 
One issue that has arisen from this is that the laws themselves permitted the 
parties to get away with buying large tracts of lands given.  As mentioned earlier, 
the inquiry concluded that the transaction was legally executed.   
 
Based on the given account, enterprising individuals and entities tried to exhaust 
legal remedies to reduce the amount of land available to less wealthy Filipinos.  
Despite the unsuccessful attempts to reveal irregularities in the sale, this episode 
of the American colonial era also uncovers how larger-sized firms or wealthy 
individuals continued to be at an advantage in terms of ability to own more parcels 
of land on offer, and how less wealthy Filipinos remained deprived of the same.  
If the colonial government and Congress were serious in implementing some 
meaningful land reform, then they would have reminded themselves of the 
reasons for purchasing these lands in the first place.  As mentioned, they wanted 
to maintain colonial security, and keeping the status of the unoccupied Friar lands 
would, in their mind, undermine such efforts.  Also evident here is a preference to 
continue protecting private property rights.  However, the problem was that most 
protected properties belonged to those who would otherwise lose out when bold 
land reform measures would otherwise be implemented. 
 
Pre-American-era Social Relationships and Agricultural Structures 
Although there were attempts to liberalise the land situation, officials ultimately 
ended up working with the elites, which included members of the landed class 
(Putzel, 1992: 51).   
 
Taft realised the social realities on the ground when he decided how much of his 
agenda he would pursue.  Although he had this idea that could have a 
consequence of improving conditions for Filipinos, such became subject to social 
constraints.  Thus, he also acknowledged that as much as he wanted to change 
the social structures dramatically, such would be “impossible” to attain.  Thus, he 




An example of one such institution was the kasama or sharecropping system.  
Under this institution, the landlord provided the seeds and cash, while the 
sharecropping tenant had to provide the tools including the work animals.  Each 
party shared half of the profits, although the landlord deducted the expenses 
incurred from the tenant’s share.  Similar to what was in existence during the 
Spanish era, the tenants under the sharecropping system racked up massive debts 
and created debt peons which their offspring inherited if unpaid before the original 
tenant’s death.  There were no written contracts, and the landlords could 
manipulate the terms to their advantage and the tenants’ detriment.  Over time, 
the tenant-cultivators’ positions deteriorated due to a rising population and 
prevalent impersonal relationships between the tenant and landlord where the 
latter became less concerned for the former’s welfare (Seekins, 1991).  In other 
words, tenant-sharecroppers continued to experience adverse conditions, as was 
the case before the US colonial government attempted to intervene.   
 
The social practice ran deep that officials even admitted frustration in trying to 
implement their own alternatives.  For instance, the colonial government 
attempted to put up homesteads that resembled those found in the western part 
of the US.  According to Root, he expected that providing for homestead would 
cover a “very large number of cases” which were small.  Initially, Root quoted the 
proposed Philippine Organic bill which provided a fixed 100 acres per person worth 
of homestead land with the impression that each person occupying such lands 
would cultivate and improve such lands.  Root also believed that some tenants 
would have the “intelligence” to cultivate up to 100 acres while others would not 
(United States Congress.  Senate, 1902: 50).  It was most prevalent in Central 
Luzon and the Visayas, especially in areas known for growing rice.  However, it 
ultimately did not significantly change the patterns of landholdings already 
prevalent (Seekins, 1991).  Additionally, the per cent of tenant farmers doubled 
during the American occupation of the Philippines (Ninkovich, 2001: 65). 
 
Furthermore, the issue of property rights was also associated with another 
constraining institution in the colony – landed property class.  Thus, the attempts 
to make land redistribution possible involved a tension between two institutions: 
weakening the institution of the landed classes and upholding the institution of 
property rights.  Although there were advancements, the former institution has 
constrained officials and held back what could have been.   
 
Salamanca (1984) argued that as much as US officials in the Philippines wanted 
to dismantle cacquism, these officials did not have the know-how to do it as the 
situation they found in the colony bore no resemblance to what their experiences 
were back home.  Karnow (1989: 198) even went on to say that US officials 
“coddled” landed oligarchs while neglecting the plight of the peasantry. 
 
Putzel (1992: 51) posits that American officials were aware of the problems of 
concentration of the land, but decided to ally themselves with the landed elite 
anyway.  In allying themselves with the institutionalised landed elite in the colony, 
interests have been a paramount consideration.  He invoked Senator Alfred 
Beveridge’s speech on the floor of the US Senate where according to Beveridge, 
the Philippines was acquired partly because of the value of the valleys in Luzon 
island and well as his view that forests in the Philippines could supply furniture for 
the rest of the world for about a century.  Despite knowledge of the problems, 
Beveridge thought that promoting the export industry along with propping the 
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Philippines as a gateway to China was a priority and in order to facilitate that, 
existing property rights would need to be upheld.  The 1898 Treaty of Paris clearly 
stated that the US would continue to honour existing property rights, including 
those who owned a large amount of land (ibid: 52).     
 
Given the foregoing, at the heart of the issue of land redistribution is balancing 
the need for less wealthy individuals to have a secure space to make the parcels 
of land they are working on as productive as they see fit with that of respecting 
property rights to those who rightfully own questionable properties.  That was 
especially true in the case of attempts of the US officials reiterating the need to 
respect property rights.  On some level, this may suggest some contradiction since 
awarding the rights to less wealthy but enterprising tenants does not always 
involve keeping existing property rights in-tact.  It would also mean that in several 
cases, those who own large tracts of land would have to give up what was 
perceived by others to be relatively unproductive uses of the same.  By protecting 
property rights of those who already owned land, it comes with a chance that such 
owners would feel empowered to continue the oppressive measures that they have 
been doing since they acquired the property in question.   
 
FURTHER INSIGHTS FROM LAND REDISTRIBUTION 
US officials have thought of the Philippines partly as a producer of crops the 
mainland could benefit from.  Yet, they were under the notion that to avoid 
upsetting their prospects at such, they would have to strike an alliance with 
landowning elites even if on paper, the colonial government would have an 
obligation to oversee and help resolve challenges brought about by tenants of the 
lands owned by these local elites.  And given that the paper says to try to 
safeguard peace and order in the colony, one had to see it in the context of the 
operations of American businesses.   
 
One issue worth considering is whether McKinley would even consider or codify 
helping the Filipino tenants resolve their disputes if American firms did not operate 
in the islands.  McKinley had a proclamation that would on the surface suggest 
uplifting the living standards of Filipino people as he thought.  He also requested 
that the islands should be governed not merely for the US’ satisfaction but also 
the Filipinos’.  However, it was also apparent to him and his political and business 
allies that the opportunity to gain economic dividends in the colony existed in 
some form.  Even if McKinley was sincere about his pledge to deliver a government 
that would satisfy Filipinos and less so the Americans, not all Filipinos had the 
same standing.  Such was exemplified by the situation of land ownership in the 
colony, which feature a huge concentration of land among a small number of 
wealthy owners.  Through invoking the clause to respect existing private property 
rights, McKinley, and by extension, the US government, tried in his instructions 
to not upset the opportunities before him.   
 
Broadly, land redistribution attempts by the US only strengthened the hand of the 
figures that it was supposed to weaken, and their influence in business matters 
only grew.  For one, as mentioned by Seekins (1991), the majority of those who 
purchased friar lands from the colonial government were estate owners.  For 
example, sugar hacenderos worked with the US-based Sugar Trust to lobby 
against other US-based sugar growers who wanted the US government to impose 
a quota on imports of primary commodities originating from the Philippines.  The 
hacenderos continued to prosper and help lobby to defeat tariff restrictions.  US-
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based cattle ranchers were later permitted to exceed public land limitations in the 
province of Bukidnon for so long as they continued to be in good favour with the 
province’s governor.  Agricultural tenancy effectively increased from 16 per cent 
in 1903 to 54 per cent before the Second World War began.  Leasehold tenancy 
that featured fixed cash rents faced rapid decline, and cash tenants paid extremely 
high rents to the point that they had to recourse to sharecropping.  By 1939, debt 
peonage, which was a feature of Spanish colonisation, continued through to the 
American era as interest rates of up to a hundred per cent were offered.  Finally, 
landlords were able to consolidate political power (Putzel, 1992: 54-55).  Land 
ownership also became the basis for political power as one of the criteria for being 
included in the initial voter franchise was to have one’s property valued at P500 
or higher and only less than two per cent of the population was able to vote in the 
1907 Assembly elections (ibid: 55-6).   
 
The US was at the time a rising hegemon, but the issue of bringing friar lands to 
the core of land reform in their colony threatened to undermine its status.  In 
addition to diplomatic and geopolitical constraints, the other factor that had 
somehow stalled further progress on the Friar lands was the potential backlash 
from Catholic voters back home.  That manifests an instance where the US 
ambitions for the Philippines, even if it politically provides some sense of law-and-
order back in the islands, would come at the expense of political rewards in the 
wider world and back home.   
 
As one could see, there were ambivalent signs toward land reform.  As Putzel 
(1992) reiterates, the large landowners that the laws were supposed to curb were 
only emboldened.   
 
One observation was that colonial policy actually strengthened the hand of the 
previous landholding class.  Because of tariff policies, native sugar producers 
competed with their resource-backed US counterparts.  It fostered a more 
exploitative attitude on the milling class towards their wage workers (Guzman, 
2015). 
 
CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
This chapter has shown that the interaction of ideas, institutions, and interests 
have made prospects for land redistribution in the Philippines challenging for 
colonial officials to approach.  The issue of land redistribution highlights especially 
how institutions make certain interests salient.   
 
When politicians formulated the Organic Act of 1902, Taft continued his call that 
American investments were necessary for the islands to develop, particularly in 
the agricultural sector.  Part of doing this would have to run through the road of 
developing the agricultural industry and hence, imply a form of agricultural reform 
and land redistribution.  At the same time, Taft was aware so as not to give control 
of land, especially agricultural land, in the colony to just a handful of individuals 
(in Alfonso, 1968: 246).  As alluded to earlier, the colonial government had an 
economic stake in ensuring that officials appropriately carry out some form of land 
redistribution.  Based on Taft’s statements, one of the Commission’s priorities was 
to develop the islands’ agricultural potential.  There was a fear that had parcels of 
land ended up in the wrong hands, they would not be used productively, and the 
future of their potential use would be uncertain.  Colonial officials were under the 
impression that providing an alternative for peasants to purchase land would allow 
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them to utilise the lands purchased as productively as possible.  Evidence had 
historically suggested that larger tracts of lands concentrated in fewer owners 
tended to have more unutilised spots (e.g. Herring, 1983). 
 
However, land redistribution, even though one argues that it had the objective of 
taming the institutions that necessitated it and hence provided an alternative to 
achieve economic liberalisation, it was not done merely for the sake of such.  Like 
other initiatives discussed thus far, there were underlying motives to enact it.  It 
was only a priority to the extent that it aided the broader goal of developing the 
colony’s agricultural sector.  In addition to the “civilising” mission which connoted 
and impressed that Filipino civilisation, as colonial officials saw it was substandard, 
there were security considerations behind some specific measures.  For one, 
officials were hoping not to agitate the pro-independence crowds.  That was 
something that would be performed if Friar Lands were not for redistribution at 
some point.   
 
The security interest also cut against effective land redistribution when one 
considers it with the institution of the landed elites.  The government needed the 
support of pro-US landed elites and incentivised them to help minimise the risk of 
uncontrollable insurrections.  In relation to that, there were property rights 
considerations, which the US has demonstrated it tried to uphold and work with.  
That institution also constrained officials from just disregarding the landed elites’ 
roll. 
 
However, the commitment to upholding the practice of the institution of property 
rights was something officials needed to consider.  One should consider it together 
with the fact that the Treaty of Paris also constrained what the US could do.  The 
Catholic Church was also an institution that administrations in the US and the 
Philippines did not want to undermine, lest they suffer electorally.  It was also 
seen in light of the interests to prevent an electoral setback with the Catholic vote, 
which Taft believed was instrumental in the loss of a gubernatorial race in 1904.   
 
When it came to the interactions between ideas, institutions, and interests, based 
on the foregoing, one could argue that institutions helped keep interests alive.  
This was seen, for instance, in the interaction between the Catholic Church, 
property rights, and the Catholic vote.  The fact that politicians worried about the 
Catholic vote implied that the Catholic Church was a powerful institution.   
 
Furthermore, Poteete (2003) also posits that institutions structure interests.  It 
implies that institutions would help dictate what interests to prioritise.  The landed 
elite was an institution that was mentioned several times in this chapter.  Although 
officials claimed that they wanted to grow the economy through land 
redistribution, the fact was they had to work with the elite.  Colonial administrators 
also tried to secure the Philippines from further insurrections and rebellions.  Given 
such a security objective, they had to work with the institutions already present 
(i.e. landed elites) and aiming for full land redistribution was to the mind of officials 







CHAPTER IX: AMERICAN EFFORTS FOR IMPROVING 
MATERIAL CONDITIONS (1898-1916) III: THE 
EVOLUTION OF TARIFF POLICIES  
 
INTRODUCTION 
This chapter continues looking at the motivations to improve material conditions 
in the colony.  In particular, this chapter analyses how ideas, interests, and 
institutions can explain the evolution of tariff policies involving the Philippines. 
 
By discussing the politics of trade, this chapter examines the US domestic political 
situation.  This chapter will also gain some insight into selected members of 
Congress since it was such members who would control the agenda.  This chapter 
argues that although officials and politicians had varying interests in advancing or 
hindering tariff reform in the colony, one could understand these interests in light 
of the ideas these officials believed in and the institutions that they had to operate 
under.  Such policies are deeply rooted in desires to improve material conditions 
in the colony.  
 
Some of the key reforms included the gradual reduction of tobacco and sugar 
tariffs. It took nearly a decade to remove tariffs on all raw materials from the 
Philippines bound for the US.  As this chapter shows, tobacco and sugar were the 
last goods politicians granted tariff-free access.   
 
Throughout the chapter, the ideas discussed are the “civilising mission” of the US, 
in particular, the idea that developing a sense of entrepreneurship is a way to 
manifest a more civilising society.  There will also be an analysis alongside the 
policy of attraction.  This chapter will show that the interests that were involved 
had to do with economic reconstruction, especially given a difficult Philippine-
American war.  Another interest that would be involved in Taft’s desire to develop 
the Philippine agricultural sector and secure the colony.  The chapter also argues 
that electoral politics was a key consideration, especially since some parties were 
campaigning to reduce tariffs for the domestic market.  In other words, the third 
group of interests that this chapter will discuss are the political realities.     
 
Given the electoral situation, the preceding paragraph identified, the chapter 
argues by extension that the decision by Congress to reduce tariffs was not made 
merely because of what was necessary to improve conditions in the Philippines.  
It was a consequence of other interests rooted in certain ideas.      
 
The chapter will proceed as follows.  The second section will briefly explain the 
key ideas, institutions, and interests involved such as the ideas behind the policy 
of attraction, the civilising mission, and the interests such as the need for 
economic growth and the electoral realities that changed over the years.  After 
this brief enumeration of ideas, institutions, and interests, a discussion of both the 
initial economic backdrop that precipitated calls for tariff reduction and the 
debates behind the gradual abolition of tariffs will follow.  It shows how the ideas, 
interests, and institutions are manifested and places them against a broader 
context.  There will also be questions and challenges posed as to whether the 
ideas, institutions, and interests could have been free-standing in their ability to 




Given that legislation behind tariff policies has evolved and faced opposition for 
years before receiving approval, and that reasons colonial officials had throughout 
the process, this chapter feels that a chronological account will best highlight the 
ideas, institutions, and interests, especially the electoral/party politics involved. 
 
 
IDEAS, INTERESTS, AND INSTITUTIONS INVOLVED IN THE STRUGGLE 
FOR REDUCING TARIFFS  
The reduction of tariffs was rooted in ideas such as Taft’s Policy of Attraction and 
his notion that Economic growth was a civilising measure.  Opponents of tariff 
reduction also invoked their racial beliefs to justify their position. 
 
IDEA: Taft’s Policy of attraction 
As chapters 6 and 7 have discussed, William Taft’s so-called policy of attraction 
refers to the overarching series of measures that his administration rolled out to 
discourage Filipinos from breaking away from US’ rule.  Free trade was thus seen 
by colonial officials to encourage the Philippines to remain dependent on the US 
economy, thus quelling calls for outright independence of the islands and further 
show the “genius of the American System”.  The measures may seem associated 
with introducing liberal institutions. However, the paradox was that if the US kept 
introducing both political and economic liberal establishments, Filipinos would 
have more incentives to not demand independence.   In the process, there would 
be a “lasting imperial bond” between the Philippines and the US.  Trade links were 
considered an important tenet of this whereby Taft characterised it as “crucial” to 
forging such bonds.  In a speech given to the Harvard College Alumni Association, 
Taft believed free trade would Filipinos would “understand the benefit that they 
derive from such association with the US and will prefer to maintain some sort of 
bond so that they may be within the tariff wall and enjoy the markets, rather than 
separate themselves and become independent and lose the valuable business” 
(Moore, 2017: 120-122).  Specifically, Taft himself believed that there was a lot 
to gain by reducing tariffs.  On this count, one way to look at this is that by 
promoting trade, the US would be able to maintain its hold on the Philippines more 
smoothly (Burns, 2011).   
 
Certain Filipino officials such as Resident Commissioner Manuel Quezon would 
later raise such a worry about prospects for independence (Ninkovich, 2001). 
 
As has been discussed in previous chapters, one should consider this idea vis-a-
vis the security interests that officials had.  On the one hand, given the 
institutionalised racist views that some officials held against non-whites in 
Chapters 5, 6 and 7 have alluded to, one would suggest that officials had limited 
interest in seeing Filipinos compete against Americans in a capitalist setting.  On 
the other hand, Taft believed that by liberalising economic policies in the colony 
and promoting free enterprise for Filipinos to acquire jobs, the colony would secure 
itself better against insurrections.  Thus, one could argue that economic principles 
contained in the idea of the Policy of Attraction reflected the security interests of 
colonial officials.     
 
IDEA: Economic Growth as a Civilising Measure 
As alluded to in the previous chapter and related to the policy of attraction, Taft 
was adamant about what the US was supposed to do in the Philippines – make 
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them civilised to the standards that US officials hoped for.  It was based on the 
notions that officials had that Filipinos were to the minds of officials “uncivilised”.  
Economic policies were a way to do this.  To Taft’s mind, “nothing will civilise them 
[Filipino people] so much as the introduction of American enterprise and capital 
here” (Taft, 17/10/1900: 3).  An important part of this is trade.  
 
Just as with the previous idea discussed, the “civilising” measures should also be 
considered alongside security interests.  When officials thought Filipinos were 
“uncivilised”, it also added worries that Filipinos might undermine colonial 
security.  Hence, officials believed the notion of providing economic opportunities 
would redirect Filipinos to use their abilities into what these officials considered as 
more productive means.  It suggests that officials also believed that a lack of 
economic opportunities would cause unrest in the colonies.   
 
Furthermore, this notion of being “uncivilised” also has to be seen in light of the 
institutions in the Philippines.  As mentioned in previous chapters, especially in 
Chapter 4, there was a basis for officials to pass negative appraisals – the 
institutions left behind by the Spaniards made it difficult for them to work with.  It 
would also include the state of the colonial economy, and hence the 
pronouncement by officials that they have to equip Filipinos for employment.  
Furthermore, to open more opportunities to provide such employment, colonial 
officials thus lobbied for relevant policies such as the tariff law.  Therefore, the 
institutionalised set-up colonial officials uncovered in the Philippines facilitated the 
salience of the idea that Filipinos.      
 
Thus, officials opening up trade would improve the colonial economy, which would 
facilitate the “civilising mission” Taft intended for the Philippines. 
 
IDEA: Racial concerns 
In the ensuing tariff debates, there were direct references to racial elements and 
in particular, white supremacy.  More specifically, it consisted of a notion that by 
letting foreign goods, particular from Asia into the US mainland, it would come 
with the risk of “degrading white civilisation” (Merleaux, 2012: 30).  As chapter 2 
has alluded to, ideas are about people putting forward and acting based on their 
belief systems.  Given that Merleaux suggests that people thought at the time that 
white American culture was at risk of being “degraded”, it implied a belief that 
such a “white” culture is of superior quality and that anything not from a similar 
region risked undermining this thought.  On this basis, there was a desire to not 
bring Philippine goods into the US market (cf. 44 Congressional Record 2373, 
1902).   
 
These racist ideas against non-whites have also been institutionalised in the US 
for generations.   
 
Such ideas were reflected in the interests of southern legislators who were keen 
on defeating the bill.  These legislators felt that keeping non-white forces in an 
inferior position when it comes to trade.     
 
INTEREST: Economic Growth in the Colony 
As this chapter and previous chapters mentioned several times, colonial officials 
wanted to promote economic growth, and Taft mentioned that this was to fulfil 
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the civilising mission and an integral part of his policy of attraction.  Furthermore, 
he alluded to the fact that by liberalising trade policies, this desire by Taft would 
be gradually satisfied.  Taft’s allies, such as President Roosevelt would later echo 
those principles (Moore, 2017). 
 
Some goods were of key interest.  Officials posited that the Philippines enjoyed 
“unique advantages” in producing hemp and “special advantage” in tobacco and 
“possibly” sugar, the Commission had the opinion that they could withstand a so-
called licence tax or low export duty to favour the treasury (United States. 
Philippine Commission, 1900: 117).  
 
This interest in economic growth in the colony that officials posited is based on 
ideas such as the glut thesis and common notions of free enterprise that were 
dominant in the US.  Moreover, officials who lobbied for tariff reduction thought 
economic growth would also benefit their business allies.  These officials have 
subscribed to these ideas and have invoked it in acquiring the Philippines, to begin 
with.  In this way, it is a manifestation that notions of free enterprise (idea) help 
make sense of officials’ desire for economic growth in the colony (interest).     
 
INTEREST: Fiscal Concerns in the Colony 
Most of the concerns about free trade within the colony had to do with tariffs as 
the main source of revenue for the colonial government.  Before the US colonised 
the Philippines, Spanish officials raised revenues by various means internally such 
as internal taxation, lottery, and other indulgences.  However, after the Spaniards’ 
departure, tariffs consisted of up to seven-eights of colonial income (Plehn, 1902: 
507).  Hence, not all officials in the colony would welcome outright free trade.  The 
talk of reducing tariffs was usually directed at Filipino goods entering the mainland 
and not the other way around.  Given the perception of the Philippines as a weak 
party in negotiations, nobody was willing to discuss reducing tariffs for Philippine 
goods entering the US without considering US goods entering the Philippines 
without tariffs.  Other treaties also meant that certain countries (e.g. Spain) would 
have to grant similar rights as the US to have their goods enter the Philippines.  
Consequently, it meant that if the US received tariff concessions on certain goods 
entering the Philippines, the same premise would have to be extended to countries 
party to the pertinent agreements.  This implied tariff reductions could deny the 
Philippines of a crucial source of revenue (cf. Abelarde, 1947). 
 
In this case, there seems to be more of an interaction between institutions and 
interests.  The institutional norm here was that officials used tariffs to operate the 
colony.  Furthermore, considering the social and economic condition left by the 
Spaniards over the years, there was a long way to recovery and funds were 
needed for this.  Therefore, as much as there was the idea of free trade, the other 
side of it was that officials had to assume a governing responsibility.  It is in this 
way where institutions (i.e. previous condition left from Spanish colonisation and 
the requirements for recovery) constrain the interests of officials to promote free 
trade.  The same institutions likewise made salient the interest to want to raise 
money.   
 
One can also identify a similar relationship between the said interests and the 
standing legal agreements such as the Treaty of Paris.  Given that the latter 
contains agreements of extending the same tariff concessions the US would enjoy 
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to Spain, the colony’s fiscal situation may worsen.  Thus, these rules (i.e. treaties) 
constrained colonial officials to focus on the fiscal concerns of the colony.     
 
INTEREST: Colonial Security 
Officials did not merely pursue relaxed trade restrictions for the Philippine goods 
to improve Filipino economic conditions.  Based on the previous section which 
discussed the policy of attraction, as well as previous chapters, Taft identified a 
security motive, and it stemmed from the idea that promoting business in the 
islands would ward off calls for independence as well as insurrections (Burns, 
2011).  On a more practical matter, trade was one way to ensure a sufficient 
supply of daily goods.  Given that the Philippines was ripe ground for insurrections 
and law-and-order concerns, economic issues previously caused some of them.  
Hence, officials had a security stake in promoting the economic wellbeing of the 
colony. (e.g. Constantino, 1975). 
 
As mentioned previously in the first two ideas, this security interests behind a 
trading regime were reflected in the policy of attraction.  The policy of attraction, 
which contained provisions for improving the colonial economy through trade was 
a product of security interests.     
 
INTEREST: Electoral and Party Politics 
Given that politicians, especially Congressional lawmakers, controlled the 
decisions on tariffs, one cannot avoid probing whether electoral considerations 
were at stake.  On the one hand, politicians had to appeal to their constituents 
and lobbyists.  Some of those constituents expressed concern with the potential 
entry of goods from outside their homes.  There was a fear of competition both 
from outside the US and intra-US colonial competition (Abelarde, 1947; 
Mearleaux, 2012).  On the other hand, parties would later capitalise on other 
economic circumstances to win votes.  There was a consumer base of voters that 
politicians needed appeal to (Democratic Party, 1912).  Furthermore, there would 
be a change in political parties in charge of the US.  With that, questions about 
policy changes in the colony and broader legislation also changed.  In other words, 
as the upcoming sections show, the electoral and party politics were a major 
interest.       
 
Business and Economic Interests in the US and Economic Ideas 
Related to the interest of electoral politics was the interest of business lobbyists.  
One could find these interests on both sides of the tariff debate.  On the one hand, 
the profitability of some US firms such as the Sugar Trust depended on importing 
goods from outside the colony (Merleaux, 2012).  As such, such firms believed 
that tariff relief would be useful for their operations. 
 
On the other hand, some groups claimed that the importation of goods was 
detrimental to their business and would hence cost jobs.  It was prevalent among 
domestic sugar manufacturers and politicians allied with them.  In this case, there 
was the idea of economic protectionism that opponents subscribed to.  The coming 
sections will highlight more specific examples of those who believed their 
economic position would be undermined, especially when it came to the ability to 
generate jobs.  Given that ideas are understood to be belief or belief systems that 
actors possess, the interest of protecting jobs was informed and given sense by 
the idea of protectionism, more specifically that opening up the US economy to 
foreign (i.e. including those of US colonies) products endangered existing players.  
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The economic downturns made notions of protectionism more salient (Nivola, 
1986; Fordham, 2017). 
 
These would be recurring themes during the congressional hearings and debates.  
Officials and politicians were hence keen on referring to economic interests in their 
positions.  However, how they characterised what benefitted their interests 
depended on whether they subscribed to protectionist or free-market ideas. 
 
Institutions of Laws and Interests Governing the Philippine Status 
One of the things that precipitated the talk of trying to reduce tariffs in the first 
place was a Supreme Court ruling that US possessions outside the mainland were 
not completely part of the US for the trading purposes.  That ruling initially 
constrained the ability of traders based in the Philippines to export their goods as 
they please.  It also constrained the desire of colonial officials.  However, there 
was an option to rectify the issue by changing existing laws (Abelarde, 1947).  It 
was due to this that officials needed to work with Congress to change the law. 
 
The institution here is the Supreme Court’s ability to interpret laws.  The Court 
acted to constrain players’ options when it came to trading.  Given that according 
to the Court the Philippines was not a part of the US for purposes of implementing 
international trading rules, officials and their mainland-based business allies could 
not just export free to the Philippines as much as they wished without appropriate 
legislation.  It meant fewer opportunities for firms to export their goods to profit 
from opportunities.  Thus in light of the Supreme Court’s powers, officials felt 
prompted to resolve the issue of trading barriers through the legislative process if 
they wanted to satisfy their business allies. 
 
Established Procedures from the Treaty of Paris 
As institutions are defined as the rules of the game (North, 1995), institutions that 
influenced a few opinions, particularly on opposition inside the colony, were the 
provisions established by the Treaty of Paris.  In particular, it was the rules that 
governed Spain’s access to incentives in the Philippines.  The treaty protected 
Spain’s right to continue importing goods into the Philippines (Abelarde, 1947).  
As the colony depended on tariffs to keep it as fiscally sound as possible, officials 
there faced an additional consideration.  As such, it formed the basis of why some 
officials felt concerned about the interest of improving the colony’s fiscal position. 
In this regard, institutions associated with the Treaty of Paris, whilst constraining, 
also helped facilitate the drive of colonial officials to find other ways to increase 
revenues for the colonial budget.   
 
INITIAL ECONOMIC SITUATION IN THE PHILIPPINES TO WARRANT 
CONSIDERATION OF TARIFF BILLS 
It took nearly a decade to open up the US to raw materials from the Philippines.  
The aftermath of the Philippine-American war was among the things that 
prompted William Taft to call for Congress to gradually reduce the tariff burden 
on goods entering the US from the colony.    
 
Taft’s superior, President Theodore Roosevelt, was keen after his re-election to 
promote a 1905 tariff bill which would also allow the islands to be open for 
investments.  That was consistent with what Roosevelt said in his first address to 
Congress, which he thought it was in the country’s interest to entice businessmen 
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to enter the Philippines (Roosevelt, 1901).  Roosevelt believed tariff reduction 
would achieve such.  Roosevelt thought that the islands needed capital and that 
one could secure it by amending tariff arrangements or removing other restrictions 
on investments by US-based individuals or entities.  At the same time, it would 
result in profits for his business allies.  One should stress here that Roosevelt 
wanted to move away from “The Philippines for the Filipinos”-based policy.  A 
proposed Payne bill would allow for up to corporations to acquire 10,000 acres of 
land in most parts of the islands, and up to 30,000 acres in Mindoro or Mindanao 
(New York Times, 1905b: 14).   
 
However, the wishes of the Roosevelt administration faced significant opposition 
along the way, even from some members of Roosevelt’s party.  Other interests 
were afraid that liberalising the Philippines may undermine competition with their 
counterparts in the mainland US and its other possessions. 
 
Philippine Sugar Industry 
Sugar was one of the most important commodities the Philippines traded during 
American times.  As at 1902, sugar was grown in large tracts. However, some 
sugar was also grown in small farms found in Negros island.  The “important” 
aspects of the sugar industry, according to Taft, were also carried out by those 
who owned large parcels of hacienda land in Negros (United States Congress.  
House.  Committee on Insular Affairs, 1902: 114, 118). 
 
Moreover, from 1899 to 1902, there was no noticeable increase in sugar 
production across the islands.  The local sugar industry had not experienced 
growth.  It was primarily a result of the great depression of 1897, occasional 
competition by beet sugar in great consumption centres, and years of rebellion 
against Spain and the US (Abelarde, 1947: 48). 
 
INITIAL STATE OF CONGRESSIONAL SUPPORT TO PRINCIPLE OF TARIFF 
REDUCTION 
Before initial Roosevelt and Taft called on Congress to reduce tariffs, 
Congressional support toward the maintenance of the American empire was rather 
limited.  The political imperative to do so was not domestically persistent given 
the limited number of voters, a hostile or indifferent public back in the mainland, 
and no patronage positions to give away.  As a result, the colonial government 
had to rely on its measures to help raise needed revenues to maintain the colony.  
For instance, to lure investments into the Philippines, it permitted US-produced 
mining and agricultural equipment to enter without paying tariffs while 
maintaining tariffs for European equipment.  There was a concern that the reason 
for annexing the Philippines could be significantly undermined if capital was short.  
It would then bolster arguments of Western European colonial powers that the US 
possessed weak government mechanisms to become part of the Great Powers 
club.  Moreover, free trade was also seen by colonial officials to encourage the 
Philippines to remain dependent on the US economy, thus quelling calls for 
outright independence of the islands and further show the “genius of the American 
System”.  In a speech given to the Harvard College Alumni Association, Taft 
thought that with free trade, the islands would be able to “understand the benefit 
that they derive from such association with the US and will prefer to maintain 
some sort of bond so that they may be within the tariff wall and enjoy the markets, 
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rather than separate themselves and become independent and lose the valuable 
business” (in Moore, 2017: 120-2).   
 
Based on these accounts, Taft may have thought that reducing tariffs due to the 
US by Philippine-based sugar producers would, in theory, keep money in the 
islands.  First, profit figures of firms doing business would show something more 
favourable because of money did not go to the US treasury to pay for such tariffs.  
It would mean a higher base from which to collect taxes to fund colonial 
expenditures.  In other words, Taft believed that free trade would be a rouse to 
help the Philippines remain under US influence given what he had viewed as free 
trade’s benefits. As mentioned, colonial officials were almost entirely responsible 
for raising revenues for the islands and received only limited financial aid from the 
mainland government.   
 
In 1904, Taft said that although he was “willing an anxious to give it 
[independence] to them” if he let the islands go on their own at that point, it would 
violate the trust placed in him and the Commission (New York Times, 1904: 6).  
It also means that Taft believed that giving free trade to the Philippines would be 
a way to divert Filipinos’ attention from what he thought were the harmful effects 
of premature independence or even self-governance itself.  As was previously 
established, was an ardent believer that the Philippines was not yet fit to be an 
independent state and continued to harbour that idea.  Thus, to some officials, 
free trade in the form of lower tariffs had an internal political as well as a practical 
dimension.  More importantly, it had an ideational objective to make the Filipinos 
want to stay under the influence of the US.             
 
The economic idea of Taft also came with a hope that Filipinos would be in a 
position to one day purchase US goods (Alfonso, 1968: 243).  Taft further said in 
a 1903 speech that his policy on “the Philippines for the Filipinos” was about the 
“investment of American capital” that would do most for the “elevation and 
civilisation” of Filipinos (Taft, 17/12/1903: 3-4, 7).  By developing Filipino welfare, 
Taft hoped to nurture a market for US goods.  Thus, based on these statements, 
any economic measure proposed for the Philippines had this as the end goal.   
 
Trade and Tariff Debates before 1913 
As alluded to by officials previously, trade was one important way to facilitate the 
development of the Philippine economy.  Congress set tariff legislation that 
governed trade between the Philippine Islands and the US.  In particular, officials 
hoped that goods from the islands would be able to enter the mainland without 
incurring tariffs.   
 
Given for instance that as of 1900 the Philippines enjoyed “unique advantages” in 
producing hemp and “special advantage” in tobacco and “possibly” sugar, the 
Commission had the opinion that they could withstand a so-called licence tax or 
low export duty to favour the treasury (United States.  Philippine Commission, 
1900: 117).  
 
Taft had continuously reiterated his call for a reduction of the tariffs by 75 per 
cent of the prevailing Dingley rates, the standard set of tariff rates set for trade 
between the US and most other countries in the early twentieth century.  Taft 
believed reducing tariffs would serve his interests as governor-general.  For him, 
such a reduction would help the provide the islands with more opportunities for 
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generating internal revenue, and that it would comprise what Senator Culberson 
would consider as a “level rate” between tariffs imposed on goods originating from 
the US and the tariff imposed against Filipino goods.  Furthermore, a 75-per cent 
reduction would enable Philippine-based tobacco manufacturers to place their 
products in US markets and import Connecticut-based wrappers.  When asked 
what a 50-per cent reduction would do, Taft thought it would “probably increase” 
trade but that it would not “create a revolution in the trade” straight away.  He 
was confident a dump of sugar and tobacco that domestic interests (e.g. lobbyists) 
feared would not take place once tariffs on Philippine goods entering the mainland 
decrease.  Taft even told the Committee that a sugar manufacturer based in the 
US who contacted was “willing” to trade at the 50-per cent level and thought that 
it would not affect his business.  Taft further reiterated that as of 1902, the amount 
of sugar produced in the Philippines amounted to no more than 200 thousand 
tonnes, which was less than ten per cent of American consumption of sugar back 
then.  He also described that Philippine sugar did “not seem to be regarded as 
favourable as sugar from other ports” (United States Congress.  House.  
Committee on Insular Affairs, 1902: 111-2; Abelarde, 1947: 45).  The last 
statement had an implication for sugar producers based in the US who feared that 
they were unable to compete with the quality of sugar imported from the islands.  
It was Taft who was reassuring Congress and these interest groups that they had 
nothing much to worry about in terms of quality.  Taft further testified that most 
Philippine-produced raw sugar gets exported to China, India, and Europe to some 
degree (ibid: 112).   To be sure, Taft also used to acknowledge that tariffs imposed 
by the colonial government may be beneficial for as it was a source of revenue for 
the colony.  Ultimately though, Taft thought sided more with the net benefits of 
free trade relations, more particularly that it would bring more opportunities for 
investments in the colony (in Merlaux, 2012: 33).  
 
Based on such circumstances, Congress initially allowed for a reduction in several 
1902 bills which put forward.   
 
In support of Taft throughout this series of tariff reduction bills was his party mate, 
Senator Henry Cabot Lodge.  Lodge said that amendments to the original trade 
bill would provide Filipino producers with a “very substantial benefit”.  Specifically, 
tariffs would fall by approximately 35 per cent of standard rates.  It would allow 
for more money to be made available for public expenditures in the islands (New 
York Times, 1902c: 2).  He and Representative Payne agreed as to the urgent 
need for legislation after the US Supreme Court ruled that the Dingley Law that 
governed tariffs did not apply to Philippine goods entering the US.  They thought 
that introducing legislation would fix these issues as well as issues related to 
applying shipping laws for commerce between the islands and the mainland 
(Abelarde, 1947: 42).   
 
Senator Edward Carmack partly voiced opposition to tariff bills.  In the same way 
that interests played a role in promoting the bill, some interests lobbied against 
its passage.  Such interests stressed the perceived consequences to the supply 
chain back in the mainland.  Although the bill provided tariff reductions, Carmack 
thought the bill was written in such a way to frame the islands as a “deadly menace 
to our own trade” and also argued that the bill would only benefit those looking to 
exploit.  Senator Albert Beveridge, a staunch supporter of acquiring and retaining 
the Philippines, rebuked that notion.  Beveridge thought Carmack deliberately 
wanted to portray an image where the Philippine Commission did not carefully 
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think about the tariff rates.  Beveridge further added that the tariff rates were set 
after “months of consideration and after consulting every interest in the 
Philippines” (New York Times, 1902b: 3).   
 
Among the sugar groups that lobbied for lower tariffs was the Sugar Trust.  Their 
business depended on importing large quantities of raw sugar from outside the 
US (Merleaux, 2012: 35). 
 
Some officials believed outright free trade between the Philippines and the US was 
initially not advisable.  In addition to obvious opposition from domestic sugar 
manufacturing representatives, the Philippines was used to raising most of its 
internal revenue through tariffs.  Then there was also a consideration that trade 
between the US and the Philippines meant that the same privileges ought to be 
extended to trade between Spain and the islands based on the Treaty of Paris’ 
Article IV.  By extending trading privileges to Spain, the islands may experience a 
further decrease in revenues since similar goods from Spain would need to enter 
the Philippines tariff-free.  A uniform tariff between the mainland and islands was 
deemed impractical because of the differences in each party’s economic and social 
conditions trade (Abelarde, 1947: 41-2). 
 
As mentioned previously, there was opposition to the bill based on ideas on what 
some politicians thought was the place the Philippines, i.e. in terms of race.  
Southern Senators were worried about racial issues the opening up of trade would 
spark.  For instance, Senator and sugar planter Murphy Foster of Louisiana was 
worried that importing free sugar from colonies had “precipitated” a conflict 
between the Anglo-Saxon race in the mainland and the “cooly labour of the Orient 
and the cheap labour of the tropics” (in Congressional Record, v44, 1909: 2373).  
Foster and Sen Newlands thought that the sugar tariff and white supremacy as 
“bases of democracy”.  Because of that, both of them were able to convince 
Congress to retain prevailing tariff regimes as provided for in in the Payne-Aldrich 
Act (Merleaux, 2012: 38). 
 
Opposition to the bill received opposition from members of the president’s own 
party.  Some of them advocated a “careful, general reduction” of tariffs while 
others wanted reciprocity and adjustment but not the abandonment of the 
prevailing protective system.  If the party failed on its mandate to do these, the 
latter group warned that the opposition would seize on this potential failure (Blum, 
1951: 1334-1335).  For instance, Senator Patterson of Colorado thought that 
sugar-related industries in the likes of   Colorado, Louisiana, and Michigan would 
be “wiped out on account of the immense area of the Philippine territory that may 
be used for the cultivation of sugar” (in Moore, 2017: 123).  Thus, the existing 
opposition to the colonial government’s tariff proposals was somewhat bipartisan.  
Initial attempts to get a tariff bill through to the US Senate died when the 57th 
session expired (ibid: 123).  Also worth noting was that free trade was granted to 
Puerto Rico and mainland-based agricultural lobbyists became more determined 
not to grant the Philippines with the same privileges (ibid: 124).  That account 
suggested that there was a first-hand account of what the negative consequences 
of free trade.   
 
Another attempt at a tariff bill was introduced in Congress in late 1902.  The 
backdrop of this is further economic problems the islands had faced to the point 
that reducing tariffs was necessary.  The islands were also reeling from nearly six 
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years of warfare, which threatened local industries.  The colony also experienced 
losses of up to ninety per cent of its carabaos and seventy-five per cent of its rice 
crops and locusts.  Based on opinions of the House Ways and Means Chairman 
and the Philippine Commission, a reduction of tariffs to 25 per cent of the so-called 
Dingley rates would not affect the US commodity market.  The proposal would 
additionally increase the amount of sugar and tobacco imported into the islands, 
which would also mean increased revenues for the insular treasury (Abelarde, 
1947: 52-3).  Even President Roosevelt pushed for further reductions not just as 
“wise governmental policy” but also as a “measure of humanity”.  The president 
also reiterated the US’ mandate to help the islands become more prosperous than 
in the past (ibid: 57).  In 1903, a second amendment to the law called for just a 
fifty, instead of a seventy-five, per cent reduction off the Dingley law for sugar 
and tobacco imports into the mainland, but the free entry for other products.  
Lodge indicated that this was a compromise he would take in exchange for not 
losing the bill altogether.  Lodge was also aware of the significance of the sugar 
industry to his home state, but he continued to push for passage of the tariff act 
anyway.  He reasoned out that amidst the help he was giving farms, he thought 
that “the greatest charity, the largest humanity, that we can show them is to open 
the channels for reviving business” (in ibid: 58-9).   
 
When it came to further initiatives to lower tariffs, Senators were facing pressure 
from corporate interests.  Corporate influences on Senators in 1905 made 
prospects for tariff bill passage less promising (Alfonso, 1970: 136). 
 
Representative Sereno Payne noticed a deficit in cotton imports from the mainland 
and the islands.  For instance, imports from the Philippines reached a value of 
more than $6.3 million at the end of the fiscal year 1905.  However, imports from 
the US was under $765 thousand at the end of the same period.  To correct the 
issues associated with this deficit, Payne introduced another tariff bill.  Mr Payne 
revealed that US cotton manufacturers were excluded from Philippine trade which 
was primarily caused by European manufacturers using a special loom of twice 
the width of desired textiles.  It was deemed as more economical than what was 
prevailing in the US, but a “complete loss of the present capital invested in textile 
machinery” prevented complete adoption among US manufacturers (ibid: 64-6).  
 
Later in 1905, a minority report from the House of Representatives emerged.  In 
it, the minority took issue with how the Philippines was seen as part of US soil for 
certain purposes but not for others.  It wanted an unambiguous and consistent 
status for the Philippines for all the purposes.   Furthermore, it also “welcome[d] 
the dissatisfaction of the hitherto legislatively-favoured classes, growing out of the 
competition of the products of Philippine labour with our products.” President 
Roosevelt’s Congressional allies were, unfortunately, unable to derail the bill by 
getting opposition Democrats on their side to shut down debates (Washington 
Post, 1905: 4).   
 
It was also partly motivated by a desire by Americans to defeat British and foreign 
exporters in Manila from getting their hands on what they see is a valuable Filipino 
commodity called hemp (Storey and Lichauco, 1926: 218).  Officials requested 
further reductions in later years, and there were hearings to settle such 
matters.  Proposals to reduce rates faced opposition from members of Congress 
who represented tobacco- and sugar-growing states such as Michigan then (cf. 
Ofreneo, 1980).  Reyes (1923) argues that members of Congress felt that despite 
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potential competition producers in their home states would face (which some have 
argued is minimal given the relatively small appetite among American consumers 
for Philippine-based commodities), it was morally imperative to rebuild the 
Philippine economy.  American politicians were also concerned about propping up 
the Philippine sugar industry due to their perception that the Philippine growers 
were propped up by what they perceived as slavery (Elliott, 1968: 356).  
 
A report by the United States Department of Commerce and Labor (1907: 9) 
showed that in 1905, the Philippines exported a total of over $33.4 million worth 
of goods, slightly larger than an import of just over $30 million.  This export value 
was much larger than what the Philippines experienced in the previous fiscal 
year.  Hemp and sugar led Philippine exports at almost $21.76 million and $5.1 
million respectively.  Hemp has experienced the most rapid growth in of all 
commodities exported.  Before the 1900s, when the US had not yet colonised the 
Philippines, the export of hemp never exceeded $10 million whereas, in 1900, it 
exceeded $13 million.  However, sugar exports were on a decline as it exported 
as much as almost $14 million in 1873 (ibid). 
 
In 1905, Taft once again reiterated his call for Congress to reduce the tariff to 
nothing on all goods produced in the Philippine islands except for sugar and 
tobacco, which he wished would stay pegged at 25 per cent (New York Times, 
1905a: 6).  Philippine Governor-General Wright made similar calls in an earlier 
Philippine Commission report.  Specifically, Wright said that Congress should pass 
legislation that gives the Philippine Commission authority to set tariff rates 
independently (in United States.  Philippine Commission, 1905: 31).  Based on 
that, there were strong sentiments within the islands to clamour to the US to 
support reducing tariffs since colonial officials were responsible for developing the 
islands.        
 
Concern for reduction of tariffs started brewing early on just before the 1905 tariff 
hearings began.  For instance, the New England Tobacco Growers’ Association 
wanted their Senator, John Spooner to “bear in mind the interests of the tobacco 
growers of New England and of other leaf producing districts in the United States” 
(Hallady, 30/12/1904: 1).  The Michigan Sugar Manufacturers’ Association also 
said in its resolution that 
any aid or assistance given to the Philippine Islands by the United States 
Government or through congressional legislation should provide that the 
burden imposed thereby should be borne equally by all the industries of this 
country, and that it is not just or honest to compel any one or two industries 
to bear the whole burden of the civilisation, education, enlightenment and 
development of the Philippine Archipelago, for the purpose of fitting its 
inhabitants for self-government. (Hathaway, 31/12/1904: 3). 
 
Other associations, such as the Merchants’ Association of New York, adopted 
resolutions that favoured the removal of duties of Philippine products entering the 
US (Mead, 6/1/1905: 1).  Although there was no outright opposition from 
everybody, there was a concern about ensuring that the burden to help the islands 
was shared commensurately.   
 
During the Congressional inquiry into Philippine Tariffs in 1905, Mr F R Hathaway, 
a beets sugar producer opposed to tariff bills granting more concessions to 
Philippine products entering the mainland, testified before the House of 
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Representatives.  Hathaway said as of 1905, the sugar industry in the Philippines 
entailed a system of “semiservile labour”, that nominal wages paid back then 
stayed fixed at 15 cents per day (worth approximately US$4 in 2018 money), and 
that the produce in the islands would yield only about a quarter of what would 
otherwise be produced using the US or European methods already in place in 
Cuba, Hawaii, or Java.  Additionally, the cost to raise and deliver that sugar at 
tidewater in the Philippines was approximately three-quarters of a cent but with 
high interest rates.  Furthermore, Hathaway indicated that given that the 
Philippines was not an “integral territory” of the US, that it should not be treated 
as such for taxation purposes.  Doing so would have implications for whether 
tariffs should be implemented (United States Congress. House. Committee On 
Ways and Means.: 41).   
 
When Congressman McLeary of Minnesota asked Hathaway about the impact of 
the bill to lower tariffs on Philippine goods to the US would be, he indicated that 
it was going to be the “most serious blow you could give us” because of the 
“ultimate possibilities over there” if one could find ways out of this Brussels 
convention proposition.  He also mentioned that due to low wages, a vast 
opportunity of improvements in agriculture and milling lay ahead (ibid: 52). 
 
Mr F M Hatch, counsel for the Hawaii Sugar Planters’ Association who was also 
against the tariff bill, also told the House that the amidst the benefits the bill has 
for the Philippines, would “very seriously impair our industry” and said to the 
inquiry that “Hawaii is a part of this country, in a sense in which the Philippine 
Islands never can be.” (ibid: 55). 
 
In a testimony to the House, Major Aaron Gove, coming out against the tariff bill, 
said that the Philippines would be “the greatest menace there was ever held over 
us” but that it was possible to develop them without contract labour.  He indicated 
based on a report by the Department of Agriculture that 8 million acres of land 
comprised sugar lands (ibid: 70). 
 
Opposition to the 1905 iteration of the tariff bill was also felt in among members 
of the American Beet Sugar Association.  Its secretary, Truman Palmer, explained 
the difference in labour costs as a detrimental factor.  He maintained that a Filipino 
labourer received approximately 30 US cents per day, while his/her US 
counterpart was paid anywhere between $1.50 and $2.50 per day for the same 
kind of work.  Instead, Truman thought Filipinos would be wiser to “devote more 
time” to producing hemp, coffee, or rubber as he thought that it would benefit 
them more to do so over the long run (House of Representatives, 1905, in 
Abelardo, 1970: 79).  Palmer here seemed to point out that the low prices of 
Filipino beat sugar products were attractive to buyers in the mainland.  Mr A Bijur, 
a member of the National Cigar Leaf Tobacco Association, made a similar 
argument regarding tobacco.  According to Mr A Bijur, a large difference existed 
in tobacco and cigar labour costs between the mainland and the Philippines.  
Specifically, such labour cost $1.50 per day in the mainland, while only 25 US 
cents per day in the Philippines (ibid: 81).   
 
Those who made a case for the islands, such as Clarence Edwards of the Bureau 
of Insular Affairs, thought that between 1895 and 1904, sugar imports from the 
islands had not “materially increased” and that domestic consumption still far 




Taft reassured representative of the beet sugar industry Charles Warren that his 
first allegiance was to the US and that he would not push for tariff bills that would 
ultimately injure US sugar and tobacco industries.  However, Taft was adamant 
that the reduction of tariffs on the said products was not going to do that based 
on the conditions of the US-based industries back then.  Nonetheless, on 18 
January 1908, Taft was willing to compromise by limiting the quantity of such 
products and pushing for a limited tariff reduction than originally sought (in 
Alfonso, 1970: 140).  Taft appeared mindful of the worries of domestic industries.  
The fact Taft was willing to compromise with the quantity of controversial goods 
that could be permitted to enter the US without duty was an indication of political 
pressure his original efforts faced.   
 
Resistance to free trade was also ripe among Filipinos.  Manuel Quezon, a resident 
Philippine commissioner, publicly thought that granting free trade privileges would 
encourage US interests to seek protection from the US, something that would 
make prospects for independence “less likely” (Ninkovich, 2001: 65). 
 
1912 Election Campaign and Push for 1913 Underwood Bill 
As hopeless as the prospect to reduce the remaining tariffs remained, an electoral 
interest in reforming tariffs sprouted again in the 1910s.  From 1912-1913, the 
country just experienced a presidential campaign in which the Progressive Party, 
a party in which then-former President Roosevelt stood as a Presidential candidate 
in 1912, influenced the ensuing policy.  One of the manifesto items put forward 
included the rising costs of living as a result of tariffs (Progressive Party, 1912).  
The official opposition Democratic Party also campaigned on a manifesto to reduce 
tariffs as a way of addressing the rising cost of living back home.  In particular, 
they pointed to tariffs as the “principal cause of the unequal distribution of wealth” 
(Democratic Party, 1912).    It was notably different from what Democrats in 
Congress previously believed.  Despite Taft being one of those who campaigned 
to liberalise tariffs for US-bound Filipino goods permanently, his party had lost 
that election, especially as Democrats accused him of policies that were vetoed.  
With a change in the president’s party and electoral promises, there was a change 
in the policies that administrators pursued.    
 
In 1913, as part of a broader bill to reform tariffs and taxes across the US, 
Congress proposed a law to allow for more unlimited raw materials from the 
Philippines to be exported to the US (the provision did not apply to manufactured 
goods with over 20% worth of raw materials).  Reyes (1923) argued that US 
lawmakers thought this would be sensible for business interests in the mainland 
to allow Philippine goods with fewer restrictions.  Tariffs were ultimately abolished 
in 1913 with limited opposition (ibid: 114-115).     
 
In the ensuing debates leading to the bill’s passage, opposition to tariff reduction 
came from the tobacco industry lobbyists.  For instance, in a letter to 
Congressman Frank Willis, the Cigar Makers’ International Union cited that more 
than 11,000 workers worked in the tobacco industry and that they feared 
European and American tobacco trusts would relocate factories in the Philippines.  
Underwood rebutted that the tobacco industry in the Philippines was “no new 
industry” (50 Cong. Rec. 1328-1329, 1913).  Although lobbyists did not explicitly 
say it, there was a worry for the over 11,000 jobs that may be lost.  When asked 
by colleagues for why seek a higher quota limit when the islands did not even use 
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up their allotment completely, Underwood replied that he did not want the US to 
be the power that forced the other to open their goods to the former’s products 
but to form a market for the latter’s products while keeping it closed to such (ibid).   
 
The Underwood Bill was broad-based law, not just something particular to the 
Philippines.  As a consequence, given that it took nearly a decade to remove tariffs, 
the Philippines appeared to be a derivative beneficiary of such moves.  The 
removal of tariffs on the key goods of sugar and tobacco was due to the broader 
appetite of politicians (especially Democrats and Progressive Party candidates) to 
satisfy the electorate by at least claiming to want to bring down the cost of living.  
The bill’s passage was, hence, a move to fulfil a campaign promise. 
 
The successful passage of tariff laws by a new Democratic Congress and its 
support by a new Democratic President reflect how ideas help agents make sense 
of their interests.  The interest here Democrats’ desire to win an election and show 
its voters that it was fulfilling campaign promises.  The idea involved was 
proposing tariff reductions between the US and Philippines to alleviate the 
economic troubles in the 1910s.  Hence, tariff reduction provided a way for 
Democratic politicians to realise their interests of winning an election and keeping 
their promise afterwards.     
  
CONCLUSION: TARIFF STRUGGLE AND THE INTERACTION OF 3Is 
One of the important lessons this chapter wishes to convey is that the factors to 
promote and oppose trade liberalisation are connected.  Although there were 
multiple interests involved in it, ideas became helpful in informing the interests of 
the key players.  Those who proposed tariff reduction felt that the idea of free 
enterprise would best serve their interests.  For example, Taft strongly promoted 
the idea of introducing enterprise into the colony, and it was compatible with his 
business interests, which he persistently sought to operate in the Philippines.  
Meanwhile, those who opposed it felt their interests might be undermined 
subscribed to more protectionist ideas.   
 
Another way in which tariff reform proposals highlighted the relationships between 
ideas and interests is Taft’s interests in discouraging Filipinos from seeking 
independence and maintaining order to allow businesses to conduct their affairs.  
It was a paradox since being self-sufficient with enterprise skills was something 
associated with steps towards being independent.  Nonetheless, Taft hoped that 
such ideas would make the Filipinos want to stay part of the US to the extent that 
they did.   
 
The third way that ideas and interests interacted was in electoral politics.  The 
Democrats needed to win an election, and they felt winning and fulfilling campaign 
promises meant providing economic relief to voters suffering an economic crisis.  
This included tariff relief. 
 
There were also interactions between institutions and the commonly-cited ideas 
and interests behind the tariff battle, even though the interactions are indirect.  
However, to identify the institutions, one will need to consider the laws and rules 
involved as North (1995) describes institutions to be the “rules of the game”.  For 
instance, one such rule deals with the legal system whereby the Supreme Court 
ruled the Philippines was not a part of the US for international trading purposes.  
These rules acted as a limit for how officials and their business allies could pursue 
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their agenda.  Similarly, there were legal treaties that governed existing tariff 
arrangements.  Such treaties acted to constrain colonial administrators against 
pursuing tariff reduction, as the treaties had provisions for reciprocal 
arrangements, which meant fewer sources of revenue.  There were also 
institutions such as the separation of power.  They acted as venues for politicians 
to get their points across.  One could observe this in the Congressional hearings 
whereby members of Congress would invite allies in the private sector to support 
their statements.   
    
In this backdrop, the economy would develop much more than in 1902 as far as 
officials were concerned.  Despite the hopes that it would discourage moves 
towards independence, there was slow but steady evidence that material 
conditions were headed towards a level that officials could not even consider the 
thought of keeping the Philippines with the same grip as they have for nearly 15 












CHAPTER X: 3Is AND THE ROAD TO THE 1916 
PHILIPPINE AUTONOMY BILL 
 
INTRODUCTION 
This chapter discusses the background that informed the process of passing the 
1916 Philippine Autonomy Act (the “Jones Law”)23 and some of its key features.  
This law was known for codifying the commitment of the US to grant the 
Philippines independence at some point in the future.  The Jones Law was a 
product of the Wilson administration’s thinking about what ought to happen in the 
Islands.  Under, Wilson’s presidency, moves to prepare the Philippines for eventual 
independence were underway.  He set an ultimate goal of promoting freedom and 
self-government “for every people” even as he supported whatever system he 
thought would provide benefits to inhabitants of the Philippines at the time.  
However, he was not going to promote outright independence as quickly as some 
members of his party would.  Nonetheless, he promised that “every step will be 
taken with a view to the ultimate independence of the Islands” (in Clements, 1992: 
107).   
As will be explained later, this law would amend key provisions of the 1902 
Philippine Organic Act, the prevailing law that had made provisions for governing 
the Philippines, particularly granting more opportunities for Filipinos to get 
represented in the colonial government.  It was effectively tantamount to 
providing the Philippines with a new constitution that would ultimately last for 
nearly two decades; the period of which is already beyond the focus on this thesis.  
However, the language of the law suggested wiggle room for politicians to invoke 
it to further delay it and not set an absolute fixed date.  Passage of such a bill 
from its earlier iteration took years and faced opposition.  The question this 
chapter is interested in is how Hall’s three Is (interests, ideas, and institutions) 
can be used to explain the evolution of the Jones Law, and in particular, the Wilson 
administration’s role in shaping what it looked like.  This chapter will also use such 
ideas, institutions, and interests to trace opposition to such motives with a view 
that the bill was not going to have a smooth ride.  This chapter tries to look at the 
interplay within these elements.  As it does so, it will outline key elements of the 
bill that could conceivably be a consequence of such ideas, interests, and 
institutions.   
In order to proceed, this chapter will begin by considering the ideas involved.  
Among the ideas discussed would be the recurring notion that Filipinos could still 
not be trusted to manage their affairs and were uncivilised.  It would be discussed 
with a view that significant opposition to outright independence existed on the one 
hand, and some officials acknowledged improvements in the Philippines, on the 
other hand.  A related idea discussed is whether officials considered Filipinos as 
“civilised” enough.  It would be viewed by discussing the extent of how material 
conditions have improved in the islands.  Furthermore, on the notion of ideas, the 
 
23 The Philippine Autonomy Act of 1916 was informally referred to as the Jones Bill or later 
the Jones Law.  The Jones here refers to the author of the bill, Representative William 
Jones, an fellow party-mate of then-President Wilson.   
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chapter will look at how officials saw the Philippine mission vis-à-vis upholding the 
ideals set forth by McKinley and American values in general.  It will look at how 
politicians used race as a basis for including some provisions in the bill, including 
provisions on citizenship. 
When it comes to interests, the section will discuss the threat of Japan and how 
both proponents and opponents of the Jones bill used it to promote their 
arguments.  The chapter will include how some Filipinos felt the need to justify 
their side by using the Japanese situation.  The chapter also discusses how the 
prospect of the First World War reopened considerations for the certain economic 
provisions to be in the bill.  Third, the section discusses the electoral 
considerations that warrant consideration.  The section then turns finally to other 
economic interests that have informed the debate.   
The section of institutions will primarily discuss whether the political institutions 
introduced by the Wilson administration’s Republican predecessors still served 
their original purpose.  As will be seen in that section, there were questions 
officials had about whether the existing structures perpetuated the behaviour they 
sought to avoid.     
IDEAS  
Democratic Party’s Anti-Imperialist Manifesto 
Momentum for the Jones Law coincided with a change in party control in 
Washington.  Wilson was the first Democratic President since the US acquired the 
Philippines.  It also marked the first time the Democratic Party had controlled both 
the executive and legislative branches of the Federal government at the same 
time since the US acquired the Philippines.  Changes to certain policy areas 
accompanied this change in who the party-in-charge of different branches of 
government were.  Although Wilson himself held ambivalent positions over the 
years about the Philippines, he was nonetheless representing a party that had 
been against colonisation.  Just as with the 1908 manifesto, the party’s 1912 
manifesto specifically stated it was “against a policy of imperialism and colonial 
exploitation in the Philippines or elsewhere”.  Moreover, the party favoured “an 
immediate declaration of the nation’s purpose to recognise the independence of 
the Philippine Islands as soon as a stable government can be established” 
(Democratic Party, 1912).   
Prominent pro-independence Filipinos shared such a perception of the new 
administration.  For instance, in a letter to incoming Secretary of State and former 
Democratic Party Standard Bearer William Jennings Bryan dated 15 November 
1912, Emilio Aguinaldo regarded Wilson’s Democratic Party as the “standard 
bearer of justice, equality, and liberty” as he hoped for the move for independence 
to enjoy widespread support among that party (in Link, 1978a: 10).  Bryan replied 
on 2 January 1913 by assuring Aguinaldo that his party preferred “democratic 
methods” of governing (ibid).   
To be clear, not all of this was a product of moral or altruistic considerations.  
Some members of Wilson’s parties had other considerations for why the 
Philippines must be given its independence or even not be part of the US in the 
first place.  Some of this was even rooted in the party’s 1900 manifesto whereby 
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it condemned the war the Republican-led administration waged in their then-
newly-acquired territory.  It also stated that “Filipinos cannot be citizens without 
endangering our civilisation; they cannot be subjects without imperilling our form 
of government; and as we are not willing to surrender our civilisation nor to 
convert the Republic into an empire” (Democratic Party, 1900).  That provoked 
the image among some in Democratic Party circles that Filipinos were undesirable 
as citizens.  Brands (1992: vi) also argues that the Democrats were opposed to 
colonisation mainly because it “contradicted American ideals and prevented the 
natural development of Filipino society”.  Nonetheless, it was a sign that some 
members of Wilson’s party were not looking forward to considering Filipinos to 
have the same rights as Americans. 
Filipinos still cannot be trusted to run their affairs? 
One of the most commonly cited reasons that the Filipinos became subject to US 
rule in the first place was the notion that they still could not be trusted to govern 
themselves.  As at the 1910s, this view was held consistently by the likes of Taft, 
the first Governor-General and later War Secretary and US President.  It was also 
a publicly-held view, as demonstrated by the editorial board of certain newspapers 
that politicians read. 
Just like other officials and politicians, Wilson previously had a notion of Filipinos 
before becoming president.  The fact that he previously used language such as 
“order and self-control” implied that before he assumed the presidency, he 
subscribed to the idea that Filipinos lacked these characteristics.  It had driven his 
policy prescriptions (in his capacity as an academic) toward the Philippines.  This 
idea of instilling such order and self-control also explains Wilson not initially fixated 
on forming a democratic government in the islands despite him invoking the US 
being a “democratic country”.  Despite the language used in the US Constitution, 
the idea of their “civilising mission” continued to prevail as seen by the drive of 
some US officials who wanted to hold off giving the Islands more devolved powers.  
They were left with the idea that Filipino officials had a greater tendency to preside 
over corrupt governments.  Officials were still under the impression that a 
government under Filipino hands tantamounted to chaos, and such a prospect 
scared those who profited from the occupation.  This impression is consistent with 
former War Secretary Elihu Root’s characterisation of Filipinos in which the 
absence of “self-restraint” and “self-control” with corruption and personality-
based politics.  Under Root’s standards of what passes for a desirable government, 
popular self-government implied and assumed “organised self-control” (Go, 2008: 
43).  Hence one of the things running through the minds of the politicians in 
deciding the fate and future make-up of the Islands was their idea of Filipinos 
acting more like the West.  If they were to codify more self-governance, it implied 
that they reached a point that they became convinced Filipinos were capable of 
behaving in the manner officials desired.  Notwithstanding the presence of 
corruption back at home, officials associated the so-called corruption and other 
acts of political malpractice they saw in Filipinos as a disqualifying for prospects 
of self-governance.   
Henry Jones Ford was sent by President Wilson to the Philippines to assess the 
condition of the Islands vis-à-vis self-governance.  As of 28 August 1913, Ford 
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wrote that based on his findings, Americans who lived in the Islands remained 
convinced of the Filipinos’ incapacity of being able to govern themselves.  Some 
reasons for such was that they did not have a single common language and that 
there was prevailing rivalry among different tribes.  They also expressed concern 
over the prevalence of what they thought of as caciquism.  Ford downplayed the 
problem of caciquism, saying that these are common in most other predominant 
agricultural societies.  He believed that caciquism was “not incompatible with 
constitutional government” and that it did not serve as a hindrance towards 
democratic forms of governance.  In terms of economics and commerce, Ford 
observed a strong sense of commercial spirit in the Philippines’ inhabitants, which 
he then thought would bolster public order in the Islands (Link, 1978b: 243-244).  
Ford downplayed what others thought of as the peculiarities of the Philippine 
system of caciquism by saying that it was normal elsewhere to have relationships 
based on such a system emerge.     
As such, those who advocated against devolving more power to Filipinos were 
afraid that the progress made with Americans who had sincere intentions in the 
islands could be gone.  Opposition Congressmen like Clarence Miller and Charles 
Elliott believed that in devolving more power to Filipinos meant that “inefficient 
and even dishonest native politicians” would take over (Kramer, 2006: 358-9).  
That was just one account that shows sentiments of distrust among some US 
politicians that Filipino politicians running their affairs would undermine the US’ 
stake in the islands still loomed as measures to devolve power from the former to 
the latter were ongoing.   
The experience during the Spanish colonial era of Filipinos occupying positions of 
power and facilitating the hardship of their people have added credibility to this 
impression some politicians had.  In retrospect, observers have argued that not 
much has changed in terms of the inner workings of how Filipinos have practised 
political power (e.g. Karnow, 1989: 228).  The political peculiarities that officials 
observed from Filipinos since the occupation began remained for much of their 
rule.  The fact that thresholds for literacy were part of the independence 
conversation implied that US officials thought that a lack of education was one of 
the things that caused Filipinos to behave in a way that US officials thought was 
undesirable and undermining of US interests.  In the first place, politicians were 
adamant about sticking to the so-called civilising mission and that abandoning it 
would be seen as a major failure.       
In relation to the drive by the new administration to promote further home rule, 
former colonial officials belonging to the opposition party such as Taft had 
criticisms for Woodrow Wilson’s appointments to the Philippines.  Taft called the 
“wholesale removal of important, able, and experienced” US officials in the colony 
by then Governor-General Harrison “so distressing”.  Taft also thought that the 
eventual passage of the Jones bill would ‘make the work of deterioration 
complete’.  He was adamant that Filipinos were not yet ready for self-government 
of the level sought by his Democratic counterparts and that it would take “two 
generations” (New York Times, 1915: 4). 
Even as Taft publicly approached the issue of Filipino self-governance cautiously, 
Garrison cited before the Senate what Taft said about the aims of Americans in 
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the Islands.  Specifically, that Americans “endeavour to secure for Filipinos 
economic independence and to fit them for complete self-government, with the 
power to decide eventually, according to their own largest good, whether such 
self-government shall be accompanied by independence” (In United States 
Congress. Senate.  Committee on the Philippines, 1915: 639).  In any case, Taft 
testified in the Senate that he was against self-governance per se, but the problem 
he thought was that Filipinos were not in a position to determine what was 
appropriate for them.  He also admitted that notions of superiority factored into 
his thought process (ibid: 388).  Taft further warned that further moves for self-
governance back then was that it would unleash bloody forms of politics early on.  
Taft cited the situation in Mexico where the losing politician “gives his head for a 
forfeit” and that the same was bound to take place in the Islands especially with 
what he knew about Aguinaldo.  Taft feared that feuds among political groups 
would break out in the Islands (ibid: 372-3). 
Some rationalised the perception of Filipinos not being ready with why McKinley 
came to conquer the Philippines in the first place.  The New York Times (1916a: 
10) editorial board was also wary of granting the Filipinos more powers.  It felt 
that based on its reports, the locals were not yet ready to govern themselves “in 
four years or in six” and perhaps needed “another half century” of development.  
The Times wrote further that Congress would be “advertising to stronger nations” 
that the islands would be “ready for occupancy” by some other power “within a 
specified period”.  One should also keep this in light of President McKinley’s original 
options for the islands, one of which was to turn the Philippines over to a dominant 
European power back then, but that McKinley declined it to not revive the 
advantages such European powers once had. 
Among the outstanding contentious issues was that of the Moro rebels in the 
Southern Philippines.  Republican Senators struggled to extract from Garrison 
what his plan was for this group which insular officials found troublesome so that 
they could be represented and receive the same treatment as the Christian-based 
population.  For instance, when asked by Senator Crawford if there should be a 
clause to leave out Moros from provisions of self-government reserved for the rest 
of the population, Garrison said that it was done in the past, but that the outcome 
was deemed “embarrassing” that he did not want Congress to make the same 
mistake (In United States Congress. Senate.  Committee on the Philippines, 1915: 
650-655).   
The question on the idea of whether Filipinos could govern themselves was 
manifested in the issue of expanding the voting franchise.  In addition to logistical 
concerns brought up by officials, a more important reason to not expand it further 
was the notion that they were afraid Filipinos would not be smart enough to choose 
the appropriate leaders.  The Chairman of the Committee also stated that one of 
the bill’s aims or intentions should be to broaden the educational qualifications to 
join the voting franchise.  Based on actual figures from the 1912 Assembly 
elections, 81,916 voters qualified through education alone while less than 61 
thousand qualified through property alone (ibid: 185-187).  Dean Worcester, a 
Philippine Commissioner, testified that out of the approximately 250,000 voters, 
many of them did “not exercise much intelligence” in voting.  He was answering 
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this in the context that elections would no longer occur should the Philippines be 
set free.  The Senate Committee on the Philippines asked General McIntyre about 
language requirements of voting.  McIntyre replied that the requirement to 
communicate in English and Spanish were retained because eligible male voters 
did not “have the advantages of our schools”, acknowledging that they were not 
yet fully-educated in US institutions enough to know the English language (ibid: 
61-3).  Senators also asked the Secretary to the Philippines, Sam Ferguson, about 
the voting franchise in the context of whether the people in the islands were 
governed only by the approximately 250 thousand people who exercised their 
right to vote in the 1912 Assembly elections.  Ferguson replied that it would be a 
“government by the leaders to a greater extent than we have in the United 
States”, or “the educated class”.  Ferguson, when further asked about by Senator 
Lippitt (who wanted the franchise expanded) who would exercise power if 
governance was to be turned over to the Philippines, replied that the Filipino 
Legislature would “extend the provision of this bill to those who could read or write 
in a dialect”.  The Chairman of the Committee also stated that one of the bill’s 
aims or intentions should be to broaden the educational qualifications to join the 
voting franchise (ibid: 309).  It was then a feature of the final version of the Jones 
Law. 
However, there were signs of progress in terms of the ability of Filipinos to manage 
their affairs.  In a further cable relayed by Secretary Garrison to Tumulty, Wilson’s 
private secretary (dated 19 October 1915), then Governor-General Harrison was 
convinced that Filipinos have proven that they manifested self-control and 
patience in promises the US administration had given them (in Link, 1978c: 86).  
Furthermore, in a letter to Manuel Quezon dated 12 March 1915, Wilson expressed 
his admiration “for the self-respecting behaviour of the people of the Philippines” 
(Wilson, 12/3/1915).  In this light, there was a prevailing view that as far as 
Wilson’s appointees were concerned, Filipinos were ready.  Such was a contrast 
to the previous administration’s views.   
To be sure, Harrison’s moves of Filipinisation did not initially produce the results 
that officials had hoped for.  For one, Filipiniastion oversaw the hiring of Filipinos 
who had abilities that were deemed as corrupt, inefficient, incompetent, and 
dishonest.  Harrison was unable to sufficiently control the problems Filipino 
officials caused (Onorato, 1967: 99-103).  On this count, Filipinos have not 
sufficiently proven wrong and have, based on this account, added credence to the 
basis of the ideas of sceptical Americans who wanted to withhold more self-
governance to the Philippines.  Such actions have helped convinced opponents of 
independence that their material interests faced a greater threat if the Filipinos 
headed more government agencies.        
Furthermore, according to Harrison, in a letter to Tumulty “Filipinisation” 
ultimately made government more efficient as he felt convinced he was able to 
better secure the ability of the local people and officials to cooperate and 
administer such laws promulgated there (Harrison to Tumulty, 31/8/1915: 
37855).   
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Mostly Improved Material conditions: “Civilised Standards?” 
Another one of the reasons that US officials have cited for why they took on the 
Philippines, to begin with, was that they thought it was not civilised enough to 
their standards.  It meant that material conditions in the islands were not of a 
“civilised” standard when they first took possession of the islands.  As far as these 
officials were concerned, being civilised also included the notion that it was not 
ready for business and not educated enough.      
However, in the 1910s, officials have often cited that material conditions in the 
islands have improved to warrant consideration for further devolution in the 
Philippines.  The fact that lawmakers sponsored devolution-related bills in 1914 
may indicate the progress that Filipinos have exhibited.  It then prompted 
questions such as how that progress looked like and if the Philippines’ existing 
constitution (Organic Act) was going to inhibit the ultimate plans that US officials 
had for the islands.  This rest of this subsection compares conditions in 1902, the 
time when the first organic act was adopted and 1914, which was the year in 
which measures to provide governance was put forward in Congress.     
In 1913, the total value of taxable business activity in the islands amounted to 
₱671,685,704.  By comparison, this just amounted to just over ₱380 million in 
1909 (Philippines.  Governor, 1914: 8).  There are no comparable statistics 
available in 1902.  Nonetheless, the Philippine Commission report has pointed to 
a steady increase in such activity over the years.   
When it came to customs (tariff) collections, the primary source of income for the 
islands, collections totalled total of $8,246,025 (approximately ₱16.4 million) was 
collected as of 1913.  That, however, marked a slight decrease from 
$8,525,216.48 (approximately ₱17 million) collected in 1902.  It is important to 
note that within this period, tariff bills were passed in the US to allow free entry 
of goods from the US to the Philippines.  In the fiscal year ending 1913, the 
colonial government collected a combined subtotal of more than ₱25 million from 
internal revenues, customs duties, taxes and fees from the City of Manila, and 
miscellaneous fees alone; this was higher compared to the end of the 1902 fiscal 
year - $10,516,751.44 (approximately ₱21 million) (United States.  War 
Department: 762, 831; Philippines.  Governor, 1914: 222, 231).  
Exports from the islands reached $53,683,326 (approximately ₱107 million) in 
1913.  By comparison, the value of exports was $20,509,404 (approximately ₱41 
million) in 1902.  Specifically, the total trade between the US and Philippines was 
valued at ₱91,235,034 in 1913 compared to approximately ₱18 million in 1902.  
Exports from the Philippines to the US were valued at just over ₱10 million in 
1902, but it rose to almost ₱40 million in 1913 (United States.  War Department: 
849-850 Philippines.  Governor, 1914: 8, 228-230). 
As for education, an average of almost 288,000 pupils had attended school as of 
1913.  Notwithstanding the decrease from the previous year, this was still up from 
when the US took over the colony.  Administrators have reported ‘steady and 
encouraging’ educational progress other than the fact that a slight decrease in 
pupil enrolment was reported.  For instance, 1,032 standard school sites were 
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built, of which 592 were classified as “permanent” (Philippines.  Governor, 1914: 
24-5, 243).   
So that officials in Washington can get a first-hand view of conditions on the 
ground, President Wilson sent Henry Jones Ford (1914) was sent by President 
Wilson to the Philippines to assess its conditions.  However, amidst these 
improvements, Ford still found some issues when it came to education.  In 
particular, he identified difficulties when it came to improving the literacy level of 
most inhabitants from their local dialects into more national vernaculars of English 
or Spanish.  Ford nonetheless thought that it was an unnecessary burden that the 
islands’ inhabitants learn English in order to be deemed literate.  As such, he 
recommended that the voting franchise be extended to men literate in any local 
dialect.   
Avid imperialists such as Taft even conceded such material improvements.  In 
front of the US Senate on 2 January 1915, Taft conceded that that economic 
conditions in the Philippines made prospects for self-government there brighter 
than in Cuba.  Specifically, he thought that the insular economy was riper than 
Cuba for allowing what he thought of as an “intelligent” middle-class to flourish 
(United States Congress.  Senate.  Committee on the Philippines, 2015: 385).  
Part of the aims of the US was to enhance the Islands’ economic fortunes.  Taft 
had seen that more industries that depended on a so-called “intelligent middle 
class” were thriving.  Taft was, however, not enthusiastic about enshrining in law 
a commitment that Filipinos be permitted to more provisions of self-government 
than what already existed at the time.  However, Taft had a parallel thought that 
faintly resembled Rueschemeyer et al. (1992) regarding the role of a growing 
middle-class on self-determination, especially given that their counterparts in the 
Philippines had become more educated than before the US assumed sovereignty. 
If one were to believe US officials at face value, the law’s authors desired to 
balance what politicians claimed was the goal of governance of Philippine self-rule 
and the maintenance of their sovereign rights over the Islands.  A concrete 
manifestation of more powers given to Filipinos was the election of a fully-elected 
bicameral legislature.  Under the previous constitution, only the lower house, or 
Philippine Assembly, was guaranteed to become an all-Filipino chamber.  Eligibility 
to vote also extended to men who could “read and write either Spanish, English, 
or a native language” (1916 Philippine Autonomy Act, Section 15(b)).  Previously, 
when it came to who qualified for the voting franchise through literacy 
qualifications, it was only extended to those who could read and write in either 
Spanish or English.  The fact that this was included serves as a recognition that 
US officials were growing more confident of the abilities of Filipino men to become 
literate enough to vote.  The fact that this franchise was extended was also a 
signal that politicians in the US, which decided the Philippines’ constitutional 
structure, were giving more Filipinos a greater voice on how to govern their 
territory.  The Islands’ legislature had more powers compared to its previous 
iteration when it came to raising funds and allocating them to internal priorities.   
Based on these developments, notwithstanding isolated statistics, there were 
considerable material improvements for more than a decade.  Nonetheless, there 
were areas in which much work remained.   
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Upholding American Ideals 
Wilson’s thoughts about retaining the Philippines has gone back and forth 
throughout his public career.  Nonetheless, he viewed the Philippines vis-a-vis the 
US’ broader mission in the Western Pacific.  In it, he indicated a need to be 
“opened and transformed” and be aligned with the West’s way of living.  Wilson, 
just like McKinley and Roosevelt, was convinced that the democratic nature of the 
US made it suited to take up the task of aligning the East’s standards with the 
West.  In the Spanish-American War, he observed that there was a lack of 
progress when it came to Filipinos getting a democratic form of government.  As 
such, Wilson felt it was incumbent for his country to aid the political education of 
Filipinos in the same manner that England had done so to its colonies in the 
Americas.  As Wilson observed that Filipinos revolted, he felt that they needed to 
cure what he thought of was ignorance on their part before the Philippines could 
be given a democratic form of government (Ambrosius, 1987: 10).  He used terms 
such as teaching Filipinos “order and self-control”.  It did not necessarily mean 
that Wilson had initially been in favour of instituting democratic government for 
Filipinos but rather a government based on what he thought was “justice and 
enlightenment” where certain guarantees deemed effective vary on a case-by-
case basis (Wilson, 1901).  As for his views on American imperialism, he further 
justified it by arguing that when domestic frontiers for trade have been closed-off, 
an international frontier had to be created (Mulder, 1978: 231).    
During the 1912 presidential election campaign, Wilson (1912: 31) pronounced 
that it was Americans’ duty, as trustees, to institute a governing arrangement that 
was “most serviceable to’ the inhabitants’ ‘freedom and development’”.  That was 
in line with his party’s long-standing manifesto first promoted by its former 
Presidential candidate William Jennings Bryan whereby the party renounced 
imperialism and exploitation in the Islands (Curry, 1957: 67). 
For some officials, legitimacy was key to discharging their duties.  It meant that 
such officials believed they needed to promote the values they claim to stand for 
to the degree that they could.  Thus, Americans needed to devolve power to the 
Filipinos to the degree they had to increase such.  By not passing further moves 
to devolve governance to Filipinos for 19 years, there is an implication that 
whatever the US did to appear as a more legitimate force to Filipinos have worked 
better while at the same time, allowing officials to continue their work in the 
Islands and allow political interests to cash in on.   
Racial animus 
Given the ideas among some that Filipinos were not fit to manage their affairs, 
some politicians used it to support moves towards independence.  Politicians 
introduced a racial element into the campaign to eventually allow Filipinos to 
govern themselves (Kramer, 2006: 355).  Kramer thought the bill would facilitate 
the creation of a policy that would “exclude” what Sen Clarke of Arkansas called 
the “Asiatics”.  Clarke introduced an amendment (hereto referred to as the Clarke 
Amendment) to recognise the Philippines as an independent state and for the US 
to withdraw within two years of the bill’s passage.  Clarke also took into 
consideration the possible racial animus that would brew among Asian nations, 
particularly Japan if the US would not withdraw from the islands (in Curry, 1954: 
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446).  In other words, by making the Philippines an independent state, it would 
contribute to US officials crafting a coherent policy that would keep what they saw 
as Asians out of US soil.  That implies that American officials found it difficult to 
justify excluding Japanese from their country but not Filipinos, who based on their 
accounts, were closer in terms of race to the Japanese than to the US.  
Additionally, if ever the Japanese were to invade, officials also found it made better 
sense for them (Japanese) to keep the Philippines once captured than the US take 
possession of it (ibid).  Some lawmakers contended that eventual retention was 
tantamount to the US becoming involved in what was called “the dangerous 
maelstrom of Oriental politics” (in Congressional Record 51, 1914: 15834).   
 
INTERESTS 
Material interests were also present in pressuring US leaders who wanted to 
manifest the independence promised to Filipinos.  It did not necessarily contradict 
accounts of US officials treating the Philippines with understanding.  They needed 
to appease its inhabitants to the extent that they did as a practical means to 
facilitate their interests.  A complaint at the beginning that businessmen had was 
that the Islands lacked law-and-order, which created uncertainty.   
Threat of Japan 
Those who favoured and opposed further devolution of powers to the insular 
government cited the threat of Japan as a reason for their position.   
Given that the Philippines was a territory for the US, there was a fear among 
officials favouring more devolution that the Philippines could act as a backdoor for 
Japan to undermine US power.  As a later section describes, defence systems of 
the Philippines were seen as weak, and if Japan were to exploit this, it would be 
tantamount to entering the US and attacking them therein. 
The serious possibility of granting the Philippines independence had considerable 
roots in the middle of the Roosevelt presidency where Roosevelt was also worried 
about Japan’s rising power in the region.  The field commanders assessed that the 
Islands were an “extremely desirable possession” for the Japanese, which can use 
it as an outlet for the rising power’s surplus population.  In addition, the 
assessment also cited that Japan had some use for the Philippines as a strategic 
point for which to be able to “command the coast of China” (in Daniels, 1963: 55).   
As deliberations for the bills loomed, the Japanese factor was still a significant 
consideration for some politicians.  Democratic politicians felt that although 
Filipinos would ultimately become capable, the looming threat of a Japanese 
invasion was an import factor.  They believed that the US was not in a position to 
defend the Philippines in such an event.  Even a Republican lawmaker, Albert Fall, 
characterised the Philippines as a “weak point in the line of our defence” (in 
Kramer, 2006: 122).  This notion was backed up by military officials such as 
Bradley Fiske, who said that the US was only in a position to send its fleet to Japan 
and sever trade links but not to a full extent with the northwest trade links still 
able to continue.  Fiske also warned not to underestimate the Japanese people’s 
ability to live frugally to ward off whatever trade sanctions the US could impose 
whereas the US would be at higher risk for costly sea-related perils (in Daniels, 
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1963: 56).  On 16 May 1913, Navy Secretary Josephus Daniels conceded that US 
forces “could not prevent” Japan’s navy from acquiring the Philippines if it wanted 
to (ibid: 65). 
The situation in Japan also generated significant initial opposition to the Jones Bill 
and outright independence at that point.  Just as those who supported the bill 
were worried that the US was at that point not in a position to defend the 
Philippines against Japanese invasion, those who opposed it thought that by 
providing Japan with an opportunity to seize the Philippines would undermine the 
US’ ability to take command of the western Pacific (Curry, 1954: 443).  As officials 
thought the US acquired the Philippines for its value to the US-China trade, the 
Philippines was nonetheless vulnerable to falling to Japanese rule (Ford, 1914).   
Such sentiments were shared by those who planned to vote against the bill.  
Congressman Fees felt as if the proponents of more self-rule were trying to pull a 
fast one as he characterised the assessment of war as an “expedient” manner or 
an excuse to merely pass the Jones Bill (Curry, 1957: 84).  Some of the president’s 
allies also thought that Japan would be happy to seize the Philippines from the US 
if both nations were to become enemies.  Furthermore, Senator John Williams of 
Mississippi charged that Japan would better perform guardianship over the islands.  
He also said that both Japanese and Filipinos would understand each other than 
the Americans do of the Philippines.  Therefore, given these stakes, he thought 
that the burdens of defending the Philippines outweighed the benefits (New York 
Times, 1916b: 2).  Based on these accounts, it seemed to be a given that an 
invasion from a third power would be inevitable if the Philippines was allowed to 
govern itself, but a disagreement emerged about whether it was a desirable 
outcome to see what could be the US’ Asian possession end up in someone else’s 
purview.  In summary, proponents thought that attacking the Philippines under 
US rule was the gateway to undermining US military prowess whereas opponents 
thought the same would be likelier to occur if the Islands were no longer part of 
the US.  
Reasons involving the Japanese threat were also cited by key Filipino officials when 
they lobbied measures short of independence.  Although Quezon was publicly 
advocating for Philippine independence, he was privately very wary of granting 
independence outright.  For the same reason that US officials thought that 
Japanese forces were waiting in the wings for the US to withdraw, Quezon 
expressed concerns about independence by citing the Japanese situation.  He was 
worried about what Japanese power could do to influence the islands.  Quezon 
also confided to Frank McIntyre that Americans expressed concern to him of their 
interests getting undermined with early independence.  Quezon said this is as 
most Filipinos thought that being given independence would hinder Japan’s hopes 
and dreams.   He instead wanted the bill to dictate the relationships between the 
mainland and the islands for a period covering at least 25 years.   However, 
Quezon was nonetheless in favour of the elected Senate and a veto threshold in 
that chamber (Curry, 1957: 79).   
Quezon also worried about how to face the lower classes himself without US 
support (Ninkovich, 2001: 76).  It is also noteworthy to consider these things in 
perspective where the US was an emerging imperial power.  Given that in 1898, 
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McKinley did not want to give an upper hand to its European imperial rivals, 
allowing another power to take over the Philippines would have undermined what 
McKinley sought to avoid.  Nonetheless, one key debate was whether keeping the 
Philippines or letting it go free was consistent with what they hoped to achieve in 
the islands.   
Ford also expressed his concern that the existing set-up of governance was ill-
suited for the Philippines in that it would perpetuate the bad habits associated 
with factionalism rather than facilitate good governance.  Ford proposed to repeal 
the Organic Act, and the Philippines be instead placed directly under the control 
of the White House who could decide to establish a legislature controlled by the 
Islands’ native inhabitants.  Ford believed instead that his proposed set-up could 
discourage Filipinos from rebelling since he thought they would have what they 
need and thus become more militarily self-sufficient to defend themselves against 
the Japanese threat (ibid). 
First World War and need for a More Devolved Legislature 
In addition to the Japanese threat, the First World War was seen as a geopolitical 
factor in introducing the Jones bill in Congress.  In particular, the bill’s provisions 
on giving the Philippines more autonomous trade policies was looming large on 
the minds of its promoters.  As previously mentioned, the previous insular 
constitution did not permit the insular government to set the Islands’ own trade 
policy and that in the event of any disruption, Congress would have to grant relief 
(Curry, 1957: 84).  Representative Jones, together with Quezon, argued that 
passage of the bill warranted consideration since that war was said to disrupt trade 
involving the Islands.  Trade disruption would mean that Congress would need to 
intervene often to give the Islands an aid package to help recovery.  The US’ 
involvement in wars similar to the one described meant that their economic 
interests in the Philippines were under threat.  The fact that Congress was setting 
laws also implied that the economic interests of the federal government were more 
likely to be undermined if they would stick to the existing legal arrangement for 
the Islands since the Islands could not move to alter its trade strategies without 
Congressional authorisation.  It would thus impose unnecessary and onerous costs 
to the US mainland. 
Given the practicalities that can be stymied as a consequence of war, it implied 
that it was necessary to have a more devolved legislature than the one that 
prevailing laws provide.  The would-be Jones law would contain changes towards 
what the Philippine legislative structure would look like.  Before the Jones Law was 
approved, the Philippine Assembly was the only elected all-Filipino chamber in the 
Insular government.  However, Garrison in a letter to President Wilson dated 13 
June 1913 alluded to the suggestion by Episcopal Bishop Brent that the Philippines 
be given a Senate.  It was in contrast to what Garrison hoped to do, which was to 
simply give Filipinos a majority in the already existing Philippine Commission 
(Link, 1978a: 516).  In the floor of the US Senate, Senator Hitchcock (one of 
Wilson’s party-mates) agreed with instituting a Colonial Senate by saying that the 
bill’s section that discusses the legislature in the Philippine was there to give them 
a “very natural but a very moderate” legislative independence.  Hitchcock also 
characterised the addition of the Senate as the “most important change” the bill 
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gives the existing colonial constitution (53 Cong. Rec. 609-610, 1916).  Another 
main feature of the bill was that Filipinos had the authority to pass laws that had 
to do with setting tariffs, coinage, mining amongst others, something that was 
heavily restricted under the Organic Act (Curry, 1957: 82).         
Electoral politics 
Given the Wilson’s party’s manifesto pronouncements, the pressure was mounting 
for Wilson and his party to deliver on their campaign promises.  They had won 
control of the executive and legislative branches of government.   
As mentioned previously, Harrison blamed the failure of previous iterations of the 
Jones Bill on threats by the opposition Republicans to filibuster or stymie it.  
Harrison was also well aware that the fate of the president’s party depended on 
the successful passage of the said bill.  Harrison believed that the opposition’s 
game plan was to pin issues of further self-rule on whether such moves would 
undermine the efficiency of government in the colony.  This way, the opposition 
would hope that it would undercut the president’s party’s narrative. 
There were, however, also electoral-religious interests at play, particularly within 
Wilson’s party.  Harrison found that the president’s party-mates who voted against 
the bill were mainly Catholics and that their attitude was due to the intervention 
by and influence of Cardinal James Gibbons of Baltimore, purportedly in relation 
to the investigation of Church authorities in the islands.  Furthermore, a pro-
independence newspaper reported that the Catholic Church had interests that 
were controlled by an “old revolutionary element” and that they were afraid that 
independence would risk the Philippines to fall under Japan hands, which to the 
Church meant a step closer to paganism (Beadles, 1968: 438).  Again, this 
demonstrates that the Catholics were still an influential driver of colonial policy 
and electoral fortunes.  As discussed previously, it was difficult to get around the 
Catholic Church, especially as they were an important group for members of 
Wilson’s party, especially in the northern part of the country. 
Other economic interests 
There was a mixed view of whether the Philippines was still commercially viable 
for the US.   
On the one hand, Taft mentioned that while powers such as England and their 
colonial territories were enriched through trade, the US was a country “large 
enough” without any trade and that he did not think that it should be a basis to 
retain the Islands.  Nonetheless, Taft cited figures showing how US sovereignty 
over the Philippines improved trade and commerce in the islands: from 
approximately $4 million in 1899 to $50 million within 15 years (United States 
Congress. Senate.  Committee on the Philippines, 1915: 398-9).  One of Wilson’s 
Senate ally, Senator Shafroth thought nonetheless it was a matter of who were 
being ruled rather than the rulers themselves (ibid).    
On the other hand, Wilson would hardly be alone among presidents to cast doubt 
on the economic value of the Philippines to the US at some point in his presidency.  
Even Roosevelt conceded in 1913 that the US no longer had “any special beneficial 
interest” in retaining the islands (in Ninkovich, 2001: 75).  On some level, his 
open-mindedness about the Philippines was hinted in the previous decade when 
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he said that the US should be open to setting the islands free in the future, 
although back then he still expressed a preference for retaining the islands.      
INSTITUTIONS 
Structures built for purpose? 
However, even as concerns about Filipinos being able to govern themselves 
festered, some officials in the Wilson administration believed that the current 
system actually made it difficult for the US to achieve its stated objectives in the 
Philippines.  Thus, newer management would think it needs to try something 
different.   
Ford also inspected the conditions of self-governance in the islands.  Upon his 
arrival there, his initial impression of the overall situation was “very grave” and 
due for “radical treatment”.  Ford opined that the problem did not lie in the men 
running the policies as with the policies themselves (Ford, 30/4/1913: 52497).  In 
his report, Ford had concluded that “American administration has been attended 
by greater success in organising the Philippines and fitting the country for self-
government than I had supposed before visiting the Islands”.  Moreover, he also 
said that the Wilson administration adhered to the view that the insular 
government should conform not to the Americans’ so-called “theoretical views”, 
rather the context found in the Islands.  Finally, Ford thought that the existing 
insular government accomplished what it set out to do and that by delaying the 
further devolution of self-government would be a breach in the pledges the US 
made to the Islands.  He identified difficulties, however, such as when it came to 
improving the literacy level of most inhabitants from their local dialects into more 
national vernaculars of English or Spanish.  Ford nonetheless thought that it was 
an unnecessary burden that islanders learn English in order to be deemed literate.  
As such, Ford recommended that the voting franchise be extended to males 
literate in local dialects.  He then further called on the Wilson administration to 
focus less on hiring local staff for the civil service and rather, economic reform.  
In this light, given the differences he observed in both the Philippine and mainland 
US economic development, he thought that the Philippines should have its own 
system of taxation and navigation to facilitate economic independence (in Link, 
1978b: 244-245).     
The mood to alter some aspects of the existing structure were rooted in desires 
to account for whether existing structures reinforced undesirable behaviours of 
Filipinos.  Whereas some of the prevailing policies of US on Filipinos were based 
on the premise that Filipinos were unable to manage to govern their affairs, others 
feared it was these structures introduced by the US that would make it worse.  
Ford (1914) also expressed his concern that the existing set-up of governance 
was ill-suited for the Philippines in that it would perpetuate the bad habits 
associated with factionalism rather than facilitate good governance.  Ford 
proposed repealing of the Organic Act, and the Philippines be instead placed 
directly under the control of the White House who could decide to establish a 
legislature controlled by the Islands’ native inhabitants.  Ford believe instead that 
his proposed set-up could discourage Filipinos from rebelling since he thought they 
would have what they need and thus become more militarily self-sufficient to 
defend themselves against the Japanese threat (ibid). 
 
 169 
There were initiatives to include more Filipinos in the central colonial governance 
structure even before the 1916 bill was passed.  Wilson (in Kramer, 2006: 352) 
reiterated that as the Philippines was part of the US, he had hoped to “deprive 
[themselves] of that frontier”.  He also sent to Quezon a message which said the 
US regarded itself as “trustees” who acted for the “benefit of the Philippine islands” 
and that each step taken would point in that direction (ibid).  In light of this, his 
then Secretary of War, Lindley Garrison, recommended that the Islands’ 
legislature be comprised mainly of Filipinos in the upper house (Philippine 
Commission) in addition to the lower house while reserving an executive veto for 
either the Governor-General, Secretary of War, and US President.  Garrison 
reminded Wilson that the prevailing doctrine was that the Filipinos have more 
leeway to be able to govern their affairs.  Initially and to be consistent with the 
statements government officials had released to the public as well as tradition, 
the War Secretary did not call for an immediate change in the structure but wanted 
Filipinos to have more say under the existing structures.  For sure, he explicitly 
indicated that there need not be elections to executive positions as there were to 
the Philippine Assembly (Garrison, 24/4/1913: 51960-1).  In turn, Wilson’s 
designated Governor-General, Benjamin Harrison instituted a practice known as 
“Filipinisation”, under which Filipinos became part of the provincial and insular 
bureaucracy.  To be consistent with such actions, on 6 October 1913, Harrison 
promulgated a message from Wilson to the Filipino people which reiterated that 
the US administration would take every step with a view of “ultimate 
independence of the Islands and as a preparation for that independence” (in Link, 
1978b: 323-4).   
As an immediate consequence of Harrison’s new policies, more than half of the 
members of the Philippine Commission consisted of Filipinos.  US encouragement 
of business activities also came to an end under Harrison’s stewardship of the 
islands (Kramer, 2006: 352).  It was said there that Wilson had a “hope” to take 
the Philippines out of US sovereignty.  
Moreover, based on the suggestions of Ford in the previous section, he wanted to 
frame the question of self-government more as an expression that it would better 
serve Filipinos when it came to being able to chart their own economic destiny.  
He then cited the discrepancies between the US and Philippine systems.  It implied 
that as much as looking out for the welfare of the Islands’ economy, the desire to 
push for self-government had the hope of also keeping the mainland’s economy 
in-tact.  By pegging the Philippines tightly to the US, Ford was suggesting that it 
would undermine economic stability back home.     
Congressional Politics and Priorities 
The reality of Congressional politics was something that factored into the bill’s 
progress. 
Although the bill’s first iteration had its genesis in the 1912-13 session, it was 
competing with issues on the First world war, conservation, shipping, and an 
emergency tax bill in 1914 for Congress’ attention.  Ultimately, the Senate was 
unable to pass it before the end of the 63rd Congress (in Curry, 1957: 86).   
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The preamble in the Philippine Bill became a source of contention, especially 
among the then-opposition party.  Garrison wrote to Wilson that his allies in 
Congress were worried that the insistence of wording the preamble in such a way 
that suggested a promise of independence would threaten any chances of passage 
during the current session (Garrison, 26/2/1915: 73234).  Before this, the 
opposition raised objections to the timing of introducing the Jones Bill.  
Congressman Towner, for instance, claimed that it was “unwise” to introduce and 
discuss late into the 63rd Congress any issues regarding the Philippines were 
deemed sensitive.  Even a mere suggestion of outright independence at that point 
would make the Philippines ground zero in a war that would involve many 
countries who wanted a stake in the Far East such as Germany and Japan (in 53 
Cong Record 15802, 1914a).  Moreover, as the US was engaged in war in the Far 
East region, Towner and other members of the opposition thought that it was not 
prudent to push further self-government in the Islands and instead recommended 
increasing the debt limit of the Islands to $15 million from $5 million to aid them 
for the expected tie-up of Pacific shipping (Dougherty, 1914: 12).  Elections were 
coming up in just over a month.   
In reply to Towner, Jones cited a previous statement by Towner, whom he 
purported to say that some form of legislation to provide relief for Filipinos and 
business operating in the Islands was needed.  Additionally, the letters were 
written by Mr Fairchilds, a businessman whose corporation invested $4 million of 
its money in the Islands.  Jones said that Fairchilds claimed that the course of 
action proposed by the former’s bill was “imperatively demanded”.  Moreover, 
Jones even reiterated that Towner even characterised the bill as a “conservative” 
one (in Congressional Record, 26/9/1914: 15803-4).  A few days later, Towner 
renewed his call to hold off any moves for independence in the Islands, citing the 
example of Canada and Australia where back then, he claimed that while they 
enjoyed self-governance, they were not clamouring for outright independence 
because of their association to the country that exercised sovereignty over them 
(in Congressional Record, 3/10/1914: 16134). 
Even though Wilson’s controlled both chambers of Congress and the White House, 
the party’s majority was not large enough to overcome opposition.  That was a 
concern made by officials of Wilson’s administration Later in Wilson’s first term, 
Harrison wrote to Tumulty whereby the former blamed the failure of previous 
iterations of the Jones Bill on threats by opposition Republicans to filibuster or 
stymie them as they made their way through Congress (Harrison, 31/8/1915: 
37854-37855). 
INTERACTION OF THE IDEAS, INTERESTS, AND INSTITUTIONS 
REVISITED 
The given reasons appear compelling for officials to pursue a higher degree of 
autonomy for Filipinos.  However, some ideas, interests, and institutions are 
insufficient in and of themselves to understand the motivations that these officials 
and politicians had.   
Interactions between ideas and institutions 
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In light of discussing institutions, one way to consider it is that the institutions in 
the Philippines officials and politicians hoped to work with and rectify with their 
presence.  Institutions are the rules of the game and the constraints that agents 
faced and can also include social and economic situations.  Although there was 
more work left to be desired, it was difficult to claim that there was no progress 
in terms of economic progress and education rates back in the colony.  It would 
mean that the notion that Filipinos were unable to govern their affairs became 
somewhat less salient in the 1910s than when the Americans started to take up 
the colony.  On the other, granted that a lot of work remained, the proposed set-
up and the fact that it would take decades before members proposed another 
major piece of related legislation were testaments to such a reality.  It is therefore 
in this way where institutions constrain ideas: the improvements, however limited 
they were, limited the salience of the ideas that Filipinos were never going to be 
ready for being capable of managing their affairs. 
         
In moves to try to devolve more power to the colonial government, there are 
instances whereby ideas help make sense of the related institutions.  As 
mentioned, the notion that Filipinos were unable to govern themselves prompted 
officials to reconsider whether existing institutions continued to serve their original 
purpose.  Even though there were material improvements, the fact that officials 
still invoked some doubts about the ability of Filipinos to defend themselves was 
manifested in how officials questioned whether the existing institutions were 
helping them achieve the stated objectives.      
 
In relation to the foregoing, there were American ideals Wilson and his designees 
in the Philippines felt they needed to uphold.  Based on the assessments, the 
current institutional set-ups were no longer appropriate as far as trying to project 
American ideals were concerned.  Hence, officials deemed that a reconfiguration 
of the institutional laws was necessary.   
 
Interaction between institutions and interests 
The institutionalised set-up of Congressional and electoral politics discussed in the 
Institutions section provides a manifestation for how such set-ups constrain 
interests, particularly those who want to pursue their interests as easing colonial 
control over the Philippines.  Given that there were many agenda items that 
Congress had to pursue, there is a chance that the interests related devolving the 
system of government in the Philippines may be de-prioritised in favour of other 
interests.   
 
Still, on the issue of relationships between institutions and interests, the fact that 
warding off the threat of Japan was an interest that military officials invoked points 
to questions about the extent of the strength of the US military.  As mentioned, 
officials claimed that since the Philippines was a territory of the US at the time, 
the Philippines was fair game for Japanese conquest.  As such, the then-set-up of 
the US military in the event of a Japanese invasion of the Philippines was not 
adequate and would thus undermine their mainland interests.    
 
As was discussed in previous chapters, the Catholic Church was a powerful 
institution.  A notable vote among the Congressional members who expressed 
initial opposition to independence initiatives were Catholics.  Given that there was 
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the Catholic Church was keen on retaining the Philippines for reasons such as to 
discourage the growth of paganism that would result if another power would take 
over.  In turn, Catholic Congressional members were wary about what that 
institution would do if such members would go against it.  Hence, there was a 
constraint for Catholic members against pursuing interests that undermine their 
electoral prospects because of the power the Catholic institution over the voters 
these members depended on.       
 
Furthermore, the electoral interests of other officials and politicians in the 
mainland were reflected in the use of the institutions.  Given how legislative voting 
worked, the Wilson administration, despite having his party control Congress, 
encountered intra-party challenges in convincing his party-mates to vote for 
devolution.  As mentioned earlier, some of these were related to the fact that most 
of those who initially opposed to Wilson’s party were Catholics.  They have 
manifested their interests through the institutional of levers of Congressional 
power.           
 
Interaction between ideas and interests 
To make sense of the upholding American ideas, it helps to look at it alongside 
the interest of officials wanting to improve the US’ reputation as an emerging 
global superpower.  As the coming First World War had undermined existing 
European powers, someone needed to take over.  The US was in a position to so.  
However, officials acting on behalf of the US needed to exhibit credibility by at 
least showing that they are making efforts to conduct themselves consistent with 
the values they claim to espouse.   
 
Party and electoral politics were also present.  For a variety of reasons ranging 
from the hypocrisy to racist views about the Philippines, Democrats had been 
usually - though not universally or consistently – against colonisation.  The 1912 
Democratic manifesto contained such ideas. They were also a guide for such 
politicians to think that their electoral fortunes hinged partly on how they pursued 
these interests.   
 
Furthermore, electoral politics, particularly the Democratic Party’s manifesto and 
how some members of the party saw the Philippines from a racial perspective, 
security-related interests had to be examined in conjunction with each other.  
Earlier iterations of the manifesto stated that Filipinos “cannot be citizens without 
endangering our civilisation”  (Democratic Party, 1900).   Although this was an 
older manifesto item, the 1912 campaign provided room for those who still 
harboured such ideas about Filipinos to pursue security-related interests. It is in 
this way where ideas could reflect security interests. 
 
CONCLUSIONS AND FURTHER ASSESSMENTS 
President Wilson signed the Jones bill into law on 29 August 1916.  He said that 
upon signing it that the bill “excites peculiar feelings’ in him because ‘there have 
been times when the people of the Philippine Islands doubted [US] intentions to 
be liberally just to them”.  Wilson hoped that the bill reassures the locals of the 
US’ intentions for them (Link, 1964: 355). 
Given that pressure from lobbies wanting to keep the Philippines as a US 
possession was present, the Jones Law was considered a way to satisfy such 
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colonial interests by nominally instituting a looser grip on the Islands’ internal 
affairs short of outright independence.  That law was the last primary law passed 
in Congress that concerned devolving internal Island matters to its inhabitants 
before the Tydings-McDuffie law 19 years later.  Why it took that long to push for 
another law to further give the Philippines even more independence is beyond the 
scope of this thesis.  However, the fact that it took a long time for politicians to 
propose further devolution (as compared to the time that the Organic Act was in 
effect) implied that the Jones Law successfully addressed something that inflamed 
the passions of those seeking more self-determination in the islands.  It also 
implied that US officials had interests that they could achieve more successfully 
with the reforms set in the 1916 constitution than with the Organic Act.  It would 
come in the form of more Filipinos being in the legislature while at the same time, 
the US would dictate some of the issues Filipino officials should not advocate.   
Just as with the previous administration, the situation with Japan, especially that 
the US back then was not completely capable of protecting the Islands from an 
attack by those forces, was a factor that prompted officials to reconsider their 
position and give urgency to whatever actions they needed to do to the Islands.   
In discussing interests, ideas, and institutions, this chapter has again 
demonstrated the difficulty of discussing some of them per se.  For one, the notion 
of whether Filipinos were fit enough to govern themselves is relevant for the 
discussion on the existing institutions that the Americans set forth for the Filipinos.  
The officials that Wilson appointed assessed whether the US governance 
structures were fit for purpose and a shared notion was that Filipinos were not in 
a position to manage their affairs effectively.  Thus, the basis for officials deciding 
on what path the Philippines would need to be on were dependent on whether the 
existing institutions were perpetuating the social structures their predecessors 
sought to eliminate, to begin with.   
Although it is too simplistic to say that party politics had any direct effect on policy, 
it was clear that getting into the Philippines was something Wilson’s party largely 
sought to avoid in the first place if they could.  Wilson’s party maintained a 
relatively anti-colonialist line that the party tried to tie to its electoral fortunes.  It 
needed the bill to pass were it to be successful in the upcoming 1916 elections.  
Even though 1914 to 1918 was also a small window in which Wilson’s Party held 
both the executive and legislative, the parliamentary hurdles were something they 
needed to consider, and the opposition party took advantage of such hurdles.   
The passage of the Jones Bill happened to be the last time in almost two decades 
Congress would pass a law granting a greater degree of self-government to the 
Filipino people than was previously the case.  Given further fears of what Japan 
may do to the islands, Quezon further requested future US administrations not to 
hasten any moves towards granting Filipinos more power than what they have.  
In the ensuing years, the effects of the 1929 Great Depression has made US-
based business reconsider their position in the islands, with more of them 
favouring letting the islands free (Ninkovich, 2001).  Although the 1916-1935 era 
is beyond the focus of this work, one can imply that there were business and 
geopolitical interests, particularly a change in economic conditions that started to 
factor in.         
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CHAPTER XI: CONCLUSION: THE 3Is AND GRADUAL 
LIBERALISATION OF THE PHILIPPINES 
 
OVERVIEW 
After nearly two decades of the United States colonising the Philippines, the US 
presented both political and material reforms.  However, as this thesis has shown, 
the reforms introduced were not executed merely to improve the lives of Filipinos.  
Officials had underlying interests to introduce such reforms.  However, one has to 
look at these interests alongside various ideas and institutions to understand how 
these reasons are related and thus in and of themselves not sufficient to 
understand such decisions.  
 
This concluding chapter provides a summary of the key ideas, institutions, and 
interests discussed in the previous chapter that have helped shape US officials’ 
decision-making and how they interact.  This chapter aims to reiterate the fact 
that although there are valid ideas-, institutions-, and interest-based explanations 
for why officials introduced the relevant reforms, they are connected to a 
significant degree with each other and hence should be understood in relation to 
each other.    
 
This chapter will begin by going through the most recurring ideas of Filipinos as 
“uncivilised” and Taft’s Policy of Attraction.  The interests of internal, external 
security, as well as the economic opportunities generated and electoral and 
partisan politics.  Such institutions will be described again with a view that they 
were constraining factors in decision-making, and interacted with one of the other 
ideas and interests. 
 
The chapter then reiterates how the ideas, institutions, and interests interact with 
each other.  In particular that a) ideas help agents make sense of interests and 
institutions, b) ideas also reflect agents’ interests, c) institutions limit and facilitate 
the effectivity and saliency of interests, and d) institutions result from the 
construction of agents’ interests.      
 
The chapter closes by considering the wider lessons from this thesis and the 
implications from it.  
 
IDEAS 
As the earlier sections suggested, ideas are about the knowledge and values that 
decision-makers hold.  Ideas are about what these actors think about the 
underlying issues that help them to make decisions as well as the values that 
inform such decisions.  
 
Filipinos as Uncivilised? 
One of the most commonly-recurring ideas for whether to give the Philippines 
such forms of governance was the idea of Filipinos not being civilised enough.  In 
particular, most officials harboured an image of Filipinos unable to govern 
themselves and manage themselves.     
 
This notion was significant when there were questions about political institutions 
such as the Philippine Assembly.  Senators who were allies of Republican 
presidents were under the impression that Filipinos were unable to govern 
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themselves enough to warrant their own insular parliament (May, 1980: 58).  
There was a fear that these institutions would be used to introduce measures that 
would counter the interests of the US.      
 
That initial idea of Filipino was also cited when it came to why officials wanted to 
develop the colonial economy as discussed in part III.  For Taft and his colleagues, 
free enterprise could civilise a society.  He stated in a letter to Senate ally Lodge 
that “nothing will civilise them [Filipino people] so much as the introduction of 
American enterprise and capital here [in the colony]”.   
 
This notion of uncivilised Filipinos also formed the basis for educational policies.  
Taft’s conception of education was in line with making people ready to be able to 
govern themselves even though he had shown no intention of granting them this 
sense of autonomy anytime in the foreseeable future.  That was the case, as he 
also said that Filipinos should be capable of self-governing before the government 
that he led could be turned over to them (Brands, 1992: 68).  Education policy 
was thus also used to instil in locals patriotism and unity, as well as a preparation 
for democratic “self-government” (Sobritchea, 1990: 74-5) even if Taft had no 
foreseeable plans to grant Filipinos such a privilege.  Taft testified that the Filipino 
race was not yet ready and had a somewhat limited potential relative to their 
white counterparts to get educated enough to manage their own affairs (in 
Committee of Insular Affairs, 1/3/1902: 96).     
 
Taft’s policy of attraction 
A related idea to the notion of civilising Filipinos is Taft’s broader notion of trying 
to attract Filipinos.  The attraction of Filipinos came with the idea that by 
introducing reforms that are associated with American ideas, officials could win 
Filipinos over (Burns, 2010).  In this way, there would be fewer reasons for 
Filipinos to want to break away from the US.     
 
One of the elements of this was introducing mass-based education.  In here, there 
was an emphasis on reinforcing American values.  These values included liberty 
(to the extent permitted) and enterprise.  However, at the same time, officials 
acknowledged the risks that Filipinos may use them to demand more than what 
the officials were prepared to or legally permitted to offer.  To allay fears of what 
education could do, officials imposed restrictions on what criticisms locals may 
express in the colony. 
 
INTERESTS 
This thesis has shown there were plenty of interests at stake as officials tried to 
decide the next move for the Philippines.  Based on Hall’s definition, these could 
include security, geopolitical situations, and economic opportunities.    
 
Security against Filipino Insurrections 
Security was of paramount interest to those operating in the colony.  US officials 
often used security concerns as a basis for why they felt Filipinos were not able to 
manage their affairs satisfactorily.  As mentioned, officials feared that Filipinos 
would misuse the institutions and use them to express their disdain for the 
colonisers, initiate insurrections, declare outright independence prematurely, and 
cause other forms of chaos that would undermine colonial security.  It took several 
years to capture the key leaders of the Aguinaldo-led insurrection.  Thus, there 
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was a view that resolving the security situation required deep and fundamental 
measures and not mere brute force.   
 
Chapter 6 has shown that security was a reason for why Taft, an ardent opponent 
of outright independence or even further measures of devolution, introduced the 
Philippine Assembly.  In particular, Taft proposed this idea as an incentive for 
Filipinos to cooperate with US officials.  That is, even though a consequence of the 
Assembly was to provide more opportunities for locals to participate in the 
governance of the Philippines, Taft believed that one of its main functions was to 
aid in the pacification of Filipinos and prevent insurrections (Stanley, 1974).  Taft 
hoped by providing such reforms, Filipinos would have to rebel against the US.      
 
Chapter 7 also demonstrates that security was another primary reason for 
instituting mass-based public education in the Philippines in the first place.  Taft 
made promoting primary education a central tenet to his so-called “policy of 
attraction”, which is his policy used to win the hearts and minds of Filipinos (Burns, 
2010: 57).   
 
Amidst the security experiences, “Filipinising” Filipinos meant for colonial 
administrators returning to experiences the administrators would worry about.  
Thus, education was used as an avenue for the US to impart in Filipino minds the 
superiority of US values in the hopes that the risks of promoting independence 
would drop.  
 
External Security 
Chapter 10 has argued that two security issues prompted debate about the future 
of the Philippines in US custody: Japan and the First World War.   
 
Both sides of the debate considered the issue of Japan when deciding the elements 
of the final form of the Jones Law would comprise.   On the one hand, there was 
a broad concern that given the defence capabilities of the US in the north-western 
Pacific, Japan could use the Philippines as a backdoor to attack the US.   
 
On the other hand, the vulnerability of the US to Japanese forces was also a reason 
for some officials to discourage not granting the Philippines further devolution.  
There was a feeling that if the US let go of the Philippines and Japan would, in 
turn, seize it, the ability of the US to secure the north Pacific would be undermined.   
 
The First World War was also seen as a geopolitical factor in the introduction of 
the bill in Congress.  In particular, the bill’s provisions on giving Philippine bodies 
more leeway in the area of trade policy was looming large on the minds of its 
promoters.   
 
Building American Credibility 
Compared to European Powers, the US was a relatively young player in foreign 
policy.  Various groups wanted to ensure that the US lived up to its ideals and that 
the way to do so was to act credibly.  One way they would show this was to honour 
international laws and treaties the US entered into.  Hence, how to handle the 
issue of redistributing friar lands was done partly to improve American credibility 




Some critics say that the US may lose credibility by the mere act of entering the 
Philippines, to begin with.  However, by signing the Treaty of Paris with Spain, the 
US managed to secure its claims to the Philippines.    
 
Economic Opportunities 
Chapter 5 discussed some of the economic opportunities that the US was thinking 
of.  One obvious interest that governed what the US wanted to do in the Philippines 
was the opportunity for China trade.  The China trade aspect of this was salient, 
especially after given that the US was coming off a recession and it needed more 
markets for its goods.  Furthermore, imperialists such as Taft and Roosevelt have 
found commercial value in acquiring and governing the Philippines as part of a 
network of naval and coal stations that would form a trade route between the US 
and China (e.g. McCormick, 1963; Beveridge, 1900; Gould, 1980).  These officials 
believed the Philippines would also facilitate further access to the other trading 
ports (Vanderbilt in testimony to US Senate, 1900: 561).   
 
Chapter 7 also demonstrated that economic considerations were one of the main 
considerations for instituting the educational curriculum that was in place.  
Officials and businesspeople needed graduates who could perform blue-collar 
work.  Thus, officials felt that education needed to have a practical value.  Given 
that one of the hopes was for the Philippines to facilitate trade between the US 
and the Far East and that the colonial economy was underdeveloped, there was a 
need for extra manpower to take on the economic demands.  The blue-collar-
based curriculum fed into the export-based orientation that colonial officials hoped 
to achieve out of the colony (ibid: 516).   
 
Chapter 9, shows that tariff reform in the Philippines was a long-fought battle.  
The most important goods for local producers – sugar and tobacco, took years 
before becoming tariff-free.  However, there was an economic situation in the US 
that prompted politicians to reconsider their position further than previously.  
During the 1912 election campaign, there was a concern about the high cost of 
living which the then-opposition Democrats exploited.  Public opinion then felt 
convinced to want to reduce tariffs for relief from high costs.   
 
Electoral and Partisan Politics 
Electoral politics had been part of the equation.  For instance, McKinley needed to 
demonstrate credibility on foreign policy given a perception that he lacked such.  
The acquisition of the Philippines became an opportunity for him to demonstrate 
it.  His handling of the Philippines and more broadly the Spanish-American War 
was often considered a reason for a rise in his popularity through the 1900 election 
campaign (Gould, nd). 
 
The Catholic vote (related to the institution of the Catholic Church described in the 
next section) was also something sought after.  The Catholic vote was especially 
prominent in two instances.  The first instance can be seen in Chapter 8 when Taft 
acknowledged that he had to be careful when it came to the redistribution of friar 
lands.  Scholars have argued that a consequence of not dealing with the Catholic 
Church carefully would be alienating voters affiliated with the Catholic faith.  
Chapter 10 has also demonstrated that the Catholic vote was a reason for why 
some members of Wilson’s party had expressed hesitation with how much power 
to give the Filipinos in the Jones Bill.  It was as Democrats in the northern US 
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accepted the reality that the Catholic church did not want to separate itself from 
the Philippines, something that the US could do. 
 
When it came to tariffs, as seen in Chapter 9, politicians also tried to appeal to 
key trade groups in a hope to win their political favours.  It helped explained initial 
objections as these politicians feared political repercussions of crossing such 
groups.   
 
Electoral politics also played another roll in tariff reduction.  The mainland 
economy suffered problems and Democrats promised to voters that they would 
solve it.  They won on that basis, voted to reduce tariffs to help fulfil their 
promises.   
 
Moreover, in Chapter 10, in keeping with campaign manifesto promises, members 
of the new governing party tried to initiate moves towards giving Filipinos more 
power.   
 
INSTITUTIONS 
Pre-American Social Structures in the Philippines 
Most of the institutions in the Philippines were discussed in detail, especially in 
Chapter 4.  An important aspect of it was that there were deeply-informed and 
deeply rooted pre-existing social structures that have been a breathing ground for 
challenges that US officials would face.  Statistics that indicated a lack of progress 
in the Philippines were also rooted in the issues Chapter 4 has identified.  Taft 
indicated that if he had his way, he would rather not deal with the groups that 
were products of these institutions.  However, Taft was left with limited options 
for whom he and his colleagues could work with. 
 
Such behaviours witnessed encapsulates a broader finding.  Given the situation 
that the likes of Kerr had witnessed, it was apparent to American officials that the 
Filipinos could not be trusted to govern themselves and undo the atrocities the 
Spaniards did to them with without any assistance.  This idea has been built up 
gradually.  It was also apparent that officials who wanted to rule the Philippines 
had a stronger case to do so and portray the Filipino subjects lacking the abilities 
to operate a government.  Based on these, Kerr (1906: 13) thought that to giving 
the Filipinos gradual liberties associated with liberal democracies was something 
more feasible than early full autonomy.    One can surmise that with what the 
Spaniards left the Philippines, the US was looking at the Philippines more from a 
perspective of what the islands can contribute to the former’s fortunes.     
 
Property Rights 
Among the most important considerations in promulgating economic-related 
policies were protecting the institutions of protecting property rights.  In the US, 
it was of paramount importance that parties to an agreement demonstrated 
credibility when it came to their ability to respect such.  Some scholars have 
suggested (e.g. Lamoreaux, 2014) that property rights protection worked hand-
in-hand as a consequence of suffrage (of white men), which was part of the idea 
of ‘American exceptionalism’.  The approach to land distribution was also a 





Taft and his successors as governors-general wanted to institute some form of 
land redistribution.  However, the Catholic Church acted as a constraining factor.  
It was among the most important institutions that politicians needed to appease, 
of which whose Spanish arm was also an institution that the Treaty of Paris hoped 
to protect.  That was especially an important consideration given that the largest 
parcels of land were still legally under the names of the Friars.  This one, along 
with other institutions mentioned earlier meant that officials were resigned to need 
to the exercise restraint when there were conflicts that arose.  The last reason 
stated was quite similar to the dilemmas faced by the central Spanish government 
when it tried to reign in abuses by the Friars (see Cunningham, 1916).  
Furthermore, Taft saw the recommendation of his Commission to exclude all friars 
as “too radical”, and that he believed the US could accomplish more by not looking 
bad in front of them (Taft to Wright, 22/6/1902; series 3 reel 36: 2).   
 
INTERACTIONS AMONG IDEAS, INSTITUTIONS, AND INTERESTS 
The framework has helped explain that the commonly cited reasons for the 
officials colonising the Philippines and introducing liberal reforms have connections 
to each other.     
 
Ideas help agents make sense of their interests and institutions.   
One could witness how ideas could help agents make sense of institutions through 
desires of officials to promote economic growth.  Given that officials and their 
business allies were clamouring to support measures that encourage free 
enterprise, a relevant question to be posed is what ideas feed into such.  As 
discussed in Chapter 5, before the colonial relationship began, there were the 
ideas of the glut thesis and capitalism in general.   Another instance that 
highlighted the interaction between interests and institutions was security-related 
interests.  As this interest contained an emphasis on insurrection concerns, it 
implies and presupposes that a prevailing idea had to be that Filipinos were prone 
to committing insurrections.  One could make a similar premise that the idea of 
Filipinos unable to manage their affairs and the uncivilised notion helped inform 
the officials’ security-related concerns (e.g. insurrections).   
 
One could also identify the interactions between ideas and interests when it came 
to how to approach voters.  For instance, Democrats wanted to win elections, and 
they saw an economic crisis under the other party’s government.  Tariff reduction, 
as a part of economic relief measures, was the idea that Democratic politicians 
considered.  Hence, the latter served as an option to help Democratic politicians 
make sense of their interests to win votes in the 1912 election, and its passage 
was a way to show voters the party would keep its promise. 
 
Ideas reflect an agent’s interests.   
Based on correspondences, concerns about security and the Filipinos inciting 
insurrections fed into the idea that Filipinos were not capable of being given 
outright liberties and that they needed further guidance.  This thesis has 
reinforced the notion that the interest of security is inseparable from the ideas 
Americans had about Filipinos, and thus the ensuing policies.  These security 
issues help form the basis of what Americans think about Filipinos.     
 
As mentioned in Chapter 10, to understand and appreciate what upholding 
American ideas meant, it helps to look at it alongside the interest of officials 
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wanting to improve the US’ reputation as an emerging global superpower.  As the 
coming First World War had undermined existing European powers, someone 
needed to take over.  The US was in a position to so.  However, officials acting on 
behalf of the US needed to exhibit credibility by at least showing that they are 
making efforts to conduct themselves consistent with the values they claim to 
espouse.   
 
Institutions limit or facilitate the effectivity of ideas and saliency of interests.   
First, when it comes to how institutions inform interests, as demonstrated in the 
previous section, winning over certain votes cannot be separated from respecting 
the institution associated with them.  One can imply that the institution in this 
light has sway over the groups that hold the key to whether an actor’s interest 
would be satisfied.  The institutions, which are also normal behaviours or “rules of 
the game” (North, 1995), also provide a springboard and constraint for actors to 
pursue their interests.  If politicians wanted to win votes or the US was to build 
its reputation respectively, they needed to act without breaching certain 
constraining institutions.   
 
Another example of institutions informing interests was the norm of adhering to 
neutrality and building, especially as the Spanish-American War was going on.  As 
mentioned in Chapter 5, given that the US and the host countries were bound by 
neutrality, the US was forced to find a station somewhere else.  US officials wanted 
to defeat Spain.  However, Britain and China’s refusal to grant American requests 
made the Philippines an alternative for establishing a base for US naval operations.    
  
Similarly, respecting the institution of property rights also spoke to the interest of 
the US to be a credible player in the world stage.  As mentioned earlier, the US 
was trying to build its image and credibility, and it could ill-afford to renege on 
treaties.  It meant that a way to build credibility was to honour its international 
commitments, something that respecting property rights would demonstrate.  As 
Chapters 5 and 8 have explained, officials feared violating that norm may cause 
diplomatic, legal, and political consequences for the US reputation.  Thus, the need 
for prolonged negotiations.   
 
This thesis has shown the institutions in the Philippines that came from the pre-
American era.  These practices and norms were compared to the standards that 
officials believed were acceptable.  In particular, the notion that Filipinos prize 
reciprocity and indebtedness, social institutions made prevalent back then gave 
credence to the idea that Filipinos do not prize less corrupt forms of governance 
and hence are not trustworthy enough to govern themselves.  The institutionalised 
social structures provided the basis that Filipinos in general were - as far as 
colonials officials were concerned - an uncivilised group.  It also caused worries 
among US officials if the institutions they set up were built for purpose, i.e. 
effective enough to stem the problem brought about by the ideas US officials had. 
 
The social structures left during the Spanish era were also some reasons for 
rebellions and calls for independence from all colonisers.  Hence, colonial 
administrators became nervous about securing the colony.  As such, this is an 
instance of where the structures and rules of the game back then help inform 




Furthermore, institutions are manifested in pertinent laws and norms.  The 
prevailing colonial institutional set-up gave agents even more compelling reasons 
to come out in favour of relaxing trade restrictions.  The 1902 Organic Act did not 
permit the colonial government to set the colony’s trade policy independently 
(Curry, 1957: 84).  Officials felt that passage of the bill warranted consideration 
since that war was said to disrupt trade involving the Philippines.  Trade disruption 
would mean that Congress would need to intervene and give the Islands an aid 
package just to recover very often.  The involvement of the US in wars similar to 
the one described meant that economic interests operating in the Philippines were 
threatened.  The fact that Congress set laws also implied that the economic 
interests of the federal government were more likely to be undermined if they 
would stick to the existing legal arrangement for the Philippines.  That is as the 
colony could not move to alter its trade strategies without Congressional 
authorisation.  That would thus impose unnecessary and onerous costs and 
burdens to the US mainland. 
 
Institutions result from the construction of an agent’s interests 
As Chapter 10 has discussed, the electoral interests of other officials and 
politicians in the mainland were reflected in the relevant institutions.  Given the 
rules of legislative voting, the Wilson administration encountered intra-party 
challenges in convincing his party-mates to vote for devolution.  These were 
related to the fact that most of those who initially opposed from Wilson’s party 
were Catholics.  They have manifested their interests through the institutional of 
levers of Congressional power.       
     
IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE DEVELOPMENT IN THE PHILIPPINES 
For the reasons discussed in the thesis, the US introduced institutions associated 
with liberal democracies.  However, given there was a security interest in keeping 
the Philippines from, US officials had to work with actors they felt were the closest 
to becoming “civilised” even if Taft and his colleagues regarded these Filipinos as 
corrupt.  In that case, it was the established local politicians.  It would mean and 
point to the fact that the ability of ordinary Filipinos to participate depended partly 
on security interests.      
 
Moreover, as officials underscored the importance of vocational/blue-collar over 
academic/white-collar subjects in the 1900s, it meant that most Filipinos would 
be precluded from the prestigious occupations that the illustrados would enjoy.  
Although progress and social mobility existed, the fact is only relatively few 
Filipinos continued to make it to university and hence be offered well-paying and 
leadership jobs. 
 
The Philippines would not experience a major wave of political liberalisation 
initiatives until 1935.  Given that there was a nearly two-decade gap between the 
passage of such initiatives, it implies that the ideas and interests of US officials 
were satisfied for the time being.  Furthermore, the institutions both in the 
Philippines and US constrained them, and the institutional set-up in the 
Philippines, as imperfect as it was, became much less of a concern for officials. 
 
BROADER LESSONS 
Ultimately, this thesis attempted to contribute to the existing body of literature by 
providing context to the interests of officials and showing that these interests were 
in and of themselves not a sufficient reason to propose, pass, and execute the 
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reforms.  This thesis has shown that the possible factors and reasons for why 
agents decide to act in a certain manner are more connected to each other than 
most analysts think. 
 
It is inevitable to identify the possible interests that actors who promote pertinent 
policies possess.  However, the previous section and the rest of this thesis 
emphasises one has to consider the interests in a certain context, and ideas and 
institutions provide this.  When it comes to analysing interests, for instance, this 
thesis contributes by questioning how actors considered such to be their interests.  
Scholars should, thus, not assume the interests have an inherent meaning.  
Likewise, institutions provide the circumstances that help actors consider what 
interests that are feasible for them to pursue.  For instance, one could consider 
whether difficulties in passing legislation could be traced back to racial ideas about 
who may benefit from them and whether these racial ideas could have informed 
any interests legislators had or vice versa.      
 
Given the Orientalist literature presented and reviewed in Chapter 2, the role of 
ideas also becomes important when considering the policy-making process.  The 
thesis has established that the belief of actors about Filipinos was an important 
factor to influence other pertinent policies.  It could also be instrumental in 
understanding the ideas-based factors behind why various pieces of legislation 
could succeed or fail.    
 
The application of the 3Is framework to the Philippine colonial situation also 
highlights that ideas involved in the policies may be a product of the interests.  
Some officials put forward policies based on certain ideas.  The ideas behind the 
policies, however, also contain the interests that actors possess. 
 
Based on the Philippine case, institutions have acted as a constraining factor.  
However, they may have also facilitated change.  Based on what the thesis has 
shown, institution-based factors may contribute to change if agents believe that 
they are not fit for purpose.  Chapter 10 has demonstrated that case when the 
existing institutional set-up the US had in the Philippines no longer served the 
original purposes.  The fact that the institutional set-up may contribute to change 
may also indicate that these institutions, when built, reflect the interests and ideas 
behind why they were established.  Additionally, each agent has different agendas.  
Therefore, they could find support from these institutions if it helps them serve 
their interests.   
 
As to whether factors involving ideas, institutions, or interests are most important 
in decision-making, the thesis has shown that the major factors would, to some 
degree, depend on one or the other.  It is thus the hope that this thesis has 
provided an opportunity to demonstrate how the 3Is framework reveals the 
connection between some of the most commonly cited reasons.  In other words, 
this thesis has also hoped to establish how a few of them depend on the others. 
 
This thesis has not sought to directly contradict existing literature that casts the 
US as a positive or negative force.  It does not even disregard the atrocities other 
scholars (e.g. San Juan, 2002) have argued.  In fact, this thesis, where 
appropriate, has shown evidence of some politicians and officials thinking the 
Filipinos negatively.  The thesis has also pointed the environment that would make 
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such thoughts salient.  However, the thesis could not ignore the fact that the US 
has introduced even a limited form of liberal democratic reforms.       
 
Based on everything mentioned, the thesis has hoped to contribute to a more 
insightful and integrated manner of understanding the reasons for why actors 





APPENDIX A: DRAMATIS PERSONAE OF SOME KEY 
OFFICIALS AND POLITICIANS INVOLVED 
 
Emilio Aguinaldo – President of Philippine Revolutionary Government (1898-1899) 
Nelson Aldrich – United States Senator from Rhode Island (1881-1911), a 
supporter of Philippine annexation, and co-author of Payne-Aldrich Act that would 
allow some provisions for tariff-free trade for goods from the Philippines to the US 
Fred Atkinson – American Director of Education in the Philippines (1900-1902) 
Jose Basco y Vargas – Philippine Governor-General (under Spanish rule) (1778-
1787) 
Albert Beveridge (also known as Alfred Beveridge) – United States Senator from 
Indiana (1899-1911), a supporter of Philippine annexation and tariff reduction for 
goods coming from the Philippines 
Edward Carmack – United States Senator (1901-1907), an opponent of an early 
iteration of a tariff bill that would reduce goods from the Philippines to the US 
Josephus Daniels –Secretary of the Navy under Woodrow Wilson (1913-1921) 
Bradley Fiske – Rear Admiral in US Navy under Josephus Daniels who commented 
on US military position vis-à-vis Japan. 
William Cameron Forbes – Philippine Commissioner of Commerce (1904-1909); 
Governor-General of the Philippines (1909-1913) 
Lindley Garrison – War Secretary under Woodrow Wilson (1913-1916) 
Gilbert Hitchcock – United States Senator from Nebraska (1911-1923) who 
pushed for reforms in the 1916 Philippine Autonomy Act or Jones Law. 
Francis Burton Harrison – Philippine Governor-General (1913-1921) 
George Frisbee Hoar – United States Senator, an opponent of Philippine 
annexation 
Luke Wright – Philippine Governor-General (1904-1906) 
William Atkinson Jones – United States Representative from Virginia (1891-1918) 
and author of Jones Law. 
Henry Cabot Lodge – United States Senator, in favour of Philippine annexation 
Samuel McEnery – United States Senator from Louisiana (1897-1910), an 
opponent of granting US citizenship to Filipinos when the Philippines was annexed. 
Frank McIntyre – Chief of Bureau of Insular Affairs during Taft and Wilson 
administrations (1912-1929) 
William McKinley – United States President (1897-1901) who oversaw the 
annexation of Philippines 
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Sereno Payne – United States Representative from New York (1889-1914) and 
co-author of Payne-Aldrich Act that would allow for some provisions for tariff-free 
trade for goods from the Philippines to the US. 
Manuel Quezon – Member of Philippine Assembly (1907-1916); Resident 
Commissioner of the Philippines (1909-1916); later first President of Philippine 
Commonwealth (1935-1944) 
Theodore Roosevelt – United States President (1901-1909) 
Elihu Root – United States War Secretary from 1899 to 1904 under Presidents 
William McKinley and Theodore Roosevelt 
Henry Stimson – War Secretary under William Taft (1911-1913) 
William Taft – Philippine Governor-General (1901-1904); United States War 
Secretary under President Theodore Roosevelt (1904-1909); United States 
President (1909-1913) 
John Patrick Tumulty – Private Secretary to President Woodrow Wilson (1911-
1921) 
Albert Todd – First Education Superintendent of the Philippines during when the 
colony was placed under military rule  
Horace Towner – United States Representative from Iowa (1911-1923) and an 
opponent of Philippine independence during Wilson administration 
Oscar Underwood – United States Representative (1897-1915), House Majority 
Leader (1911-1915), and author of Underwood Tariff Bill 
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